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.although Irving shows no interest in his brother's wel-
fare, Irving's welfare is his brother's concern; more so,
even, than it is their mother's, for Ben has the capacity to
minister, in a pathological way to be sure, to Irving's in-
ner needs. Ben perceives and ministers to the unmet needs
of the whole family; in his strange way he is the only one
who makes living in this family tolerable.
--Jules Henry, Pathways to Madness
From the beginning he had been the one marked--by brute sit-
uation as much as by any gift of hfs-'to understand them all;
.
. . .
And so all his life he had alternated between try-
ing to make peace between them and hating them both, and in
the end he had found he had no choice but to cling to them
stupidly, voluntarily allow himself to be pulled apart,
snarling first at one, then at the other, with angry love.
He was now repulsive to them both. To each he seemed the
image of the other.
--John Gardner, The Sunl ight Dia -
1 ogues
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ABSTRACT
Intrapsychic and Interpersonal Processes in the
Parentif ication of Children
February 1977
Mark A. Karpel
,
B.A., Queens College
M.S., University of Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Harold Jarmon
The concept of parent i f i cat i on organizes a complex web of intrapsy-
chic and interpersonal processes which have long been observed in both
family and individual therapies. Parent i fi cat i on refers to the process
in which one member of a relational system—often a child—comes to act
as an over-responsible caretaker for another member, for several others
or for the system as a whole. This study examines the pathogenic par-
entification of children in family systems— that is, the prolonged and
unilateral use of the child to care for and protect family members with-
out such care being extended in return. Empirical data, drawn from
family therapy sessions of five families and naturalistic home observa-
tions of another, are interwoven with theoretical material from a va-
riety of sources in order to illustrate the concept of pa ren t i f i cat i on
,
to suggest its utility for individual and family therapists and to ex-
amine the theoretical context in which it is embedded. At the same time,
an attempt is made to highlight the interlocking of individual and rela-
tional dynamics which, it is thought, renders complex family patterns
such as parenti f ication most intelligible. Parent i f i cat ion is examined
within the context of dialectical relational theory, which stresses the
importance of conjunctive forces— such as loyalty, commitment and con-
cern-and of relational ba 1 ance--that is, mutual trust, fairness, reci-
procity and accountability—in family systems. It is viewed as a rela-
tional configuration which transcends the acts of any one person and
which is characterized
,
most fundamentally, by imbalanced concern. The
study examines factors within the parents as individuals, within the
marriage and within the child which constitute preconditions for parenti-
fication. It proceeds to trace the complex interlocking of intrapsychic
and interpersonal processes which contribute to the development and main-
tenance of parentif ication. Characteristic patterns of pa rent i f i cat i on
are analyzed, at a functional level--in terms of the various callings, or
roles and responsibilities, of the parentified child--and at an ethical
level, in terms of the child's exploitation in the family system. Next
,
probable effects of parent i f i cat ion on the psychological, psychosomatic
and relational development of the child are discussed. Finally, the con-
cept of the parentified child is differentiated from a number of closely
related concepts in an effort to further clarify its utility and limita-
tions and the theoret ical -context within which it is most intelligible.
XTABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I
Chapter I. Introduction
I
Chapter 2. The Theoretical Context-Assumptions and Amb i gui t i es . . . 1 6
PART I I
Chapter 3. The Families
^
Chapter 4. Pre-conditions
^
Chapter 5. Development 32
Chapter 6. Characteristic Patterns 109
Chapter 7- Effects
> ] /,2
PART III
Chapter 8. The Theoretical Con text--Conceptua 1 Boundaries 161
Chapter 9. Recapitulation and Implications for Further Study 1 80
References
1 90
xi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Families Studied and Sources of Data
, 12
Figure 2. The Families 53
Figure 3. Dialectic of Actions and Expectations 107
PART I
CHAPTER
1
I ntroduct ion
The concept of parent i fi cat ion represents a recent addition to the
theoretical vocabulary of family therapy. Yet, like any important con-
cept, the phenomena it describes are not new. Parent i ficat ion organizes
a complex web of processes which have long been observed in both family
and individual therapies, but only recently bounded, interrelated and
articulated by this concept. These processes include intrapsychic ex-
periences and interpersonal transactions, complementary projections and
introjections, role-assignments and existential commitments among
family members. Introduced by Boszormeny i
-Nagy and Spark ( 1 973) in the
book, Invisible Loyalties: Reciprocity jm I ntergene rat iona 1 Family
Thera Py> Parentification refers to "the subjective distortion of a re-
lationship as if one's partner or even children were his parent" (p.
151). In the case of two adults— a marital couple, for examp 1 e— th i s
occurs when one partner adopts a child-like position, experiencing and
inducing the other to accept a protective, care-taking role and when
the other, in fact, fulfills such a role.
In the case of a parent and child, the distortion of the relation-
ship progresses even further, as the generational differential must
actually be reversed. As Nagy
1
points out, "the person of the child
^The authors indicate in their foreword that, although the book
was written jointly, Boszormeny i -Nagy (to be referred to as Nagy) is
primarily responsible for the theoretical chapters and Spark for those
chapters explicating therapeutic considerations. Unless otherwise in-
dicated, all citations for Nagy are from this source, as are citations
attributed to Spark, 1973.
first must be transformed into that of an imaginary adult" (p. I 52 ).
For this reason, the parent i f i cat ion of children is considered a more
serious and potentially harmful process than the parent i f i cat ion of a
spouse
.
Nagy asserts that parent i fi cat ion is to some extent a natural and
inevitable feature of all parent-child relationships and can even con-
tribute to the healthy development of the child. The parent's occa-
sional and temporary reliance on the child as a support helps prevent
the parent from becoming emotionally depleted and allows the child to
identify with responsible roles for his or her future life. However,
in some families, this reversal of roles becomes the rule rather than
the exception. The child may have to constantly protect, support, nur-
ture or function for a parent who maintains a demanding, dependent,
child-like position. In these cases, parent i fi cat ion disrupts and im-
pairs the emotional development of the child, who becomes so over-
burdened with responsibility that s/he is never given the chance to be
a child— that is, to trust and rely on the parent as a source of care
and support who will act responsibly for the child. In other words,
when parenti f ication of the child persists unilaterally, with no bal-
ance of reciprocity in terms of the parent's availability as a parent
,
parenti ficat ion in a harmful sense can be said to exist. 2
While the literal meaning of parent i fi cat ion denotes the role of
the child as caretaker to a parent, the term will be used somewhat more
broadly in this paper. The parentified child may "answer" a variety of
2
Unless otherwise specified, the term parent i ficat ion will be used
to refer to this pathogenic imbalance in the family.
3"callings- in the family, of which this is only one. 3 The child may
serve as care-taker to one or more siblings or to both parents, act as
a go-between in conflictual relationships-marital or otherwise-or
hold an even broader responsibility to the family as a whole. These
various roles and responsibilities share the essential characteristics
of parent! ficatfon--a premature and excessive burden of responsibility
for other family members placed on a child without balanced account-
ability in return.
Concepts similar to that of the parentified child have been pro-
posed by a number of other theorists. A brief examination of some of
these concepts will highlight differences as well as similarities. One
clearly related concept can be found in Minuchin's ( 1 967 , 1 97^) descrip'
tion of the "parental child."
The allocation of parental power to a child is a natural ar-
rangement in large families, in single parent families, or
in families where both parents work. The system can func-
tion well. ... A family with a parental child may run into
difficulty, however, if a delegation of authority is not ex-
plicit or if the parents abdicate, leaving the child to be-
come the main source of guidance, control and decisions. In
such a case, the demands on the parental child can clash with
his own childhood needs and exceed his ability to cope with
them (197^, p. 97-98).
The use of the term "calling," while somewhat awkward initially,
is based on the decision that it comes closest, in its connotations,
to the central dynamics of parent i fi cat ion . It suggests the child's
recognition of a reality-based need for the duties to be assumed, his
or her acceptance of those duties and, finally, the tremendous influ-
ence they may come to exert over every facet of his or her life.
In keeping with what he describes as a "structural" family perspective,'1
Minuchin emphasizes the "allocation" of "power" and "authority," and,
when excessive, the implicit violation of subsystem boundaries.
Brody and Spark's notion of a family "burden bearer" also resembles
that of the parentified child. In an article on institutionalization
of the aged as a family crisis (1966)
,
they discuss one such person in
particular.
Rose is a prime example of what may be called the familyburdenbearer." This phenomenon appears with striking
regularity and frequency. No matter what number of sib-lings in the family, there is often one "burden bearer "Over and over again the plaint is repeated: "I am always
the one who has taken responsibility for my parent. I amthe one who shops, takes her to the doctor.
. | am the
one she calls late at night if she feels ill." Sometimes theburden bearer" seems to protect her siblings.
. .
. Some-
times the resentment and bitter envy are expressed.
The function of the burden bearer may be to ma i nta i
n
' and
'
support the family role-constellation, even at the cost of
her own individual maturation.
Bearing the burden affords no assurance of reward or recoq-
nition (p. 83).
The authors go on to emphasize the importance of the individual's col-
lusion in the maintenance of this role.
From a very different theoretical and clinical context, Harold
Searles (1971, 1973, 1975) has developed the surprisingly similar con-
Zj
We feel, along with Nagy, that the use of the term "structural"
as a description of Minuchin's approach is somewhat misleading since
Minuchin's theoretical system essent ial ly limits itself to transac-
t iona 1 family structures and does not encompass equally or perhaps
even more important "ethical and existential structures" (Naay, 1975)
in the family. In future references to Minuchin's theory, we will
retain the term within quotation marks in order to acknowledge gen-
erally accepted usage while maintaining our own stance.
5cept of the psychoanalytic patient as a "symbiotic therapist" to his/
her analyst and, by inference, at one time to a parent, parents or the
family as a whole. Searles states:
^vl
C
h
lly
',K
he
VI aduU Patlent ' the more Powerfulhave been the parent(s) transferences (largely unconscious,
of course) to him as being the latter's parent (s). There-fore, whenever the child showed any therapeutic concern forthe parent, the latter reacted to the child as though the
child were the parent's parent (1975, p. 132).
Elsewhere, he describes the "symbiotic therapist' as a
person who.
.
.has not firmly achieved individuation and
whose most deeply meaningful human relationships consist
in his complementing the areas of ego- i ncomp 1 eteness in
other persons. This mode of relatedness is founded upon a
relationship with his mother in which his ego- f unc t i on i ng
was fixated similarly at a level of relatively infantile
fragmentation and non-differentiation, partially because
the precarious fami 1 y- i ntactness required that he not be-
come a whole person but remain instead available for com-
plementing the ego- incompleteness of the others in the
family, individually and collectively (1973, p. 2^9).
SHpp (1973) has conceptualized the relational structure of patho-
logical family systems in terms of a matrix of introjects which parents
require other family members to incorporate and act out, in order to
stabilize the internal system of the parents. Spouses and children are
not seen as separate autonomous individuals, but are pressured to
think, feel and behave in accordance with these introjected images.
Four introjects that the parents employed were noted and
developed into a paradigm.
. . . The good se 1 f - i n t roj ect
. .
.is equated with conformity and security; the bad self-
introject.
.
.with rebellion, lack of achievement, or other
elements threatening security. The good parent introject
. .
.is tied to gratification of needs by their own parents
(the child's grandparent); the bad parental introject.
. .
to perceetior^ of overcontrol, deprivation or abandonment
In this formulation, the child's introjection and active expression of
the parent's internalized image of the good parent corresponds to what
we have referred to as parent i fi cat ion
. In view of his/her frequent
role as mediator in marital disputes, Slipp refers to this child as the
"Go-Between." This is similar to Ackerman's (1966) notion of "the
family healer," who "takes on the role of peacemaker, protector, healer,
or, if you like, 'family doctor'.
.
." (p. 83).
This multiplicity of recent and related concepts lends credence to
the prevalence in family systems of the phenomena described by parenti-
f i cat ion
,
In this paper, we are concerned with the pathogenic parentifica-
tion of children in family systems. We will attempt to clarify and de-
lineate the concept of pa rent i f i ca t i on in a variety of ways. Case
material, from family therapy sessions and naturalistic home observa-
tions of a family, will be used to illustrate the process of parenti-
fication and the nature of the family constellation in which it occurs.
An attempt will also be made to organize the emerging theoretical di-
mensions within which it is felt parent i f icat ion must be understood.
These efforts are seen as complementary-the first, differentiating, as
it were, the "figure" of the concept in terms of the phenomena it en-
compasses; the second, differentiating the emerging conceptual "ground"
within which parent i f icat ion is embedded. We hope, in this way, to
demonstrate the utility of the concept for both indi vidua! and family
therapists, to highlight some ambiguities it poses and, hopefully,
offer some tentative resolutions to these ambiguities.
In this chapter, we proceed to a discussion of the empirical data
to be used, in terms of their sources, criteria for selection, and re-
lative weighting in the paper. Chapter 2 begins an analysis of the
theoretical dimensions which provide a context for the concept of
parentification; it concludes with a discussion of some of the ambi-
guities that concept presents. The chapters which comprise Part II
move to the "figure" of parentification. They employ empirical and
theoretical material in order to illustrate essential patterns and
processes of parentification. Chapter 3 presents a series of brief
descriptions of each of the families to be discussed. The four chap-
ters which follow divide the gestalt of parentification into an analy-
sls of Pre-conditions for parentification (Chapter k)
,
the development
(and maintenance) of parenti fication (Chapter 5), characteristic pat-
terns of parentification (Chapter 6), and the effects of parentifica-
tion on the parentified child (Chapter 7). In Part III, we return to
a more purely theoretical level. Chapter 8 attempts to identify the
sources of the ambiguities described in Chapter 2 and to suggest the
beginnings of a resolution of those ambiguities. Chapter 9 includes
a recapitulation of the major points covered earlier in the paper and
a brief discussion of the implications raised for further study.
Before proceeding, we should point out a meta- theoret i ca 1 bias of
the researcher in this project--a bias which Nagy refers to as "the
interlocking of systems." This involves an awareness of and an attempt
8to illuminate the i nterpenetrat ion of intrapsychic experience and in-
terpersonal transactions. Despite more and more frequent and surpris-
ing convergences between the perceptions of individually- and systems-
oriented theorists and therapists, there remains an (ironically) shared
vision of the two perspectives as incompatible. One important bias
with which this researcher approaches this material lies in a convic-
tion in the possibility and inevitability of discovering a "hand-in-
glove" fit between individual and relational dynamics. This is, ad-
mittedly, a conviction which is easy to assert and more difficult to
demonstrate. We will attempt, within the limits of the data available,
to illustrate this interlocking wherever possible. In his own work,
Nagy signals such an approach by referring to parent i f i cat i on as "one
of those structuring relationship patterns which have overt role as-
signment as well as internal expectation and commitment characteristics"
(p. 15M, This concern with the interlocking of individual and rela-
tional dynamics reflects one element of a broader theoretical approach
which Nagy refers to as dialectical relational theory. Because this
approach represents the framework within which the concept of parenti-
fication is embedded, it will be useful here to briefly describe its
essential outl ines.
Dialectical theory, in general, stresses the simultaneous opera-
tion and creative synthesis of what, from a monothetical viewpoint,
appear to be antithetical forces. In Nagy's words,
The essence of the dialectical approach is a liberation of
the mind from absolute concepts which in themselves claim
to explain phenomena as though the opposite point of view
did not exist. According to dialectical thought, a positive
concept is always viewed in contrast with its opposite inthe hope that their joint consideration will yieVa reso-
rt 1™ * h a more thorough and productive understanding
He stresses that "the dialectical resolution is never a bland, gray
compromise between black and white, it is living with live opposites"
(p. 19).
Dialectical thinking is prominent in several areas of Nagy's theo-
retical approach-for example, in the insistence on subjective experi-
ence as grounded in relational interaction. In Nagy's view, "the dia-
lectical approach defines the individual as partner to a dialogue" (p.
19). It "retains the individual as a center of his universe but views
him in an on to log i ca 1
1 y dependent interaction with his constitutive
others" (p. 3*0
.
The experience of Self depends, for its very exist-
ence, on a matching Not-Self or Other. Relationship, then, is not
merely a bumping together of formed separate Selves but a dynamic in-
terface for the simultaneous delineation of both partner's Selves
against the ground of the Other.
This relationship between experience of the Self and dialogue with
the Other is obviously related to the i n terpenet rat i on of intrapsychic
experience and interpersonal transaction already discussed. Instead
of choosing to largely ignore either systems forces (the pure psycho-
analytic approach) or phenomenological processes (the pure systems
approach), this perspective insists on these as complementary and co-
constitutive realms of relational systems. It becomes meaningless to
try to discuss one without the other.
Beyond this, dialectical relational theory emphasizes the insep-
10
arability and dynamic equilibrium in relational systems of forces such
as autonomy and family loyalty, power and concern, exploitation and
reparation, conflict and reconciliation. The dynamic relationships be-
tween these forces do not disappear merely because they are ignored by
an observer. For example, an adolescent's moves toward his or her
autonomy may create guilt deriving from the violation of family loyalty
ties which, unless recognized and reconciled, can undermine the process
of individuation. In yet another area, we can see the dialectical
outlook in Nagy's assertion that a family "has to obtain mastery of
subgroup antithesis rather than hope for absolute unity" (p. 21).
Finally, dialectical relational theory stresses the dynamic aspect
of family homeostasis. In contrast to more static conceptualizations,
this approach views the equilibrium of family systems as inevitably
disrupted— by change and spontaneous actions of individual members—
and requiring re- integrat ion of change with continuity.
The qualitatively new event will upset the whole principle
of equilibrium instead of simply tilting its balance from
one homeostatic phase to the next.
. . , The prevalence
of movement over stagnation is the essence of the dialectical
view of family relationships (p. 19).
This perception of change synthesized with continuity and resulting in
a qualitatively different balance represents another vital aspect of
dialectical relational theory. Many of these points will be elaborated
later in this study. Having provided an admittedly brief introduction
to dialectical relational theory for the reader, we can move from
theoretical to empirical considerations.
11
The empirical material presented in this paper is drawn from a
variety of sources, including audio- and videotapes of family therapy
and evaluation sessions, case records for these same families, and
written material based on naturalistic observation of a family in the
home. In all, six families made up the initial "sample" of this study.
Information on specific sources of data for each family is summarized
in Figure 1. A number of factors went into the selection of these par-
ticular families. Obviously, the major criterion for selection was
that a pathogenic parent i fi cat ion process, involving at least one child
in the family, be identifiable. Second, with one exception, the ma-
terial available on each family included observation of all nuclear
family members. The exception is the Rosenberg family in Pathways to
Hadness
.
Dr
-
HenrY observes the family without the eldest of three
sons, who is institutionalized. In this instance, it was felt that
the particular nature of the data--natura 1 i st i c observation in the
home, by an anthropologist (as opposed to a psychothe rap i st) --provi ded
a complement to the data from family therapy sessions valuable enough
to outweigh this shortcoming. All other families have the advantage
of having all family members present during the intervals to which we
have access.
This complementarity of data was seen as another criterion in the
selection of materials. Jules Henry's study of the Rosenberg family
focuses on their everyday life at home. It provides a wealth of data
on the observable interactions among family members in their daily
lives together. And this, from the perspective of an anthropologist,
trained in the observation of social systems, who comes to live with
12
Figure 1
Families Studied and Sources of Data
Fami
1
y
Stei n fami ly
Robbins family
Gardner fami ly
Harris family
Lewis family
Rosenberg fami ly
Source of Data
audiotapes of five family therapy sessions,
within the context of a multiple family group
audiotape of one family evaluation
videotape of one family evaluation
videotape of one family therapy session
videotape of one family therapy session^
presented in Pathways to Madness
,
by Jules Henry,
involving naturalistic observation by the
author with a family in which one member has
been institutionalized for mental illness
-'All audio- and videotapes were made available by Dr. Ivan
Boszormenyi-Nagy, Director, Family Psychiatry Division, Eastern Penn-
sylvania Psychiatric Institute (EPPI). Also provided were xeroxed
copies of all case records related to past or present contacts with
these fami 1 i es
.
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the tally for one week. If we imagine the continuum of participant-
observation, from pure participant to pure observer, Henry comes
closest to the role of the pure observer. He is unequivocally, even
if compassionately, outside the system.
With the five families on tapes of evaluation and therapy ses-
sions, we encounter a different level of family life and two different
perspectives on the family. Here, the focus shifts to the members'
explorations of family problems, of the underlying structure of the
family system, and of one another's internal experience of the family.
These sessions were all considered valuable enough to be preserved by
the therapists involved. 6 This type of data gives us greater access
to each person's expression of his/her perspective on the family and
to their joint struggle with long-standing conflicts and family secrets
The therapists occupy positions in the middle of the continuum de-
scribed above. As participant-observers, they move in and out of the
system, and their movement is directed by their commitment, not just
to understand the family, but to help change it. The family members
themselves are "pure" participants in that they are exi s tent i a 1 1
y
com-
mitted to
,
and therefore, irrevocably part of the system. This allows
them to describe the family as experienced by its members, as no one
else can. The fact that they are more likely to do so in these ex-
ploratory sessions than, for example, at home over dinner constitutes
the unique value of this source of data for this study.
The nine tapes used here were chosen after an initial examina-
tion of nearly forty tapes selected, out of the literally thousands
available in Family Psychiatry, by staff members at EPPI as demonstrat-
ing a parent i fi cat ion process.
emma
i ons
Beyond the obje^-rpje of the parentified child, we are concerned
in this paper with the nelatlonal configuration of pa rent i f i cat ion
.
This focus on the relational system as a whole introduces an organiza-
tional dilemma which complicates the presentation of data. This di 1
centers around the choice, either to pursue similarities and variat
across family systems or to pursue the complex i nterconnectedness-the
unity of parts-within any one system, and the difficulty, in a limited
space, of doing both satisfactorily. Our goal is to examine parentifi-
cation as a relational constellation, to explore its relationship to
the family as a whole and to each of its members. This goal, in con-
junction with an interest in the interlocking of systems, dictates the
priority of depth, in the sense of intra-system differentiation and in-
tegration. However, data from more than one family can, by confirming
one another, further clarify significant features of the parentifica-
tion process and, by introducing variations, help guard against the
idiosyncratic parading as the general.
For these reasons, the values and priorities of this study dictate
a particular form of compromise between these choices. One family from
the original "sample" will be used as a primary source of data, a sort
of hub around which other empirical and theoretical material will be
organized. We will attempt to provide a fairly detailed portrait of
the family as a whole in order to convey the role of parent i fication in
the system as a whole. For this purpose, we have chosen the Stein
family, in which the parent i fi cat i on process is most clear and for
which there is the greatest abundance of data. Data from other fami-
lies will be used either to supplement or complement material presented
from the Stein family. Where illustrative material is taken from sev-
eral families, whenever possible, the Steins will be presented first
and followed by the others.
A series of capsule family portraits immediately precedes the
four largely empirical chapters in Part II. Hopefully, this organiza-
tion will simplify the reader's effort to retain some sense of each
family as a whole when specific data are presented in those chapters.
Together, these family sketches constitute Chapter 3.
16
CHAPTER 2
The Theoretical Context
-
As sump t i on s and Ambiguities
As the variety of concepts presented in Chapter 1 suggests, close-
ly related phenomena may look quite different depending on the theore-
tical perspectives from which they are approached. For example, while
they share certain features, the concepts of the "parental child" and
the "symbiotic therapist" contain obvious differences and may have very
different implications for therapy and change. This study proposes that
the phenomena described by parent i fi cat ion can be best understood with-
in a definite theoretical framework. The purpose of this chapter is
to spell out the relevant assumptions and, in a sense, dimensions of
the theoretical context within which it is felt parent i f i cat ion becomes
most intelligible. It is intended, then, as an attempt to help the
reader understand the context in which parent i ficat ion is embedded.
However, the author recognizes that it is, equally, to paraphrase Jules
Henry, an attempt to convince the reader to see these phenomena as the
author does. The reader can decide for him/herself whether the empir-
ical material presented supports these assumptions or others.
Our description of pathogenic parent i fi cat ion has emphasized the
child's sacrifice in the fam i
1 y--mean i ng both his/her self-sacrifice
in the interest of other family members and their willingness to sacri-
fice the child, demonstrated by the absence of balanced accountability
to the child. This double meaning of sacrifice, which is the essence
of parent i ficat ion, directs us to a consideration, at a more abstract
level
,
of concern and ? mba lance in relational systems.
Concern
The virtual absence, until quite recently, of serious attempts to
describe the role of what we shall refer to here as "concern" fn human
life constitutes one of the most puzzling omissions in the literature
of psychology. "Concern" is meant here to refer to a complex of phe-
nomena such as caring, wanting to treat the other fairly, devotion,
empathy, pity, loyalty, self-sacrifice and commitment. Obviously,
these expressions are not synonymous. Loyalty and concern, in parti-
cular, seem to have significantly different connotations, which are,
however, difficult to specify. | n one sense, they differ in their re-
lationship to what Farber (1966) refers to as "will." Concern is gen-
erally thought of as freely given; loyalty, as owed or obligated.
Another difference relates to the realms of experience and action.
Concern suggests an internal experience of the person, while loyalty
more easily connotes both felt experience and demonstrated action.
The concept of "commitment," a critical and largely unstudied pheno-
menon, seems almost to bridge this gap. Our own position is, instead
of attempting to split hairs semant i ca 1
1 y , to consider these as com-
plementary aspects of what Nagy (1975) has referred to as "conjunctive
forces" in relational systems. In this section, we wi 1 1 focus pri-
marily on the concept of concern. However, the approach to parentifi-
cation taken here views both loyalty and concern as vital forces in
individual motivation and relational structuring.
Psychoanalytic theory began with and has been constrained by an
individualistic, quasi-biological perspective, while traditional family
theories have been dominated by a focus on struggles for dominance,
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power and control in the family. These trends have made it nearly im-
possible for an appreciation of the significance of human concern to
emerge in these fields. Instead, the phenomenon of concern has been
not so much denied as eclipsed by a variety of alternative conceptual-
izations
.
Cojicern and pathological gum. Probably the greatest factor in
the relative invisibility of concern has been its transmutation in the
crucible of psychoanalytic thinking into pathological guilt. The con-
cept of guilt has been a cornerstone of psychoanalytic theories. And
the individual- and pathology-oriented biases of those theories have
contributed to a view of guilt as essentially irrational and pathol-
ogical. Psychoanalytic theory developed out of and in response to a
social context in which excessive neurotic guilt played an increasingly
debilitating role in people's lives, and so this was perhaps inevitable
However, the overwhelming importance of this discovery and its poten-
tially liberating effects served to obscure distinctions between path-
ological guilt and constructive concern. More recently, the failure
to discriminate between irrational neurotic guilt and realistic exist-
ential guilt (Nagy, 1973) can be observed in the uncritical acceptance
of an ideology of "autonomy" and "doing your own thing" which pervades
many forms of individual and family therapy.
Winnicott stands out as an early analytic thinker who recognized
that the capacity for guilt reflects a significant developmental accom-
plishment in terms of the infant's growing ability to maintain mature
object-relationships. He asserts that "the sense of guilt, even when
unconscious and even when apparently irrational, implies a certain de-
gree of emotional growth, ego health and hope" (1965, p . 19). It , s
difficult for us to conceptualize the positive aspect, of the involve-
ment-wlth-the-othe r implied in guilt.
.nstead, we envision a polarity
of guilt, as debilitating involvement with the other, and "autonomy,"
as a sort of proud assertion of untouchab i 1 i ty . As Nagy (1973) has
pointed out, this view is inadequate for an understanding of the posi-
tive structuring forces in relational systems. Neurotic guilt stands
in opposition not to pseudo-autonomy but to that positive sense of ac-
countability to the other which plays so powerful a role in close re-
lationships and which we refer to here as concern.
Cc^Tcern and self-interest. A second operation performed on the
phenomenon of concern involves its reduction to self-interest. Re-
markably diverse theories of human nature, within and across disci-
plines such as psychology, sociology and anthropology, have, for the
most part, shared a fundamental bias toward conflict and competition.
The possibility of specifying the historical and socio-economic roots
of this bias is tantalizing but beyond the scope of this paper. We
can, however, note an early and influential proto-type in the Darwinian
notion of "survival of the fittest" and in the social theories it
spawned
.
Traditional psychoanalytic theory has been dominated by the notion
of conflict between internal systems and forces. Jung's (i960) notion
of conflict as only one form of relationship between elements of the
psyche, together with his emphasis on the importance of the "trans-
cendent function," by which opposing elements are creatively synthe-
sized, represents a striking exception to this bias. Social psycho-
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logical and family theories have similarly been more comfortable with
the consideration of competing social interests in a struggle for do-
minance than with the exploration of conjunctive forces in close rela-
tionships. The double-bind theory of schizophrenia (Bateson etal„
1956) provides a typical example. Here, the child is seen as a help-
less victim, forced into submission by the parents' superior ability
to confuse the commun i cat i ona 1 process. An appreciation of conjunctive
forces would suggest consideration also of the role played by the
child's loyalty and concern for the parent in the creation and mainten-
ance of the bind in which s/he is caught.
In yet another social science, the situation has been succinctly
described by Jules Henry (1965):
.
.
.although sociology swells its chest with a thousand
^conflict theories," it has none on compassion. Because,
in the chesty American view, which sociology continues to
express in a supine and opportunistic way, conflict is the
source of all progress. Life without conflict seems stale
tothe American elites; and compassion, which is a low-
paid motivation, has been relegated to the fringes of the
low-paid segments of the culture and has never been a sub-ject for research (p. 197-198).
The point is that this conceptual bias has made it nearly impos-
sible for social scientists to even see_ the expression of concern in
social systems. Instead, behavior is ascribed to various forms of in-
dividual self-interest, such as need-fulfillment, pleasure drives,
mastery, and need for dominance, while interactions are understood as
the outcome of such competing drives between participants. We do not
assert that in any given act, interaction or relationship, such motives
are non-existent, but that they must be appreciated in relation to
forces of concern, loyalty, commitment and devotion. Again, it would
seem that a dialectical relational model can more adequately capture
the complexities of the relationships between these contradictory and
complementary theoretical approaches.
£>ncern and altruism. The re-definition of concern into patho-
logical guilt and self-interest leaves us with the rather mysterious
concept of altruism-a notion which appears to float in space, with
no foundation or connection to the rest of what we are led to believe
of human nature. It is very difficult to conceive of altruism without
immediately asking the question, "Why?" We would never think to ask
why someone acts in self-interest, but we ask, and rightfully, why one
acts altruistically. Unless concern is recognized as an inherent po-
tentiality, "altruistic" actions remain inexplicable. When relation-
ships are seen in terms of individuals locked in a struggle for domin-
ance, altruistic behavior is viewed, at best, as ei ther whims i cal gen-
erosity or inculcated moral conformity. However, when the structural
foundation of mutually satisfying relationships is understood as a bal-
ance of reciprocity between partners in which availability to the other
is repaid by the other's availability to self and contributes thereby
to a relational structure of "basic trust" (Nagy, 1973), the distinc-
tion between "altruistic" and "selfish" acts blurs considerably.
Searles (1973) has expressed this understanding in his discussion of
the infant's need to help his psychologically impaired mother.
The patient.
.
.is not merely a victim exploited by mother
and family; .... It is as much as anything the patient's
nascent capacity for love, and for the development of ma-
ture human responsibility, which impels him to perpetuate
this mode of relatedness. From the not-yet-we 1 1 -d i f feren-
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tiated "selfish" point of view, he strives for his psy-chological and physical survival, to maintain the onlymode of relatedness he knows and hopefully to so en-hance so strengthen the mother as to enable her to ma-
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Unfortunately, Searles' formulation represents the exception rather
than the rule for the bulk of literature in the social sciences.
The alternative explanations described above have been so consist-
ently favored in psychological and social theories that the phenomenon
of concern has been virtually excluded from our understanding of human
nature. Reduced to pathological, irrational guilt, on the one hand,
and to self-interest, on the other, the real foundations upon which
concern rests have been eroded, leaving the pale and essentially mean-
ingless concept of altruism. Some notable (but by no means, exhaustive
exceptions to this trend merit a brief examination.
One attempt to describe concern can be seen in Sullivan's (1953)
discussion of maternal "tenderness."
The observed activity of the infant arising from the ten-
sion of needs induces tension in the mothering one, which
tension is experienced as tenderness and as an impulsion
to activities towards the relief of the infant's needs.
This, in its way, is a definition of tenderness--a very im-
portant conception, very different indeed from the miscellan-
eous and, in general, meaningless term, "love," which confuses
so many issues in our current day and age (p. 39-AO).
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The reciprocal interpersonal process of "empathy," described by Sulli-
van as the induction of anxiety in the infant in response to anxiety
in the mother, might be seen as the sort of primitive, undifferentiated
receptivity from which concern would be likely to develop.
The development of concern has been the explicit focus of D
. W.
cott. In a paper on the sense of guilt, Winnicott (1965) dis-
cusses the complex and natural development of this capacity in the
W i nn i
chi Id.
I shall attempt to study guilt-feeling, not as a thing tobe inculcated, but as an aspect of the development of thehuman individual.
. . . Those who hold the view that mor-
ality needs to be inculcated teach small children accord-
ingly, and they forgo the pleasure of watching morality de-
velop naturally in their children, who are thriving in a
good setting that is provided in a personal and individual
way (p. 15).
Winnicott uses Kleinian concepts to explain the capacity for guilt.
Essentially, this posits the infant's growing ability to tolerate ag-
gressive impulses against the mother as it learns that she will sur-
vive and that reparative gestures can be made. Thus, as Stierlin
(197*0 points out, Winnicott's conception of guilt implies "a willing-
ness and ability to take into account the other, and hence to register
.
.
.the impact of one's aggression on him" (p. 152). Winnicott sug-
gests this development proceeds during the first year of life but ad-
mits that "there are immense difficulties in fixing the date of the
origin of guilt feelings in the normal infant," adding "there is no
need to claim that these things happen very early, although possibly
they do" (p. 2k).
In a later paper entitled, "The Development of the Capacity for
Concern.-Winnicott revises some of his eariier work. A short excerpt
will suffice to convey both the content and connotations of this rare
discussion of the subject.
The word "concern" is used to cover in a positive wav a
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further integration, and furthergrowth, and relates ,n a positive way to the individual's
sense of responsibility, especially in respect of rela-tionsh.ps into which the instinctual drives have entered.
Concern refers to the fact that the individual cares or£Lnd|, and both feels and accepts responsi bi 1 it7TT965,
Another author whose discussion of this subject merits attention
is Farber (1966). His description of "pity" is less in the nature of
a theoretical principle than that of a casual but significant observa-
tion in the context of the psychotherapy of schizophrenia. In an ar-
ticle entitled, "On Therapeutic Despair," he states,
If nothing has been said about the role of pity in treat-
ment, it is because the word is associated partly with
thoughts of condescension and partly with those uncom-
fortable sensations we call "anxiety." It is true that
another's misfortune may arouse fear, as well as self-
congratulation; but it may also arouse pity. I do not
mean sympathy; I mean an actual sensation of pain or
grief awakened by another.
. . , Pity demands an imagin-
ing of the other's particular pain to the degree that the
pain is experienced as one's own (p. 170-171).
The notion of concern is implied, if not d i rect ly stated , in Erik-
son's (1959) concept of gene rat i v i ty . As used by Erikson, generativity
refers to the mature adult's capacity and need to care for and guide
the development of the next generation. He emphasizes the fact that
this is far from synonymous with the ability or decision to have
children and that many young parents suffer from a failure to develop
this capacity. Its connotations of caring and taking responsibility
for another qualify this concept as yet another attempt to describe
the forces we refer to here as concern.
Perhaps the clearest and most emphatic statement of the signific-
ance of concern has been made by Harold Searles in a series of recent
articles (1971, 1973, 1975). In the mt recent (1975), Searles states
the case as fol lows
:
.
.
.innate among man's most powerful strivings towards
his fellow man, beginning in the earliest years and even
earliest months of life, is an essentially psychothera-
peutic striving./ [Psychotherapists merely give expres-
sion to] a therapeutic devotion which all human beings
share (p. 95).
He suggests a reconsideration of the etiologic picture for psychotic
as well as less severely disturbed patients based on this view.
.
. .1 suggest that the patient is ill because of the de-
velopmental vicissitudes of this particular striving,
I
.
.
.assert that j_ know of no other determinant of psy-
chological illness which compares
, in et 1 o 1 og i caImport-
ance, with this one | ital ics Searles1"] (p. 96) .
More specifically, Searles refutes popular notions of the schizo-
Nagy has observed (personal communication) that one limitation
of this formulation is its reliance on a secondary relationship (psy-
chotherapy) to describe a critical aspect of primary relationships
(fami ly t ies )
.
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Phrenic as "overdependent ,<•
"object-addicted,"
"self-centered,"
"nar-
cissistic," and "receptive," as opposed to giving. He suggests instead
that the schizophrenic's
impairment in whole ego- f unct i on i ng , his inability to func-t.on as a whole ndividual, is due most fundamental y oa genuinely selfless devotion to a mother, or other parent
tliVll
th
* .™ ?nt™ ° f Wh°se e 9° funcifonfng regu Wehat he child not become individuated from her (or him)
one
The reader may note the resemblance between this picture and the
presented earlier for the parentified child. We wi 1 1 have a good deal
more to say concerning this resemblance in Chapter 8.
Each of these theorists has attempted, under various labels, to
carve out a place for the role of concern in human life, especially,
in close relationships. But while implicitly interpersonal, their
formulations are, for the most part, individualistic. They focus pri-
marily on the individual's experience of concern, and on its impact
on individual development. The unit of interest is person, not system.
By contrast, Nagy has been primarily responsible for demonstrating the
significance of conjunctive forces such as loyalty and concern, not
only in individual motivation but in the structure of relational sys-
tems as well. His theoretical approach utilizes concepts of loyalty,
accountability and justice to describe processes on a systems level
which interlock with concern on the individual level. For now, we
limit ourselves to a brief illustration of Nagy's approach which will
be examined in greater detail in the discussion which follows.
Nagy stresses the importance of forces such as loyalty and concern
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in relational systems, asserting that "Commitment, devotion and loyalty
are the most important determinants of family relationships" (p. 8).
More specifically, he suggests their role in parent i fi cat ion
.
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56 ,nsat[able unme t needs for comfort-i g. T ese are the parentified children (p. 258).
However, even an appreciation of members' individual feelings of
concern does not suffice for a conceptualization of the structure of
multi-person systems. For Nagy, one vital "medium" which connects
members' feelings with system's structure is the realm of action. When
concern becomes manifest in the actions of members toward one another,
it moves beyond the realm of their separate internal experiences. In
relational systems,
the mutuality of care and concern is not only experienced
by the participants, but it transcends their psychology
through entering the realm of action or commitment to
action (p. 7).
In family therapy,
Expression of concern for the other and accepting recog-
nition of the other's concern lead to changes in~the action
dialogue rather than merely to improved individual insiqht
(p. 93).
This emphasis on acts of concern between members makes explicit what
remained implicit in the concept of accepting responsibility for an-
other in, for instance, Winnicott's discussion of concern.
Nagy considers the most important dimensions of relational systems
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to consist of the dynamic balance maintained between members in terms
of their mutual loyalties, obligations, meritorious acts and inevitabl
exploitation of one another. Temporary or limited exploitation of the
other is an inevitable aspect of partners' complementary self-defini-
tion in close relationships. Moments or areas in which one partner
needs to use the other in ways which violate the other's needs can not
be avoided. Balancing this inevitable exploitation, however, are each
partner's voluntary self-sacrifice for the other, and his/her willing-
ness to be available as an object for the other and to make reparation
for past injuries. In this sense, the most important determinants of
relational systems can be seen in the balance of fairness and recipro-
city between members, which leads inevitably to an ethical approach to
relational systems. It becomes impossible to discuss the interplay of
members' needs, uses and availability for one another in purely func-
tional terms. Nagy recognizes that the concept of justice seems at
first a foreign one to this subject matter but states, "We purposely
chose the word justice because we feel that it connotes human commit-
ment and value in all their rich and motivating power and meaning" (p.
55).
From this perspective, then, concern is seen not only as an im-
portant feeling experienced by individual members of a system but, es-
pecially in its manifestation in responsible action and commitment to
action between members, as a relational force which includes but
transcends members' individual psyches. In addition, loyalty and con-
cern exist as dynamic counterweights to inherently exploitative forces
in relational systems.
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Ont.caly meaningful relationships must be motivated bymutually
.nterlocking patterns of past and presentcern and car.ng, on the one hand, and of possiblploitation, on the other (Nagy, p. k3)
.
con-
e ex-
Our intention in this section has been to demonstrate the recent
emergence and vital significance of the concept of human concern as
a force in individual motivation and in the structure of relational
systems. Concern implies an ability to feel with the other; almost,
we might say, an hiabil_ity not to feel_ w i t h the other. It suggests,
beyond this, some measure of accountab i 1 i tv- that is, a willingness and
ability to act responsibly toward the other and, in so doing, to merit
responsible actions by the other in return. This mutuality of concern
constitutes a "relational structure in which each individual as a sep-
arate entity can draw from or has to be accountable to a just human
order" (Nagy, p. 2h) . We have found it most convenient to refer to
loyalty and concern as a way of designating a constellation of conjunc-
tive forces such as pity, tenderness, devotion, commitment, caring and
self-sacrifice. Our discussion of these forces at such length is dic-
tated by the belief that parent? fication becomes most intelligible
when considered in this context.
Perhaps because an appreciation of concern is so recent, the im-
plications of its vicissitudes in development appear confusing and
somewhat contradictory. For example, Searles lays primary emphasis
in the etiology of psychopatho 1 ogy on the f rustrat ion of the "thera-
peutic strivings" he describes, although he also refers to their simul-
taneous "intensification." Nagy, on the other hand, speaks primarily
°f the exploitation of concern in his discussion of parent i f i cat i on
,
while he also asserts that a parent's refuse, to .How the chi,d to
express gratitude may be harmful. For the we can sidestep
this dilemma since both processes-the frustration and the exploita-
tion of concern-converge in the concept of "relatione! imbalance."
This brings us to the second theoretical dimension we need to examine
in order to understand pa rent i f icat ion in its proper theoretical con-
text.
Ba|ance and Imbalance in Relational Systems
Many of the concepts in current use by family therapists have not
kept pace with the assumptions and realizations upon which family theory
is based. They represent, instead, hold-overs from more individual-
ist i ca 1 ly-oriented perspectives. Nagy asserts that the notion of
pathology constitutes an important instance of this lag in conceptu-
al ization.
Pathology is an individual, medical concept. Its counter-
part on a rnultiperson system level must be defined as a
pathogenic relational configuration (p. 102).
The concepts of balance and imbalance in relational systems represents,
according to Nagy,
attempt [s] to formulate a rnultiperson systemic counterpart
to what psychopathology is in individual terms. [They] im-
ply a minimally two-person system as their unit (p. 100).
The question arises then as to a balance and imbalance of what?
Nagy asserts that these terms always refer most fundamentally to the
balance of justice between members of a relational system—that is,
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between unavoidably exploitative and intentionally reparative actions,
between obligations imposed and discharged, between members' acts of
reciprocity, care and concern toward one another. From this vantage-
point, relational systems become imbalanced when concern in action
flows primarily one way (for example, from child to parent), or when
children are kept in debt to parents by being prevented from repaying
debts in action; when one member is made to serve the particular needs
of other members without being able to impose his/her own needs on
them, or when meritorious actions go unacknowledged and un-returned.
Nagy makes it clear that concepts of balance and imbalance do not
constitute an alternative to those which describe individual psychol-
ogy, but are their dialectical counterparts.
The concept of relational balance does not replace but in-
terlocks with the concept of individual depth psychology
in both its experiential and developmental aspects. A
balanced relationship promotes healthy individual growth
.
. . .
The individual also contributes to the balance of
his relationships through his availability, actions and
personality (p. 100, 101).
The degree of balance or imbalance in a relational system is consti-
tuted by the past and present actions of its members and impinges on
them as either resource or pathogenicity. This provides a language
for discussing the "fit between person and system" (Raush, 1975) with-
out having to sacrifice either. For example, in an examination of the
relational configuration of parent i fi cat ion , a consideration of the
person as a separate, discrete individual is essential. On the one
hand, the chronic imbalance of parent i fi cat ion will affect the "rela-
tional resources" the individual "brings" with him/her to future rela-
tionships. On the other, concepts of healthy individual development
provide an important standard by which to assess the harmful effects of
parenti ficat ion.
Some clarifications are in order here. The first concerns the
tenic aspect of balanced as well as imbalanced systems. Balance is
not meant to imply the absence of imbalance, a static condition in
which injustice and unfairness are non-existent. Rather, it describes
a process in which the achieved balance of justice inevitably becomes
imbalanced but can be rebalanced through the actions of its members.
Nagy implies that this constant fluctuation is not only unavoidable
but potentially constructive for members.
As injury and unfairness become balanced through restitu-
tion, the spontaneity of autonomous motions of individual
members is bound to create new imbalance and new injustice
which, if recognized and faced, leads to a richer, safer
definition of freedom and concern among members (p. 19).
In that it requires a new effort at rebalancing, transitory
imbalance contributes to growth in relationships. Only
fixed, unchangeable imbalance with its consequent loss of
trust and hope should be considered pathogenic (p. 101).
A second point which should be emphasized is that fixed relational
imbalance does not refer to the actions of any particular member of a
system but to the configuration of the system as a whole. So that,
while one member might obstruct rebalancing, "the essence of imbalance
is always a chain of social processes rather than an individual's
initiative or acts" (p. 102). This distinction takes on added meaning
when we try to examine pa rent i f i cat ion as a relational configuration
instead of the action of one parent.
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Lastly, the concept of imbalance should not be understood as im-
plying simply that one or more members benefit while another or others
suffer. This would overlook the mutual but complementar i ly limiting
gratifications in these relationships which underlie the collusion of
even suffering members in maintaining the imbalance. What begins as
imbalance may develop into a relational rigidity or inflexibility in
which members achieve some gratification and some sense of identity,
but at the cost of further growth and individuation through other
roles. Whitaker and Napier (unpublished paper) have referred to this
aspect of relational systems as follows.
A healthy family is one that maintains a high degree ofinner unity and a high degree of individuation. in-
volved in this definition also is the assumption that in-
dividuation in a healthy family makes possible such mobil-
ity that any member can function in any role.
. .and this
flexibility is available in response to a situation and
the impulse or creative moment taking place within the
family (p. 1-2).
We may quarrel with the somewhat idealized tone of this definition
without denying its utility as a descriptive formula.
Nagy expresses a related view in the distinction between genuine
accountability and frozen role obligations.
Fixity of frozen role obligations can be contrasted with
the atmosphere of basic trust existing in a family. Basic
trust, though coined as a psychological stage of individ-
ual psychosocial development, is predicated upon a rela-
tional structure in which each individual as a separate
entity can draw from and has to be accountable to a just
human order. A just order does not imply absence of in-
justices; it implies that genuine accountability should
be a stronger role than any other fixed obligation (p.
2k)
.
We can now briefly examine the relationship between these concepts
of systems ba 1 ance/ i mba 1 ance and the more familiar concepts of individ-
ual pathology and exploitation.
Lastingly unbalanced relationships imply individual psy-
chopathology of at least one of the key participants. Im-balance in the reciprocity of a relationship is never
static or stagnant and unless it can be rebalanced, it canlead progressively to more explosive tension (p. 101-102).
To the extent that fixed imbalance undermines trust and hope, it must
interfere with the individual's ability to develop psychologically and
to invest later in caring, reciprocal relationships. Whether a child
is held "overaccountable," as in the case of a parentified child, or
"underaccountable," as with a spoiled, infantilized child, individual
development is impaired. The debilitating effects of excessive, un-
reciprocated demands are well described in the clinical literature.
The similarly destructive impact of exempting a child from responsibil-
ity for reciprocal fairness to others is perhaps less obvious. It is
recognizable, however, in psychoanalytic discussions of pathological
narcissism (Kohut, I960), in Adler's (1929) formulations of the "use-
ful" and "useless" sides of life, in Erikson's emphasis on the need
for "concerned limit-setting" (1959), and in recent references by a
number of theorists (Searles, 1971, 1973, 1975; Singer, 1971; Nagy,
1973) to the pain of feeling useless to others.
Finally, this explicit concern with the balance of fairness in
relational systems allows us to recognize the implicit assumption of
such a balance upon which concepts of exploitation are based. Exploita-
tion is normally understood as refering to one person using or mis-
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using another. This mistaken equivalence of exploitation with use-of-
the-other derives from the untenable assumption that close relation-
ships can exist in which people do not use one another. It is fostered
by the naive romantic notion that "good" relationships are those in
which partners' needs are perfectly complementary. In fact, such a
situation is non-existent. Partners, as stated earlier, always use
one another. The important question becomes whether one's use of the
other is reciprocated by one's availability for use by the other. And,
although they are often used interchangeably, it is this distinction
which separates use from mis-use. Mis-use implies imba 1 ance-that is,
excessive or unilateral use of the other. And the distinction between
"using" and "mi s-us ing"-that is, exploitation-becomes intelligible
only in a context of reciprocal justice.
The previous discussions of loyalty and concern and of relational
balance and imbalance lay the groundwork necessary for an examination
of the pathological parent i f icat i on of children. They lead us to con-
sider this phenomenon as a particular form of relational imbalance, one
in which the child is called upon to expend far more energy in light of
his/her age in the care of other family members (or of the family as a
whole) than is expended by those others on the child in return.
Parent i fi cat ion is a relational configuration characterized by imbal-
anced concern and imbalanced accountability. Such imbalances would be
natural and healthy were the child and parent roles reversed, since
parenting involves a commitment to a long period of imbalance in view
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of the child's nearly total dependency in early life. Between spouses,
however, such imbalance would be more sharply felt and more harmful
and, reversed between child and parent as in parent i fi cat ion, it is more
harmful still.
What was said earlier of relational imbalance, then, holds equal-
ly in the more specific case of parent i f i cat i on
. Parent i fi cat ion re-
fers to a relational configuration, to a "chain of social processes,"
and not to the acts or initiatives of any one person. It is analogous
to those transactional modes which Stierlin (1974) designates as "co-
vert organizing structures, "which "shape the more obvious and specific
child-parent interactions" (p. xii). Nagy , as we recall, refers to
parentification as "one of those structuring relationship patterns
which have overt role assignment as well as internal expectat i on and
commitment characteristics" (p. ]Sk) . This highlights a distinction
which is easily bl urred--that is, between the relational configuration
of parentification and the object- role of the parentified child.
While the object-role of the parentified child can be discussed in
purely f unct ional terms--i.e., what tasks are performed, what services
rendered— the relational configuration of parentification can only be
fully comprehended by considering the ethical structure of the rela-
tional system as a whole.
Finally, from an intergenerational perspective, parentification
disrupts what Rappaport, in his introduction to Erikson's (1959) work,
refers to as the "cog-wheeling of the life cycles" (p. 15)--the mesh-
ing between parent ready even needing to engage in parenting and chil-
dren needing to be parented, a meshing repeated across the generations.
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Parentification | s at once cause< expression and resuU Qf ^
tion of this "cog-wheeling."
For those familiar with individual and family therapy, a common
response to the concept of parentffication is to find it both compel-
ling and elusive. It may bring into sharper focus processes which have
been dimly perceived by the therapist. But while it seems likely to
dispel ambiguity in some areas, in its present state of development,
it highlights new ambiguities in others. For example, what kinds of
functions are served by the parentified child for the parent or for
other family members? How do we conceptualize the sources of the press
for parentification by the parent, the process of rol e- i nduct ion , and
the complicity of the child? How does parentification interfere with
the child's healthy development? What are its implications for what
have been traditionally seen as forms of individual pathology, but which
may be related to it? How wide is the range of phenomena which can
usefully be encompassed by the term? Often, Nagy and others discuss
parentification as though it refers specifically to cases where chil-
dren assume dutiful, over-responsible roles, while at other times, the
concept appears to expand to include even rebellious, scapegoated and
infantilized roles or, more broadly still, any situation in which a
child's loyalty and devotion to a parent is expressed.
This paper will try to address both the attractions of the concept
of parentification as well as the problems it poses and, hopefully, to
shed some light on both. Most of the questions listed above will be
addressed in the chapters which make up Part II, dealing with the
"figure" of the concept. Ambiguities concerning the boundaries of
parentification will be examined in Part III (Chapter 8) where we will
return to the theoretical dimensions presented here in an attempt to
clarify the conceptual "ground" in which parentification is embedded.
PART II
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CHAPTER 3
The Fami 1 i es
Chapters k through 7 present a detailed examination of patterns
and processes which contribute to, characterize and may result from
parentification. As described earlier, this discussion will be or-
ganized primarily around empirical data taken from therapy sessions
and case records of one family- the Steins. Data from other families
and theoretical material will be used both to supplement and to comple-
ment this primary source of data.
The translation of a relational gestalt into an unavoidably lin-
ear form of presentation poses problems for both reader and author.
The task is somewhat like that of a map-maker who must distort the
three-dimensional shape of the globe to suit the two-dimensional form
of his/her medium. In both cases, the reader's comprehension is en-
hanced by an awareness of these changes and by an effort of imagination
In this case, the presentation has been divided into four major chap-
ters which, despite overlap, seem to represent a logical organization
of the data.
We begin in Chapter k with a discussion of pre-condi t ions for
parentification. This includes a description of factors in the parents
as individuals, in the marriage and in the child which seem likely to
contribute to the imbalance of parentification. Next, given these pre-
conditions, we examine some of the processes in the development of
parentification (Chapter 5). Involved here are both intrapsychic and
interpersonal processes which operate to create and maintain the rela-
tional structure of pa rent i f i cat i on
. Chapter 6 presents a more detailed
look at characteristic pajterns, of pa rent i f i cat i on-those roles, call-
ings and relational configurations which most typify paren t i f i cat i on
"in action." Finally, Chapter 7 attempts to describe some of the
probable effects of pa rent i f i cat ion on the parentified child him/her-
self.
We recognize that these divisions are, to some extent, arbitrary.
A parent's inability to respond to his/her child's own needs consti-
tutes both a precondition and an important characteristic of parenti-
fication, as does the child's concern for his/her parent. Similarly,
the conflictual relationships which the parentified child is often
called upon to "go-between" can be seen as both sources and results of
parentif ication. Hopefully, however, this format provides for the
greatest possible elaboration of these phenomena with the least pos-
sible distortion.
Empirical data in these chapters will be organized according to
topic. While this facilitates a presentation of general characteris-
tics of parent i ficat ion
,
it unavoidably fragments the original coher-
ence of each family. In order to give the reader an exposure to the
family contexts from which data derive, we include here a series of
brief descriptions of each family. The order of presentation corre-
sponds roughly to the relative importance of each family as a source
of data. Names and other identifying information have been disguised
to preserve confidentiality (except in the case of the Rosenberg family
where such measures have already been taken by Dr. Henry). Ages pro-
vided refer to the individual's age at the beginning of therapy or,
in the case of the Rosenbergs, at the time of Henry's visit. In addi-
tion, the make up of each family, |„ terms of all members' names and
ages, is summarized in Figure 2.
The Steins
Norman Stein is 38 years old. His wife, Mildred, is kS. Mr.
Stein is a lithographer; Mrs. Stein worked as a secretary and book-
keeper until the birth of their children, Eva, age 12, and Michael,
age 7. She has been a homemaker since that time. Five years before
their contact with EPPI, Mr. and Mrs. Stein were referred to a private
psychiatrist for evaluation, citing "marked marital difficulties and
a disruption of the entire family situation." In case records from
this contact, Mrs. Stein is described as "a rather gross, unkempt, ob-
sessive compulsive character who does not recognize her own pathology
and is making the environment miserable."
In subsequent case records from EPPI, Mrs. Stein is portrayed as
"not only older but taller" than her husband, as "an aggressive, non-
feminine woman," "belligerent, hateful, resentful and determined."
Elsewhere, however, reference is made to an "underlying depressive
problem" in Mrs. Stein. Records note that "at times she seems to be
extremely unhappy and the entire family is busy trying to console her."
Mr. Stein is described as "a rather passive, dependent character
who is willing to go along with his wife although there is a tremendous
amount of protest." He says that his wife "will not allow him to re-
sist her." In a psychiatric evaluation of Michael and his parents one
k2
year before their treatment at EPPI, Mr. Stein is described as "pedan-
tic and intellectual,
. . .
more intent on expressing his anger toward
his wife than on discussing Michael.- These records describe Mr. Stein
as "very dependent on his wife and.
. .in rivalry with the children
for his wife's attention and affection, yet resentful of this depend-
ency." Case notes from EPPI depict Mr. Stein as "an extremely verbal
but very ineffectual male, who isn't satisfied with his marital situa-
tion and his role as father. He claimed he was unable to do anything
about the family situation."
Eva, 12 years old, is "a rather large girl for her age," dressed
by her mother, in the words of the nursing staff, "like a little old
lady." She acts as "a mother substitute for Michael to the extent that
he is hugging Eva and leans on her shoulder throughout the session."
She is also described as "the life of the Steins." "She functions as
an arbitrator for the parents. She has been quite active in interven-
ing in her parents' arguments in an effort to save their marriage."
It is Michael's poor progress in school and "bad dreams" that
first bring the Steins to EPPI (although Mr. Stein alone and the couple
together have had brief treatment previously in their marriage). Psy-
chological evaluation reveals Michael to be a very bright boy (Full
Scale IQ, 131) who is not working up to his potential. He is very
anxious and fearful. Mrs. Stein requested an evaluation for Michael
because he was playing with matches and trying to watch his sister un-
dress. Parents also describe thumb-sucking, a bad temper and not know-
ing his limits as problems. Case notes from EPPI portray Michael as
an extremely infantilized child, to the point where his mother, even
upon termination of the therapy (with Michael now age 9) continues to
wipe him on the toilet presumably because he cannot do this for him-
self.
The household is dominated by Michael's demands, especially at
bedtime, when one of his parents must either take him to their bed or
lie down with him until he falls asleep. Mr. Stein protests these
indulgences but ambivalently complies himself.
The parents have experienced long-standing marital difficulties.
Five years before family treatment at EPPI, they engaged in marital
therapy for about six months. Marital conflict is revealed in the
couple's inability to discuss virtually any subject without childish
bickering and attempts to overpower the other. In addition, although
the subject is gingerly skirted in the sessions we have on tape, Mr.
Stein notes on his intake sheet at EPPI that his wife and he have
"stopped affectionate relationships years ago."
One outstanding feature of the family constellation is the infan-
tilizing and symbiotic relationship between Mrs. Stein and Michael.
Mr. Stein, while cooperating with this i n fant i 1 i za t i on , is competitive
with Michael for his wife's attention and refers to him in one session
as "that little bastard." While the parents feud over Michael, Eva
mothers him, supports both parents and seems largely to be taken for
granted.
The Steins were seen at EPPI in the context of a multiple family
group. For almost all of their 1-1/2 years of weekly therapy, there
was one other family in the group--the Kerr family. After 18 months
of therapy, the Steins terminated "on the basis of an administrative
decision on the part of the therapists." Case records indicate that
all members except Mrs. Stein expressed feelings of anger and disap-
pointment at the termination. The five sessions to which we have ac-
cess span virtually the entirety of the therapy. The first tape repre-
sents the family's second session. The second and third tapes were
recorded one week apart almost a year after the first. The last two
tapes were recorded, again a week apart, two months later. The Steins
were terminated three months after the last tape was made.
The Rosenbergs
Dr. Henry tells us that Mr. and Mrs. Rosenberg are in their late
forties. They are both immigrants from Jewish ghettos in Eastern
Europe. Abe, 16 years old and the eldest son, is institutionalized
when Henry visits the family. (Henry gives no information concerning
the length of the parents' marriage, length of Abe's hospitalization ,
or his diagnosis.) Their other sons are Irving, age 13, and Ben, age
12. Mrs. Rosenberg holds a full-time job as a file clerk; her husband
works repairing furniture.
Henry describes Mrs. Rosenberg as "the most adequate person in
the house."
Incessantly talking, ordering, driving, nevertheless she
barely restrains within her an explosive mixture of an-
xiety, rage, suspicion, dependency, confusion and feelings
of vulnerability, worthl essness and helplessness.
Mr. Rosenberg is, by contrast, extremely passive and must often be
spurred to action by his wife. Henry notes that for a long time Mr.
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Rosenberg had been too sick to work, so Mrs. Rosenberg worked to sup-
port the family and "kept everything about the children from him.
.
.
to 'protect 1 him."
Mr. and Mrs. Rosenberg are almost completely isolated from one
another. In his week with the family, Henry observes "no word of
warmth, no smile, no expression of consideration passed between hus-
band and wife." Nor does he observe any fighting or disagreement.
Conversation, itself, is rare between these spouses. Mrs. Rosenberg
tells Henry that, while her girlfriends married rabbis, she had "no
luck." Mr. Rosenberg, soon after Henry's arrival, tells him that his
wife is very violent, that she beats the boys with her fist or a
strap, and that she used to beat Abe, who hates her.
Abe appears to have been both brilliant and cherished. He was a
"genius." At the age of three he performed "mental miracles." In
elementary school he was a show-piece. But as he grew older, he became
more resistive and lost all interest in studying. Mrs. Rosenberg tells
Henry that when Abe was two years old, she was already beating him with
a strap. She says that he always believed she and her husband kept
secrets from him and did things for him only to take advantage.
The parents often compare Abe and Irving, and this is a source of
anxiety for them, since they fear Irving will follow his brother.
Irving is a perceptive, exploitative and bullying boy, who is thor-
oughly scapegoated by both his parents and other relatives. But while
he shows the pain of the constant belittling he suffers in his only
meaningful human relationships, Irving is proud and resistive, qual-
ities his parents lack. This serves to fuel their persistent under-
cutting of him, both to his face and behind his back. The relationship
between Irving and his father is especially poisoned. Mr. Rosenberg
seems to both fear and hate Irving, and takes advantage of every oppor-
tunity to criticize, blame or undercut him. Mrs. Rosenberg makes some-
what more of an effort to conceal her dislike for Irving and he acknow-
ledges that she is more sensitive than his father.
Ben used to suck his thumb, hide under a table from strangers,
and, until the age of eight, move his bowels in his underpants and go
to sleep that way. Now, at age 12, he is compliant, obedient and
available to every member of the family. In this family of detached
or hostile relationships, all members are close to Ben. Were he less
actively nurturant, he might fit the role of the "family pet" (Spark,
1973)--harmless, out of the conflictual sphere, giving affection to
everyone, like a small puppy. But Ben is in many ways the "good
mother" in this household. He prepares meals, cleans up, makes beds
and hovers over his older brother, anxiously reminding him to drink
his milk.
Irving beats Ben and delights in treating him as a "slave," but
Ben clearly enjoys this service, and Irving's real dependency is
demonstrated when he climbs into his brother's bed at night and sleeps
snuggled up to him. The boys are isolated from peers and have only
each other to play with. Mr. and Mrs. Rosenberg clearly prefer Ben
to Irving, although they wonder how Irving knows this. Mrs. Rosenberg
chats with Ben as with a woman friend and her husband snuggles up to
Ben when they watch television, occasionally slipping a hand under
the boy ' s but tocks
.
None of the Rosenbergs seem to have any relationships outside the
nuclear family, with the exception of a few of Mrs. Rosenberg's rela-
tives upon whom they are financially dependent.
The Lewises
Diane Lewis is 35 years old and works as a homemaker. Her hus-
band, Edward, is 37 years old, an appliance repairman. The children
are Larry, 12, Steve, 10 and Dale, 5. Edward is described in case
records as "a depressed man" with a history of severe colitis and
readily apparent facial tics. He is also portrayed as angry and con-
trolling, "subject to temper tantrums, particularly outbursts at the
children in which he [is] demeaning and occasionally physically hurt-
ful." He was, himself, constantly demeaned by his own father in his
childhood. Diane is seen as an "angry, competitive woman" who is both
depressed and tearful. She sometimes spends sessions in "sulky sil-
ence." An only child who is unable to see herself as a grown woman,
she is resentful and child-like with her own parents. In her family
with Ed, she vacillates between being a responsible adult and a "tem-
peramental, demanding child."
The Lewises have been married for 1 k years and have experienced
long-standing marital problems. They were referred to EPPI by Larry's
counselor at school and sought treatment in connection with his aca-
demic problems in school and his tantrums and "uncontrollable rages"
at home. While Larry is the original "identified patient," they ac-
knowledge a high degree of discord in the family as a whole.
Larry is seen by the parents as obnoxious, provocative and con-
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trolling. Mr. Lewis appears to project many of his own negative traits
onto Larry and Mrs. Lewis admits that she dislikes Larry and cannot
talk to him. Steve, by contrast, is quiet and quick to tears. He is
"passive and compliant to all demands and then erupts non-d i scr imi n-
ately." The parents see Steve as "like" Mrs. Lewis. He is clearly
preferred to his brother by both parents. Dale is "daddy's favorite,"
"quiet and overshadowed by her brothers." The whole family "speaks at
once for themselves and for each other with little controls or inter-
nal rules." Mr. and Mrs. Lewis threaten to leave each other or to com-
mit suicide, among other threats, quite often.
The Lewis family was seen in a variety of therapeutic modal it ies-
in family and marital sessions and in individual sessions for both par-
ents-on a once or twice weekly basis for 2-1/2 years. They were ter-
minated by administrative decision of the therapists, who felt they had
progressed as far as they could at that point. Material presented
here is taken from a family session six months into treatment.
The Gardners
Wayne and Carol Gardner are 50 and *»5 years old. Carol is a home-
maker while Wayne works as a salesman. The Gardners present an unusual
and somewhat confusing family constellation. Wayne and Carol have two
natural children, Bobbi
, 27 years old, and Wayne Jr., 18 years old.
At the age of 17, Bobbi married and had two children, Davie, now 8
years old and Linda Sue, 3-1/2. The marriage was characterized by
frequent arguments and separations, during which Bobbi returned to her
parents. Over the ten years of their marriage, they spent no more than
a year together at any one time. Both Davie and Linda Sue were legal-
ly adopted by their grandparents soon after birth. Davie understands
that Bobbi is his "real" mother but both children are encouraged to
refer to Wayne and Carol as "mom" and "dad", and to see Bobbi as a sort
of older sister. Davie is especially caught in this web of relation-
ships, torn between Bobbi and his real father, who is viewed by the
family as selfish and irresponsible, and between Carol and Bobbi who
vie for the role of mother.
Wayne and Carol have been married for 28 years. They separated
once when Bobbi was two years old, Wayne seemingly caught in an intense
loyalty conflict between his wife and his mother, with whom they lived.
After a year's separation, they reconciled and moved into a house of
their own. The relationship between Carol and her daughter is espec-
ially strained. Mrs. Gardner appears the most eager to take the chil-
dren away from Bobbi and relegate her to the position of an isolated
"aunt," living in an apartment away from the home. She seems to com-
•
petitively resent Bobbi's returns to the home and her, admittedly in-
sensitive, efforts to control Davie. Wayne cooperates with his wife
but expresses more concern for Bobbi's welfare as well as the grand-
ch i 1 dren 1 s
.
Bobbi is obviously unprepared for motherhood at present. Al-
though 27 years old, she sounds more like a 1^-year-old. She admits
that she was not able to cope with the children and wanted her parents
to adopt them but still feels ties to both parents and children, and
is reluctant to cooperate with her expulsion from the family.
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The Gardners were referred for treatment because of Davie's de-
structive rages in school. Although quiet, concerned and obedient at
home, Davie fights with peers and disrupts his classes. The family was
seen on a weekly basis for a year. Bobbi's husband and Wayne Jr. at-
tended only a few sessions. After one year of therapy, Mrs. Gardner
decided to terminate, with "the rest of the family ambivalently con-
curring." Davie expressed "deep disappointment." Material used in
this study is taken from a family evaluation session at the start of
treatment.
The Robbinses
Sam Robbins is k5 years old and has worked as a drug store clerk
for most of his adult life. His wife, Harriet, is 39 and a homemaker.
Their children are Emily, age 19, and Andy, age 8-1/2.
The family displays a history of serious disorganization. Both
parents have suffered "nervous breakdowns" and been hospitalized, Mr.
Robbins \k years ago for several months and Mrs. Robbins for three
weeks around the birth of their son eight years ago. Emily was hos-
pitalized briefly at EPPI several months before the parents sought
family treatment. They did so when referred by the Outpatient Depart-
ment where they had brought their son for evaluation in connection
with "emotional difficulties" and unsatisfactory adjustment in school.
Emily was hospitalized again for several weeks soon after family
treatment began.
Mr. Robbins is extremely inadequate as a husband and father. His
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wife and daughter constantly belittle and insult him. He has a long
history of psychosomatic complaints and is obsessed with his own (and
his son's) health. He is extremely anxious and generally fearful of
any kind of physical exertion. Mrs. Robbins, partly in consequence,
is primarily responsible for the family; she complains that her hus-
band had her lifting heavy furniture when she was eight months preg-
nant. She is both resentful and contemptuous of her husband, complain-
ing that he is not a "man" and never treats her like a woman.
Emily, while expressing contempt for her parents and asserting
her independence from them, in actuality, rarely leaves the home. Al-
though 19 years old, she has the high-pitched whiney voice of a small
child. She is ashamed of a serious acne condition and refuses to
look for a job, waiting instead for a man to come along and marry her.
Andy is an extremely anxious boy who has difficulty in school, cannot
relate to peers or adults and has a history of asthma and enuresis.
The Robbinses were seen weekly In family therapy for four months.
After that time, a struggle developed between parents and therapists
over treatment for Emily. The parents insisted on full hospitalization
while the therapists felt partial day care was preferable. When Mr.
and Mrs. Robbins refused to accept this plan, Emily was discharged and
the family referred elsewhere for treatment. Material presented here
is taken from a family evaluation session at the start of treatment.
The Harrises
Patricia Harris is 29 years old, a homemaker. Her husband, Bob,
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is 37. He has held a number of different jobs, most recently working
as a roofer and machinist. They have one child, Brian, who is 7-1/2
years old. Bob and Pat have been married for 11 years. It is Bob's
second marriage. They separated briefly five years ago.
Bob is described in case records as passive and dependent. He is
quiet and, if he disagrees with Pat, generally does a "slow burn," oc-
casionally exploding as when he put his fist through a wall. Pat feels
that Bob takes no responsibility "as a man, father or husband." She
appears "sad and dejected," but on one occasion "pulled a gun" on Bob
after she felt he was paying too much attention to a girl at a party.
Neither feels they can communicate with the other. Brian, who attended
only a few sessions, is seen as quiet but disruptive and attention-
seeking when tension mounts between his parents.
The Harrises sought treatment for their marital problems. They
attended marital therapy, with occasional meetings with Brian, on a
weekly basis for six months. At that time, they missed several ses-
sions due to a physical illness and then opted not to return to treat-
ment. Material used here is taken from a therapy session about mid-
way through the course of treatment, with all three family members
attend i ng
.
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Figure 2
The Fami 1 i es
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Norman, 38
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Eva, 12
Michael, 7
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Larry, 12
Steve, 10
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The Harrises
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Henry provides neither first names nor exact ages for the parents
in this fami
1 y
.
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CHAPTER h
Pre-condi t ions
By definition, the relational imbalance characterized by parenti-
fication of a child involves, in some form, a faiUjre of parenting
.
This failure includes what Minuchin e_t_ al_. (1967) have described as
the "executive functions" of the parents, but goes beyond this to in-
clude what Sullivan might have described as a failure of "tenderness."
This refers to the parent's inability to respond to the child as a
separate, autonomous person with his/her own needs. Both processes
constitute a failure of "responsibility" as the term is used by Buber
(1965) who stresses in "response-ability" the ability to respond to
the otfier. We will want to examine both of these factors, as well as
their possible origins, in order to understand the obstacles to reci-
procity which are both pre-conditions and outstanding characteristics
of parent i ficat ion
.
We begin by considering possible sources of this
parental failure and proceed to examine its expression in areater de-
tai 1 .
The major source of this failure of parenting in the families ex-
amined here can be traced to developmental deficits in the parents'
own lives, deriving from experiences in their own families of origin.
This assertion, while far from revolutionary, is we 1 1 - i 1 1 us t rated even
ith the scant i n te rgenerat i ona 1 data available for these families and
lends credence to Nagy's i ntergenerat iona 1 perspective on the origins
of s uch fa i 1 ures
.
Speaking specifically of parent i ficat ion , he states:
w
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con^ists'of'^
9ratifi
?
ation inh
-ent in parent i fi cat ionnsists of the parents' utilizing the child as a pos-sess ion for the purpose of unconscious undoing of earlyobject deprivation experiences of their own (p. 379).
More generally, an emphasis on the mu.l t igenerat ional context of justice
in family systems represents an essential facet of Nagy s theory.
Sine* the reciprocity of parent-child justice is based on
a minimally three-generational context, what remained un-balanced in one generation is expected to be balanced inthe next (p . 86)
.
Within this context, an important concept is that of the "revolving
slate," which describes the process whereby
.
.
.the unsettled account that stands between a person
and the original "culprit" can revolve and get between
him and any third person. An innocent third person may
be used (scapegoated ) as a means for balancing the ac-
count each person is programmed to seek a fair bal-
ance of give-and-take between himself and the world.
The extent of his sensed imbalance of justice determines
the degree to which he will exploit all later relation-
ships (p. 66).°
It is precisely this sense of deprivation and injustice which pervades
the experience and the behavior of most of the parents in our sample
In relation to their own parents and families of origin.
This concept may remind the reader of the psychodynami c notion
of displacement. While they are related, there are two significant
differences. The revolving slate describes a facet of relational
systems while displacement denotes an individual defense mechanism.
And while displacement suggests what may happen to one person's feel-
ings or experience, the revolving slate traces accounts of justice
between persons, accounts which transcend both their separate experi-
ences
.
56
Relatively speaking, the most detailed intergenerat ional data we
have concern the Lewis family. In an initial evaluation for therapy,
the therapist describes Mrs. Lewis at age 35.
She expresses a combination of anger and yearning when
she talks about her relationship with her parents Herfather.
.
.according to Diane is self-centered and un-
able to focus on her needs. ... She views him as giv-ing little to her or to her mother emotionally. Diane's
mother is depressed and isolated. Diane sees her mother
as treated badly by her father but feels helpless to do
anything about it.
. . Diane's mother responds to
Diane|s problems by saying, "I wish I could help you but
I can't." Thus, Diane has been the burdened one in her
own family of origin. She stated in one session, "I help
my mother a great deal instead of her helping me. She
leans on me so I cannot go to her."
This excerpt is noteworthy not only for the sense of deprivation con-
veyed but for its depiction of Mrs. Lewis' pa rent i f i cat i on in her own
fam ily of origin.
The same note describes Mr. Lewis, whose father died eight years
earlier and whose mother lives alone. Mr. Lewis says he
.
.
.does not see her often. When he calls her on the
phone he becomes aware that she is not listening to him
and will point this out to her. He says that he does not
care, but it is apparent by his increased speech, facial
tic and anxious, restless movements that he cares very
much
.
An early progress note details the following observations. "Both Mr.
and Mrs. Lewis have talked at length about their intense, unfulfilled
yearning for their own parents' acceptance, approving and caring."
The couple's feelings of angry deprivation are acted out in an incid-
ent in which they need financial help for one son's bar mitzvah. They
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make casual mention of the bar mitzvah to M
being in their own minds a request for help
rs
.
Lewis' parents, this
•both Diane and Ed expressed feelings of rage because
parents "would not" help out.
. . . They did not ask
ctly for help and yet, came away feeling hurt, reject
and angry.
The termination note records Mr. Lewis' gradual awa reness "of his
long-term competitiveness with his sister for his mother's affection,"
"of his helpless feelings when his father demeaned him." This final
case note also describes the expression of Mrs. Lewis' resentment and
deprivation with her own parents.
Diane's struggles with her parents have been the focus of
much of her treatment. She is an only child and has been
unable to see herself as an adult woman with her own
family. With her parents, she is still the resentful,
begrudging, angry little girl. Diane's interactions with
her parents have the tantrum-like quality of a child who
wants her way and will prevail no matter what.
In the Stein family, Mr. Stein's sense of injustice in his own
family of origin is expressed in one session.
MR. S: I was always the insignificant one. I was the one that was
literally screwed out of thousands of dollars. With my own fami-
ly- ... I was the one that was cut out as far as certain edu-
cat iona 1 opportun i t i es . I . . . tol d them all to go to hel 1 . .
My brother and my mother [cut me out] . My mother used whatever
influence she had on me to sign over certain properties to my
b rother
.
We are also told that Mr. Stein "has come from a broken home and does
,
in his discussion of his relationship with his father as a child,
not want to have the same thing occur with his own children as happened
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wi th him."
Mrs. Stein may represent an exception to this pattern or at least
a more ambiguous picture. Her father died one year before the family
entered therapy. She describes a lack of demonstrated affection be-
tween her father and herself but also states that she, the youngest
child, was his favorite. Her father "used to tell me stories to put
me to sleep." Significantly, the only area in which we sense real love
in Mrs. Stein in her current family is in her description of singing
her son, Michael, his "goodnight song." It is also noteworthy that
Michael's excessive demands at bedtime constitute the original reason
for this family seeking treatment.
We know even less concerning Mrs. Stein's relationship with her
mother, now 80 and living with a sister whose "rivalry" with Mrs.
Stein "goes back to the earliest years." Mrs. Stein is not close to
any of her siblings. Her mother attended one session with the family.
We are told that Mrs. Stein, far from her usual nagging self, was
"like a docile child, eager not to displease her mother." However,
in another session, Mrs. Stein reports that she and her mother "don't
get along" about a lot of things and Eva volunteers that they "fight
like cats and dogs." Thus, in Mrs. Stein's case, the data are too
fragmented and contradictory to yield any conclusive picture.
The sense of exploitation and injustice is obvious in Jules Hen-
ry's one comment on Mrs. Rosenberg's family of origin.
Mrs. Rosenberg is one of five survivors out of eleven chil-
dren. Though she resented her father, who preferred her
sisters, Mrs. Rosenberg, always considered the "mean one"
in the family, took care of him in his old age. [In addi-
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t.on one sister] continued to live with the Rosenbergs
until she herself got married. ... she complained thather father would not let her sleep in the same bed withher husband "because it wasn't orthodox.
. And
with"" (p^^Zr^
1 ^'" S3id
'
" and ^ n ° b0dy t0 Sl6eP
Of Mr. Rosenberg's family we know even less. However, Henry includes
an incident from Mr. Rosenberg's childhood which has a curiously simi
lar feel ing.
One day in the cheder [Hebrew school] he says, some rich
kids tore some pages out of the Torah and blamed him
and since he is of a poor family, the me lamed
,
or teach-
er, who also happened to be his mother's brother, beat
him bloody, and his mother beat him too, even though he
denied having had anything to do with the mutiliated
Torah. After his beatings he never went back to the
cheder (p. 125)
.
Finally, in the Gardner family, we learn that Mrs. Gardner's
relationship to her step-father was painful and she felt
criticized.
. . .
She was held strictly accountable for
the other children, even being punished when they did not
behave properly,
providing another instance of a parent in something like a parentified
position in his/her own original family.
These descriptions of parents' relationships in their own fami-
lies of origin are sketchy yet fairly consonant. They suggest a re-
lationship between the parents' sense of deprivation and exploitation--
a sense of having been somehow "short-changed"-- i n their families of
origin and their subsequent difficulties in parenting their own chil-
dren. A variety of more specific mechanisms of connection between
these two sets of phenomena might be asserted but not supported with
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the limited data available here. In any case, we can safely assume
that early deprivation in their own families of origin constitutes one
major obstacle for these parents in both the development of skills and
the exercise of reciprocity and sacrifice required for parenting.
However, this does not constitute the only source of such obsta-
cles. It seems likely (although not applicable to the families stu-
died here) that another important source may lie in what we might re-
fer to as the "factfcity" of relational systems. The term is borrowed
from existential philosophy and suggests that family systems, like
their individual members, are subject to vagaries of existence which
have serious implications for their structure and perhaps even their
survival. The loss of a parent through death, desertion or divorce,
the birth of a mentally retarded child, the loss of a child at birth-
all may create "legacies" which affect individual members as well as
future generations of the family. M i nuch i n e_t a_l_. (1967), in their
study of ghetto families, emphasize the relationship between the fre-
quent absence of a father or stable father-figure, the mother's sense
of powerl essness and her dependence on a "parental child," usually an
older sibling. Families with a large number of children may similarly
overburden the parental system, Nagy has even suggested that parenti-
fication may be related to an "ove r- 1 oad i ng" inherent in the nuclear
family itself (p. 162).
In summary, a variety of factors -- i nc 1 ud i ng early deprivation and
exploitation in the parents' own lives, stemming from experiences in
their original families, as well as various aspects of the facticity
of family life, such as the loss of one parent or a large number of
children, can be seen as contributing to the failure of parenting which
is a major pre-condition for parent i fi cat ion
. We can now examine this
component of parent i ficat ion in greater detail. To do so, we consider
both the outward forms it may take and the essential parental respon-
sibilities which may be relinquished.
The most obvious manifestation of this failure of parenting is
constituted by the parents' neediness, dependency and extreme immatur-
ity. An opening note on the Lewis family describes the parents as
fol lows
Mr. and Mrs. Lewis both present themselves as extremely
needy, dependent people. Mrs. Lewis is depressed and on
the verge of tears quite frequently as she talks. Both
the Lewises cried when they spoke of their desire to lean
on the other only to find that the other one wants to
lean on them.
We have already noted a case description of Mr. Stein in which he is
portrayed as "very dependent on his wife and. . .in rivalry with the
children for his wife's attention and affection.
. .
."
The absence of a clearly felt distinction between adult and child
is a hallmark of this immaturity on the parent's part. Again, the
Lewis family is described.
The whole family speaks at once for themselves and for
each other with little controls or internal rules; each
appeared to vie for the therapist's attention and it
is difficult at times to differentiate between parent and
chi Id.
Case notes on the Robbins family observe:
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• •
.it became quite clear that the problems of the Rob-b.ns children were really a reflection of the extreme im-
maturity of their parents.
. . . [The father] handledhis family role very poorly by passively encouraginq his
wife and ch.ldren to treat him more like a child than asthe head of the fami ly
.
A progress note on the Stein family refers to
• •
.the collusiveness of the parents to remain children
and not to accept the responsibility of parenthood. Con-
sequently, the children do not get treated as children.
In one session, Mr. Stein engages Eva in a lengthy debate, trying
to get her to admit that her quarrels with her brother are just as
foolish and petty as those between himself and his wife. Eva insists
they are not. And although Eva's depiction of the maturity and fair-
ness of their sibling quarrels strains credulity, what is significant
is that this 39-year-old man is reduced to trying (and failing) to get
his 12-year-old daughter to admit that she and her eight-year-old
brother are as immature as thei r parents. Mr. Stein himself, in an
earlier session, summarizes the state of affairs when, in response to
his wife's declaration that he has for once acted his age, he seems
to agree. He says, as if quoting, "So many of us grow old; so few of
us grow up."
The most dramatic demonstration of this confusion of adult and
child roles takes place when Eva, in tears, describes her anger and
pain in response to a fight earlier in the week with her father.
EVA: I'm crying because all my life, my parents have rejected me as
a person. They say, "Have feelings.
. .
." [Mrs. Stein inter-
rupts here but is silenced by a therapist so Eva can finish.]
".
. .but don't express them. You're not a person. You have no
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rights.
.
.
.And I tell you and you smile and smile and I start
t0 Cry
,l.;_,V
And
'
h3Ve P° ri 9 h ts, as a person, or individual
as a child because a child has no rights. "They don't know anybetter.
. .
." And I asked my father fifteen minutes after the
screaming and yelling, what makes him an adult.
MR S: (softly) And he couldn't answer it.
EVA: That's right. You couldn't. [There is silence except for Eva's
crying. Therapist 1 asks Eva what her place is in the family] Idon't even know what an adult or a child is, so I can't very wellknow my place. I, in effect, also asked my father that, you
know, what's an adult? What are you? And he couldn't answer.
I don't know.
Another common aspect of this parental failure is an obvious abdi-
cation of responsibility by one or both parents, often either implicit-
ly or explicitly attributed to the intractability of the other. In
one session, Mr. Stein says that, in the past,
I expressed my opinions. I was willing to fight for what
I thought was right. I tried to convey my ideas to her
[Mrs. Stein]. I've matured enough to know there's not a
damn thing I can do. I accept the inevitable.
In another session, discussing Eva's intervention in his parenting
Michael and his subsequent rage, he says, "I think if Mildred had been
there, I would have said to hell with the whole goddam thing and
walked away." In the referral letter dating from five years before
the family sought therapy, a therapist describes Mr. Stein asserting
that Mrs. Stein "will not allow him to resist her. . . ." He adds,
My general impression of the husband is that he is a ra-
ther passive, dependent character who is willing to go
along with his wife although there is a tremendous amount
of protest.
This perception is consistently verified by interactions in the family
therapy sess ions
.
When Eva, approaching puberty, expresses strong discomfort with
the kind of physical affection she receives from her father, her mo-
ther consistently obstructs any discussion of the subject. Mr. Stein
makes some weak attempts to support Eva's concern, but to no effect.
At the next session, he reports, in typical fashion:
f^M
t°
1
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CUSS Eva
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MI1 dred and I, and the wholeamily, several t.mes, and it got no place. Mildred com-
P etely dismissed it and if
, had pushed it any further
t would become a violent.
. .thing, and 1 dropped it.
'
I d.dn t think any purpose would be served by the violence.
In the Rosenberg family, Mr. Rosenbe rg says
that he never really gets angry and that his wife never
really gets angry at him because he is not the type thatfights back (p. 127).
He reports that
his wife is very violent. She beats the boys with her
fist or with a strap when she gets very angry, and she
used to beat Abe, who hates her,
adding that "He [Mr. Rosenberg] can handle her. ... He protects the
children from her rages" (p. 126). Henry remarks on Mr. Rosenberg's
general passivity and lack of involvement in the home and on the con-
tradictions inherent in these statements. (How wel 1 can he protect
the boys if Mrs. Rosenberg can beat them with fist and strap.) In
doing so, Henry makes clear to what extent Mr. Rosenberg has abdicated
responsibility for protecting and parenting the boys.
One constellation of parental responsibilities which may be re-
linquished by parents has been referred to by Minuchin et al . (1967)
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as the "executive function." Discussing families without fathers,
they state:
The mothers seemed to see themselves as powerless help-less, and overwhelmed by the children's demands, 'usuallythe mother would finish by demanding protection and pity
.... She would express her impotence.
. . When a
child asked for parental guidance, the mother would re-
spond with a counter-demand for the child's autonomy.
Our conception of the parental response and the relinquish-
ment of the executive role was that it pushed the child
to look to his siblings in search of guidance, control
and direction as to how to cope with the familial and the
outs.de world. The "parental children" to whom authority
was allocated by the parents and/or the siblings became
the source of reference for executive guidance and con-
trol (p. 11).
This is no less applicable to two-parent families. The parents' aban-
donment of responsibility for guiding the child in coping "with the
familial and outside world" is a hallmark of parent i f i cat i on
.
In one session, the Stein family discuss an incident in which Eva
felt that Michael wanted to eat an overly large piece of cake. Mr.
Stein allowed him to do so in order to teach him a lesson, even though
Eva felt it might make him sick. (While this clearly reflects Eva's
over-protect i veness towards Michael, significantly Mr. Stein never
rejects this as a real possibility.) Eva intervened to point this
out, prompting an angry tirade from her father.
EVA: I just couldn't stand there and see Michael get physically ill
to teach him something. It's like putting a child's hand in the
flame to teach him that it hurts. ... I couldn't stand it
when.
. .1 could do something about it . . .
MRS S: Can't you give Mikey credit for having a little bit of sense
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What is fascinating in this brief interaction and its context is that
nobody questions the indication of both Eva's and her mother's re-
marks. Eva should give Michael credit for having a little bit of sense,
but not Mr. Stein. This interchange, uncontested by the family, the
other group members or the therapists, presumes a father who either
does not know or care to protect his child. The only question is whe-
ther Eva or Michael can best monitor Michael's behavior; never whether
Mr. Stein can.
When Eva brings up her recent discomfort with her father's phy-
sical affection toward her, both parents' inability to deal with the
issue of her change from child to woman, their failure to offer any
kind of help or solution to her, is painfully clear. Therapist 1
brings up the inevitable feeling of loss and asks Mr. Stein if it
pleases him to hear what Eva is saying.
MR S: Yes and no. It pleases me that she recognizes the affection
and yet it doesn't because at this time I'm ill-equipt. I don't
know how to cope with it. I don
' t know how to handle it.
This is repeated consistently. In the next session, after Mr. Stein
describes the intervening week in terms of his relationship with Eva,
Mr. Kerr (father of the other family in the group) comments that he
seems uncomfortable.
MR S: I am uncomfortable. I don't feel secure. I don't know which
way to cope with the problem of. . .
How do you think that makes Eva feel, when you don't feel se-
cure?
Probably equally insecure. [Silence]
MR K
MR S
Later in the session, a similar exchange takes place.
K\he°™:?;
haVS VOU re," ed to Eva "V dlfferent.y th., week fromth past?
MR S: I don't think so. I don't k now
.
MR K: My God, if you don't know, how
' s she supposed to know!
We can recognize the unfairness of Mr. Kerr's implied blame of Mr.
Stein for not having a solution, but what remains significant is that
this is, in fact, what Eva experiences.
Nor is Mrs. Stein of any greater help to Eva. When Therapist 1
finally rephrases the issue in terms of Eva's growing awareness of
sexual feelings and asks the parents where this leads them, the re-
sponse is a long silence. Therapist 1 asks if they have heard him.
MRS S: Yes I did. I don't know how to answer you. [Silencel Isthere an answer to it?
Th Do you have any discussion on it, the family?
Mrs. Stein responds by denying the problem exists and simultaneously
suggesting that Eva will "get over" these sexual feelings! Therapist
2, allowing this for the moment, asks what happens in between.
MRSS: (softly, unsure of herself) I don't know. It's just something
she 11 have to understand herself and realize, deal with.
Finally, Eva asks to speak and suggests that her father will have to
find a new way to relate to her.
The lengths to which these parents may go to avoid responsible
action in relation to their children is dramatically, if glibly, sug-
gested in the following interchange. Mrs. Keer, trying to provoke
Mrs. Stein into dealing with the question of Eva's sexuality, asks
how she would feel if Eva became a prostitute. She responds, "I'd
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have to accept it, wouldn't
.
?" One of the therapists sums up the im-
pact of this executive failure on Eva by saying,
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and ar° Und 3rOUnd; and nothin^n e o Eva's feel.ngs are resolved at all.
The situation issimilar in the Lewis family where the parents'
undependability is dramatized in an opening note which details that
"Mr. and Mrs. Lewis threatened to leave each other, commit suicide,
and other similar angry threats very frequently." In a session with
this family, one therapist observes,
[It's] like there's four of you arguing about who's going
to do the dishes, instead of two parents making decisions
about how the family's going to run.
Finally, this type of situation is well summarized in the case records
for the Robbins family.
•
.
.it is obvious that part of the difficulty stems from
the fact that both parents are so pre-occupied with their
own unsatisfied needs, that they lack the drive and the
energy to be effective as parents. Both Mr. and Mrs. Rob-
bins unconsciously hope their children will find their own
way to cope with their problems or that some outside agency
or person will give them the direction which they need.
We have already asserted that, while important, this failure of
the parental executive function is not sufficient for an analysis of
parenti fi cation. In order for the parent's reliance on the child to
proceed to such an extent that the relationship becomes essentially
unilateral, the parents must be also unable to respond to the child's
real needs. The child is seen, then, not as a whole, separate experi-
encing center but as en object of the parent's experience. The parent
needs the child to fulfill a certain role. Any expression of the
child-autonomy, affection, neediness, hos t i 1 i ty-wh i ch contradicts
this role is experienced as a threat to the parent. As Slipp (1973)
states
,
.
•
.the parents in our study seemed unable to be sensit-ive and respond appropriately to the needs of their chil-dren as .ndependent persons. The child was seen in terms
of the parents' intrapsychic needs, thereby not validat-ing his own feelings and thoughts (p. 383).
This parental i nsens i t i v i ty often strikes the observer as a baffling
derailment of what would seem a natural impulse. In the sense in
which Sullivan used the term, it resembles a failure of "tenderness."
In this, the situation of the parentified child is no different from
that of the scapegoated or infantilized child, since this parental
insensitivity is both pre-condition and hallmark of all forms of ex-
ploitation or relational imbalance.
Our first exposure to the Stein family is instructive in this re-
gard. Ostensibly a casual conversation, a sort of break in the long
therapy group, the brief interaction between Eva and her mother is a
revealing one. Mrs. Stein is describing a teacher of Michael's who
had not planned a Halloween party for her class. She goes on to de-
scribe how after "four mothers failed" Mrs. Stein talked her into hav-
ing the party. Her recital emphasizes her clever strategy (essential-
ly, shame- i nduct ion by asking, "How could you relax with 30 mothers
discussing you that evening?"), her own noble sacrifice ("Smart woman.
She had an appointment at the hairdresser. I didn't mind. Cost me 3
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or
* *U.r,...), and through l t,„, her determined and effective in-
tervention on her child's behalf. Michae! tries to talk up but his
-ther ulta over and for him. Eva tries to say something, fails, and
t r i es aga i n
.
EVA: Mom, I have a teacher like that
S
rooi
C
teacner7
nhaPPy
" ^ ln" r"**'«> *ich one? The home-
EVA: No, gym. She doesn't listen to me.
EVA:
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MRS S: (interrupting) She said, "Don't breathe down my back. Yourbreath stinks." A teacher saying that to a pupil. | sn 't it
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Eva's contribution to the discussion is instantly experienced by her
mother as a refutation to her presentation of self as assertive defend-
er of her children's rights. She seems incapable of responding in any
less self-centered way. She rushes to change the s ubject-- i nci denta 1
-
ly, to one which must be embarrassing to Eva--and regains control of
the interaction by relegating Eva to the position of a sort of ventril-
oquist's dummy, who is not even permitted to finish her lines! Mrs.
Stein then attempts to recoup by expressing her anger and the rationale
for her inaction.
At a point much later in the therapy, Eva is crying and expressing
her hurt in response to her father's rage at her for intervening when
he allowed Michael to eat the cake. Therapist 2 comments.
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Right now, I see real pain in Eva, but I see absolutely none inMr. and Mrs. Stein. They just sit there
MRS S: (interrupts loudly) | fee l it, dear.
T2
: You don 1 1 show i t
.
MRS S: (self-satisfied tone) I feel it very deeply
you both can augh and look at each other, and almost form somek i nd of un i t in here.
.
.
MRS S: (interrupts) No, I was just trying to explain to her aboutthis morn i ng
.
12:
^
But you had a way of really denying the pain that Eva was feel-
i ng.
Later in this session, Mrs. Stein's real bewilderment over how to even
try to respond to and comfort Eva is made clear.
Tl: My comment was that you don't respond to Eva.
MRS S: (in a huff) I think I do. I always said that everyone had a
right to an opinion and had a right to voice it. What else can
I say?
MRS K: No one's asking you that.
MRS S: Well, what can my response be? Besides feeling inside for
her, what else can I say?
MRS K: Maybe you could feel outside for her too. Not keep it all in.
She doesn't know how you feel.
MRS S: What can I do to make her feel better? (an "I dare you" tone)
What would you do?
MRS K: The question isn't to me. It's to you.
What can be done actually? ... I think I responded.
Maybe you're responding by not responding. By not being able
to. You sound like you're warding off evil spirits.
MRS S
MRS K
Mrs. Kerr's image of "warding off evil spirits" captures the defensive
quality of this absence of empathy.
Eva observes this absence of consideration for the other in her
father's treatment of Michael.
EVA: I noticed that when he asks Michael to do something, that Michael
himself is completely ignored and that his pride isn't considered
at all. And he has to do it for the sole purpose of pleasing his
father, not because he wants to do it for self-achievement or
self-satisfaction, but because he [father] says so.
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In subsequent sections, we will return to this parental inability to
respond to the child's needs since it is an i mportant characteristic
of parentification "in action." At this point, what needs to be empha-
sized is not only the objective or consensually validated existence
of these areas of parental failure but their visibility and impact on
the child. Whether s/he responds with fear, concern, resentment or
initiative, the child knows that s/he is "on his/her own." S/he real-
izes that s/he cannot depend on the parent for the guidance, protect-
ion and sensitivity s/he needs and should expect.
The preceding discussion calls for a brief consideration of the
issues of parental blame. The parents in this study have been pre-
sented in a fairly critical light in terms of their actions toward
their children, and this critical examination will continue in the
following chapters. But we cannot be satisfied with an analysis which
blames one party for a relational configuration. The task for the
theorist as well as the therapist is to adopt a stance which holds all
members accountable for their actions while simultaneously seeking
their exculpation. This task is facilitated by a mul t
i
gene rat iona
1
perspective on the family. For while in any given interaction a par-
ent may be accurately observed as victimizer and a child as victim,
from a mul t igenerat iona 1 standpoint, we can more easily see the par-
ent's victimization in his/her own family of origin and can predict
that many of these children will be forced to victimize their own chil-
dren in turn. Family members may contribute to a relational imbalance
by their actions but they are entrapped by the legacies of injustice
which they inherit. We need to keep in mind that, despite the unde-
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niable injustice of their actions, these parents have been as much the
victims of imbalanced systems in the past as are their children in the
present
.
A second element in the constellation of pre-conditions for par-
entification involves, exper i ent i a 1 1 y , the parents' marital disappoint-
ment or dissatisfaction and, t ransact i ona 1
1 y , marital conflict or
distance. But marital conflict or dissatisfaction alone need not
seriously harm children if the parents can contain conflict in such
a way as to provide a buffer for the children. Their conflict be-
comes increasingly harmful, as will be illustrated below, when these
buffers areviolated or where no such buffers exist.
These marital problems have several important implications for
the parentified child. To the extent that the parents' individual
needs--for concern, affection, support, guidance, nurturance, even
sexuality-remain unsatisfied in the marriage, they are more likely to
be displaced onto the child. Slipp makes this connection fairly ex-
plicitly.
There was a demand that the spouse behave, feel and think
according to an introjected image, instead of viewing the
other as a separately motivated individual.
. . . When
their needs were not met, they felt rejected, worthless,
enraged and they perceived the other as depriving, con-
trolling or, in general, bad. . . . There were several
mechanisms used to diminish the strength of these de-
structive feel ings. One was a subst i tut ion of a fami ly
member to fill the lack of a stable, internalized good
introject (such as the good mother). This was accomplished
by projection and identification with the member and
served to compensate for past or present deprivation, to
7*
counter destructive feelings, and to re-establish internalsystem balance (p. 385).
In addition to ministering to one or both parents individually, the
child may be impressed into the effort- in fact, may become the sole
bearer of the effort-to minister to the conf 1 i ct- r i dden marital rela-
tionship itself.
Evidence of marital dissatisfaction is abundant for every family
examined in this study. Although originally referred to therapy with
Michael as the identified patient, both Mr. and Mrs. Stein describe
marital problems as their chief complaints when applying for treat-
ment. Mr. Stein indicates that he "cannot communicate with wife. Has
stopped affectionate relationships years ago." Mrs. Stein notes "lack
of communication with husband." Case records inform us that the cou-
ple, in fact, tried marital counseling for six months four years ear-
lier. At that time, Mr. Stein is noted to have said that he would
not stick with the marriage if not for the children. Mrs. Stein re-
marks in one session, "I've been nagged to death for six or seven years
and I'm getting revenge for it." There are barely a handful of in-
stances of Mr. and Mrs. Stein agreeing on anything or demonstrating
any sensitivity, concern or understanding for each other on the tapes.
The overwhelming bulk of their interaction is competitive, accusatory
and demeaning.
In the Rosenberg family, Mrs. Rosenberg explains to Dr. Henry
that, because of poverty, she was not able to attend college like her
girlfriends. And so while her friends married rabbis, "I had no luck,"
she says of her own husband. Elsewhere, Henry notes:
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It is easy for Mrs. Rosenberg to speak well Q f Ben-shes fond of h.m-but of her husband she tries to speak
tr^p^'hi :, "Lt|nto blame by the rlllllnT^ 'J h" empt ! nessTher
Mr. Rosenberg's lack of loyalty is demonstrated by his tell ing Henry,
" *
- an 0^s.der, that he holds her responsible for whathappened to the children and that Irving had at one t me
l-Tu
ST lnSU,tin 9 things about her on the waitwh.c he does not blame him. Thus, Mr. Rosenberg, whusually hostile to Irving, is-without knowing i?--incahoots with him against the mother (p. 127).
Henry's observations of the marriage in the home are as follows
Mr. and Mrs. Rosenberg never touched each other in mypresence; never even sat next to each other in the liv-ing room during the week I was there (p. 128).
Observing the parents' daily lives at home, I found that
nearly all of their time was devoted to getting thingsdone.
.
Ho words of warmth, no smile, no expression
or appreciation or consideration passed between husband
and wife. An act of solicitude was rare. On the otherhand, husband and wife never fought and there was no sign
of d.sagreement--nor of argument, either. Between Mr. and
Mrs Rosenberg there was rarely any conversation (p. 128-
129).
The disappointment of partner's needs in the marital relationship is
well expressed in the therapist's observation of Mr. and Mrs. Lewis,
already cited. "Both of the Lewises cried when they spoke of their
desire to lean on the other only to find that the other one wants to
lean on them."
There is also ample evidence for the absence of any buffer be-
tween the marital conflict and the children. If anything, precisely
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the opposite seems to be the case. The chMdren are consistently drag-
ged into the center of the marital arena-as ally, ransom, shield or
mere diversion. An early progress note on the Steins details,
The most recurring theme was how hopeless the parents'
marriage ,s. This theme had a destructive element athey cont.nually voice their discontent to see how theirchildren would react.
The termination note reports,
In the course of treatment , we have tried to work cproving the marriage but this was extremely difficult be-
cause the Steins were determined to bring their childreninto the picture constantly.
In the evaluation written four years before the family's contact
with EPPI, the psychiatrist noted how Mrs. Stein protected herself by
moving from the question of marital problems to the subject of Eva.
As far as their sexual life is concerned, she says that
the children were planned, that they have a fairly ade-
quate sex life although he is more adventurous than she
She quickly left the area of sexuality and went on to in-
dicate that with her eight-year-old daughter she tries to
1 ive vicariously.
. . .
One way in which the Stein children are brought into the marital
arena involves Mrs. Stein's compulsive mothering as a sort of diver-
sion from marital issues, as the following incidents detail.
Mr. Stein confronts Mrs. Stein with Eva's comment that when there is
quiet in the home it is just an act. Mrs. Stein chastizes Michael.
Therapist 1 asks the group if there is any value in discussing Eva's
expression of discomfort with her father's affection. Mr. Stein,
somewhat unsurely, says yes. Mrs. Stein quietly chastizes one of the
Kerr's children and then asks, "What has value?"
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The issue of marital sex has come up. Mr Stein ask, hie
she's embarrassed that she stimulated him! he ^ e ZtMeyou felt embarrassed me, the way you were actinq " hen \ L ^to the children and chastizes them. 9 ' tUrnS suddenl Y
There are numerous examples of this automatic turn to "mothering- the
children at moments when Mrs. Stein is confronted with threatening
marital or familial issues. On none of these occasions are the chil-
dren themselves audible on the tapes before Mrs. Stein reacts to them
(although it is possible that they are creating visual disruptions).
Furthermore, with the exception of one deafening episode in which the
kids are screaming in the corridors, no other member of the group feels
called upon to oversee them in this way.
Eva herself is never included in these fits of discipline. She
is, in fact, often delegated by her mother to oversee the younger
children. She is, however, brought into the marital fray more direct-
ly, as an ally for Mrs. Stein, on at least two occasions. In one ses-
sion, Mr. Stein asserts that his wife has recently asked the children
to be quiet for him which she had not done in the past. Mrs. Stein
replies, "Oh yes I have. Haven't I, Eva? You haven't wanted to hear
it." In another session, Eva steps in herself and is called upon by
her mother to do so. Mr. Stein claims that Mrs. Stein constantly
capitulates to the whims of the kids.
MRS S: I don't believe that I do.
MR S : Oh, Mi ldred.
EVA: She doesn 1 t
.
MRS S : Do I , Eva?
EVA: (softly) No.
MRS S: See?
MR S: (angry resignation) Fine!
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The obligation to serve as ally to one if not both parents repre-
sents only one of the ways in which the frustrated needs of the marital
partners may be displaced onto the parentified child. Other areas in
which this displacement can occur will be discussed later when we ex-
amine patterns of pa rent i f i cat ion
. In that chapter, we will also ex-
pand on the parentified child's responsibility to bridge, if not heal,
the marital rift as well. For now, it is sufficient merely to point
out these repercussions of marital conflict in order to justify the in-
clusion of these conflicts as pre-conditions for parent i fication.
Up to now this discussion of pre-conditions for parent i fi cat ion
has focused on the parents, emphasizing a constellation of elements
which involve a failure of parenting and a related marital failure.
We shift now to the child him/herself in order to examine a comple-
mentary set of elements which interlock with those already described
to create the relational structure of parent i f i cat i on . These elements
include the child's capacity for concern and his/her readiness for re-
sponsibility. Together, they comprise the child's " capacity for mean-
ingful contribution " (Nagy, p. 89).
The capacity for concern has already been alluded to in an ear-
lier discussion and will be documented with excerpts from the data in
Chapter 6. For now we wish merely to remind the reader of the import-
ance of this factor. Searles (1975), discussing the origins of the
"symbiotic therapist" role, suggests a formula which takes this fac-
tor directly into consideration.
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Jul h^h %K° re M1 3dU,t patient > the ^re power-f ave been the parent (s) transferences (largely uncon-scious of course) to him as being the lat er' parents)Therefore whenever the child showed any therapeut i c con *cern for the parent the latter reacted to the chi d asthough the child were the parent's parent (p. U2)
The applicability of this formulation for the concept of parentifica-
tion should be obvious.
Beyond a capacity for concern, the child exhibits a readiness
for some kind of task or responsibility, a readiness which consti-
tutes the basis for any meaningful contribution to family members or
to the family as a whole. Parent i f i cat ion can be said to exist when
this availability is exploited with little or not real reciprocity and
when it interferes with the child's normal course of development. It
will be useful, in this context, to refer to some of Erikson's state-
ments regarding developmental changes in the child. While his lan-
guage often emphasizes psychosexual and social— that is, extra-famil-
ial
--processes
,
his discussion of those components of growing person-
ality which take precedence during the various stages of childhood
lend themselves to an analysis of the child's receptivity to parenti-
f icat ion. ^
10T ,
l he reader may note that the question of the age of the child
at which pa ren t i f i ca t i on can be said to begin has, so far, been ig-
nored. This question will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter
8 where the concepts of the parentified child and the "symbiotic ther-
apist" are contrasted. In general, we assume that although early
forms of loyalty and concern may begin much earlier, the configura-
tion of parenti f ication is not likely to occur before the child is
three or four years old. Accordingly, we are most interested here in
the stages Erikson refers to as "initiative" and "industry," covering
roughly from three years of age to early adolescence.
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In a monograph entitled, Identity and the Life Cycle (l 959) he
states
:
•
•
.while all children need their hours and days of make-
:;:;;'
n theV -oner or later, become^"
sat.sf.ed and disgruntled without a sense of being use-ful.
.
Without this, the best entertained child soonacts exploited. It is as if he knows and his society
ITJZU : ; h;:
S
8^-
h0,09icalI V already a rudimL-
While Erikson's conceptualization of this stage emphasizes the child's
ability to produce, to use tools, we feel that this productive capacity
is complementary with, and not antithetical to, a more i nterpersona 1
-
ly-oriented usefulness. Erikson asserts that during the stage of in-
itiative, conscience, "that dependence on himself which makes him
•
.
.dependable" (p. 86), is established, and adds that,
Where the child.
.
.can gradually develop a sense of re-
sponsibility, where he can gain some simple feeling for
the institutions, functions and roles which will permit
him to anticipate his responsible participation as an
adult, he will soon find pleasureable accomplishment in
wielding miniature tools and weapons, in manipulating
meaningful toys, and in taking care of himself—and of
younger children [and, we might add, of parents].
For such is the wisdom of the ground plan that at no time
is the individual more ready to learn quickly and avidly,
to become big in the sense of sharing obligation, disci-'
pline and performance.
. .(p. 81).
It is this readiness to be useful, to make a contribution, to assume
responsibility, which seems to complement and extend the child's nat-
ural sense of concern into the realm of participation through action
in the 1 i fe of the fami ly
.
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In this chapter, we have tried to highlight those factors which
seem most significant as pre-conditions to parent i fi cat i on . We have
focused on a failure of parenting which involves both a relinquishing
of the responsibility to guide and direct the family and a related in-
sensitivity and lack of response to the child's needs. We have con-
sidered possible sources of this failure in the parents' histories
with their own original families and in various pressures imposed by
the facticity of family life. Also discussed as significant pre-con-
ditions were the parents' marital conflict or disappointment and the
child's capacity for meaningful contribution for the family.
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CHAPTER 5
Development
In this chapter, our focus is on the development- the creation
and maintenance-^ parent i fication. This requires movement between
intrapsychic and interpersonal processes. We begin by considering
some aspects of the parent's internal experience, proceed to examine
interpersonal processes between parent and child, and conclude with a
consideration of the child's internal experience. In doing so, we
move also from theoretical to empirical material and back again.
The forces which create and maintain familial configurations such
as parentif ication cannot be grasped without an understanding of what
Laing refers to as "t ranspersonal defenses."
Most defenses described in psychoanalysis are intrapsychic
defenses— for instance: splitting, projection, introjec-
tion, denial, repression, regression. These defense mech-
anisms of psychoanalysis are what a person does to him-
sej_f_. They are not actions on the external world~7 on
others, or on the world of others. . .
There is no systematic psychoanalytic theory of the nature
of t ranspersona
1
defenses, whereby self attempts to regu-
late the ? nner 1 i fe of the other i n order to preserve hi
s
own
,
nor of techniques of coping with such persecution by
others (1969, p. 12-13).
Slipp's formulation, based mainly on concepts from an object-relations
perspective, is quite similar.
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Without a stable, integrated and internalized system of
.ntrojects the parents.
. .needed external objects uponwhom to project certain split introjects. In urn otherfam.ly members were required to introject, incorporateand act out these split introjects. However,To
'
to stabhze the mternaj system of the parents, the en-
re fam.ly ecame locked into a rigid, mutually con'ol-
.ng ej^ernal system of interaction in which each one'sself-esteem and survival was dependent upon the other
member's participation (p. 38^-385 )
.
The result is that the stability of each member's identity and experi-
ential world becomes predicated upon the continuing availability and
participation of all other members in their complementary roles. When
this is the case, as Laing suggests,
The preservation, change and dissolution of the "family"
Ithe family, as experienced wi thin its members and mapped
back onto the outer family] is not allowed to be a purely
private affair when the "family" has to be felt to be
preserved by a_M_ its members.
. .
.
Hence the preservation of the "family" is equated with
the preservation of self and world and the dissolution of
the "family" inside another is equated with death of self
and world-collapse (p~. 1 A) 7
Family members are rarely consciously aware of this essential coherence
of identities but that it is apprehended by them is demonstrated con-
sistently in their interactions. They know, without knowing that they
know, how not to violate the unspoken but powerful expectations which
sustain it.
More specifically in the case of parent i fi cat ion the parent needs
a giving, nurturing, self-sacrificing parent. This parental figure,
never successfully elicited (or relinquished) in a real parent or in
the spouse, must be created in a child. The question, then, becomes
how such a "parent" can be created.
Laing provides an answer with the concepts of induction and, as
its primary mechanism, attribution. Because his formulations are
central to this discussion, he is cited here at some length.
Pure projection is not enough. As images of ghostly rela-
tions under the operation of projection, we induce others
and are ourselves induced, to embody them. .~
—
One way to get someone to do what one wants, is to give
an order. To get someone to be what one wants him to be,
•
-that is, to embody one's projections, is another mat-
ter. In a hypnotic (or similar) context, one does not tell
him what to be
,
but tells him what he is. Such attribu-
tions, in context, are many times more powerful than or-
ders (or other forms of persuasion). ... It is my im-
pression that we receive most of our earliest and most
lasting instructions in the form of attributions. When
attributions have the function of instructions or injunc-
tions, this function may be denied, giving rise to one
tVP e of mysti f ication
,
akin to, or identical with, hypno-
tic suggestion (p. 78-79).
He asserts that, when a child is told, "You are naughty," not only do
these attributions define that he is naughty but
They define what he does a_s naughty. In this way, he learns
that he j_s naughty and how to be naughty in his particular
family; it is a learned skill. Some children have a spe-
cial aptitude for it (p. 80).
As Laing points out, attributions may take the form either of instruc-
tions or injunctions. We will examine both in the creation of a
parentified child, bearing in mind that, however useful the concept
of induction, it refers primarily to the initiative of an individual
and must be re- formul ated to encompass a "chain of social processes."
How do parents induce parent i f icat ion in their children? I
n
-
85
structions may take the form of parental support of pseudo-mature be-
havior or of descriptions (in the child's presence) of his/her sensit-
ivity, sagacity or extraordinary powers. Basically, these children
get the message that to be adult, to be caring and responsible, is
good and that to be almost anything else is bad. When Eva is ques-
tioned about her relationships with peers, her lukewarm response
prompts Mr. Kerr to comment that they sound uncomfortable. Mrs. Stein
cuts 'n.
MRS S: She's much more mature
EVA: (softly) Oh quiet
, ma.
Mrs. Stein again minimizes any peer problems by explaining that:
.
.
.most of the kids are a year younger than she is 'cause we
moved here from Jersey.
EVA: (groans) Everybody's trying to make me bigger than I am. [Mr.
Stein asks if she likes this] No, I don't like anybody making me
bigger than I am.
Not surprisingly, Eva's feelings about "being made bigger" are more
ambivalent than this would suggest, as is demonstrated later. Case
records indicate that "Mrs, Stein had the habit of dressing Eva like
a 'little old lady' in the words of the nursing staff."
There is some third-party support for this perception of parental
encouragement for pseudo-adult behavior. Mrs. Stein herself admits:
Eva's sixth grade teacher told me once that we were making her,
like we were asking her to grow up too fast. He said, "She's
still a child. Let her act like one." . . . At that time I
couldn't see it as much as I could now.
One therapist reaches a similar conclusion. She tells Eva,
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Somehow you're getting lost as a teenager; that you are more andmore functioning like an adult and not a teenager. [Mrs Steinchastizes a chi Id.] L ,
EVA: I'm not even considered a person. How can I be considered as
a teenager?
T3: They're not letting you, Eva.
. .your parents give you permis-
sion to be like this, an adult.
In the Gardner family, Therapist 1 observes that Davie seems "like
he is one of the grownups here." Mrs. Gardner concurs emphatically.
MRS G: He is very
.
. ., there was never anybody on the street forhim to play with because the children were either older thanhim or younger than him, so he's always been around adults and
he s fine with adults. He can hold a conversation with you,
really. But when it comes to being with children.
. . (sentence
is left unfinished).
Progress notes in the Robbins family indicate that
The children in this family do not really fulfill a subor-
dinate role. The eight-year-old boy is too outspoken.
.
His parents.
.
.seem quite pleased with his man-like com-
ments .
The following interchange in the Lewis family provides an example
of how the child can become invested with special powers.
STEVE: I always give Larry a chance to talk, like I can stop the
family from fighting,
. . . and then Larry could have a . . .
T2: (interrupting) You can stop them?
STEVE: Yeah, I do.
T2: How do you do that?
STEVE: I just tell 'em, everybody, to be quiet, and I te 1
1
them what's
happen i ng.
MR L: He does.
T2: That's a big responsibility for you to actually stop the
family from fighting.
MR L: (proud, impressing the therapist) He does. He does. He has
actually put one word in and the whole family just shuts up for
a moment.
T2 : (gently) But that's something the parents should do; not one
of the child ren
.
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Later when Steve injects his interpretation of why Mrs. Lewis and Lar-
ry argue, hoth Mr. and Mrs. Lewis ,eap in, heads nodding furi ous, y ,
with effusive affirmation. "Tha t
' s right . That's right. He's exact-
ly right. He is. That's it." Steve sees his parents react to hi m
as though he were a kind of messiah, capable of solving their problems
with a casual observation. His parents are only too happy to encour-
age such a perception. In this way, Steve can be made to try harder
and harder to work miracles for them and to sacrifice himself in the
process
.
The induction of the child into a specific object role, such as
that of the parentified child, the infantilized child, or the scape-
goat, requires proscription as well as prescription. Just as certain
traits, behaviors, and experiences must be cultivated, others must be
pre-empted. Instructions prescribe what the child should be and do;
in
-
j
'
Unctions dic tate what s/he should not. The content of injunctions
will vary from object role to object role and from family to family.
In the case of the infantilized child, it may be the natural expres-
sion of maturity which is injoined, while in the case of the parenti-
fied child, it is more likely to be the natural expression of immature
dependency. In general with parent i f i cat i on
,
injunctions will involve
those aspects of the child's existence which run most counter to par-
ent i fication, such as needfulness or any expression of autonomous
self-definition. Such injunctions take the form of attributions and
may be concealed by what Laing has referred to as mystification and
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Stierlin describes as "ego-binding." 11
mvstif!
b,n
f'"9- ' "Plies devious communications whichy y
.,
.nterfere w.th the sharing of a common focusof attention.
. . ,
and disaffirm one's own or the other's
messages. Such devious communications strain and unsettlethe partner in the dialogue and they throw this dialogue
off the track. a
[A cognitively binding parent] by being intrusively inter-pretative, prevents her child from perceiving and differ-
entiating his basic bodily needs or states. She
cognitively binds her child when she imposes on him her
own definition of his feelings, needs, or intentions
Thereby she substitutes her own for the child's regulatory
and discriminating ego. She misdefines the child to hi
self (197A, p. k]-h2).
i m-
This description captures some of the ways in which Mrs. Stein's
injunctions are transmitted to Eva. At one point, Eva asserts that
her parents do not really get along together, they they are just act-
ing. Mrs. Stein defies Eva to explain this. She tries and Mrs. Stein
tried to intimidate her by saying:
Are you sure you know what you're saying?
EVA: I realize what I'm saying.
MRS S: (defiantly) What are you saying?
Eva explains further at which point Mrs. Stein is forced to resort to
outright den ial
.
Mrs. Stein reacts similarly when Eva exposes her parents collu-
sive sham in one session. Mr. Stein has said he feels there has been
some improvement in his relationship with his wife. Mrs. Stein
agrees weakly. Eva reveals that that very morning Mr. Stein had said
''These two terms denote essentially the same processes and will
be used interchangeably.
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he fel t nothing had charmed and was rnnci,w;™ 1^ u ti3 considering leaving therapy.
MRS S: (laughing out loud, minimizing, as if explaining away a ml sunderstandmg Ah, what brought that on this morning is that yourfather had 12 hours sleep, which isn't good for him, number one
and number two, I slept on the sofa because 6f my cold and he
resented it.
. . .
So I didn't take it too seriously, Eva. I
sorry that you did. You shouldn't all the Li
m
me
.
Interactions such as these are freguent and occur in a variety of
content areas. Beyond any one conflictual issue they represent the
operation of what Nagy has referred to as the "counterautonomous super-
ego" (1962)— that is, the moral Imperative by which various forms of auto-
nomous activity are experienced and punished as a basic betrayal of
the relational system itself. While this basic betrayal always trans-
cends any one particular "sin," in Mr. and Mrs. Stein's interactions
with Eva the struggle currently centers around Eva's growing discom-
fort with her father's physical affection toward her. Eva's internal-
ization of this counterautonomous superego will provide a powerful com-
plement to the external manipulations of her parents.
Mrs. Stein struggles to keep the issue of Eva's developing sex-
uality out of discussion primarily by misunderstanding the issue and
by minimizing and denying there is anything to discuss. She fails and
resports to mystification in an attempt to preclude discussion.
EVA: I fee 1 uncomfortable!
MRS S: (dubious, ironic tone) And you also felt that we're putting
on an act when we act friendly with each other, right?
EVA: Are you trying to make out like I'm nuts?
MRS S: Isn't that what you just said before?
MRS K: You keep laughing at her, Mildred. Do you think she's crazy?
MRS S: I'm not laughing. I'm smiling at her.
EVA: She's trying to make out like I'm nuts!
MRS S: Did you just say before that when daddy and I are friendly in
the house you don't feel it's real?
tlc''c S
we
?
k1 y> temporarily disorganized, wary of a trap) YeahMRS S: (tri umphant) Wei 1
!
EVA: Well what?
MRS S: That's what I just said.
Later Eva asks if perhaps her mother lavishes her affection on
Michael as her father has on her.
EVA: There's nothing wrong with it, but if it's on your kids in-
stead of your husband, I mean.
.
.
MRS S: (interrupting) It's not a matter of "instead of." You mean
"not enough of," right?
EVA: No, I mean instead of.
MRS S: Well, it's not instead of, Eva.
Note that in each of these interchanges Eva stands her ground, resist-
ing mystifications and invalidations, and forcing her mother to resort
to less subtle maneuvers-- typ i ca 1
1 y , simple denial. It is significant
that no such instances of Eva's resistence can be found in the first
tape available of this family (their second therapy session). However,
in all subsequent tapes, beginning one year after the start of thera-
py, such interactions are plentiful. This suggests that maneuvers on
Mrs. Stein's part which may have succeeded in the past are no longer
effective, and that we are seeing remnants of earlier modes of defense
and more recent, less covert, variants.
In one session, Eva asks Therapist 1 if her childhood adoration
for her father was healthy or not. He respond that, from the family's
point of view, Eva tried more than anyone else to be alive. Mrs.
Stein responds contemptuously, "It couldn't be just plain stupidity,
maybe?!" A later interchange between Mrs. Stein and the Kerrs is es-
pec i a 1
1 y revea ling.
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MRS S: She's not sure how she's feeling about these things. She ex-plains it one way and then she says another thing.
MR K: I think she's very sure, Mildred
MRS S: What did she say I ! ! . .
.
MR K:
' •
-
She fee,s something with Norman. Period No other
shade. No other twist of the mind. ... If you don't want to
accept it, that's up to you.
MRS S: That's ridiculous. ... I think she's not sure how to acceptthis feeling sometimes. ...
MRS K: (interrupting) But she's positive ! You're the one who's not
sure
.
MRS S: (dismissing tone) It's a growing up sensation.
MRS K
:
Don't you realize what you're doing now.
. . . You're telling
her she's crazy. And that only you know.
MRS S: I didn't tell her she's crazy. I think she's a little mixed
up. It's not the same as crazy.
MRS K: But you're the only one that's mixed up in the room.
Mrs. Kerr also tells Mrs. Stein, "You sound like you're trying to re-
arrange your daughter's thoughts."
These efforts at mystification reflect, in part, Mrs. Stein's at-
tempt to erase any expression of Eva as a sexual female. Mr. Kerr,
trying at one point to circumvent Mrs. Stein's resistance, asks how
she would feel if it were true that there was an incestuous element
to Eva's relationship to her father. He asks if she would feel jeal-
ous .
MRS S: Uh uh
.
Can you feel jealous of a man paying attention to a
baby? She's still my baby. I mean, she might be 23 or 33, or
MR K: (interrupting) She's not a baby!. . .
EVA: I'm not! I'm not a baby anymore!
MR S: Mildred, she's telling you that. God in heaven!
MRS S:
. . .She's my chi Id.
In another session, Therapist 1 asks if the family has any discussion
of this i ssue .
MRS S: I don't think he shows, er, that he's that demonstrative, that
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it's something he should put aside until she gets over her aware-
MR S: She doesn't get over it, Mildred
MRS
^nM ' "?
f b6i
?
9 l ffma]e - ,t,s something that she will appar-ently outgrow I think. HP
This interchange suggests yet another factor— the limits of Mrs.
Stein's experience of her own sexuality.
Mrs. Stein tries to get Eva to admit that she "varies" what she
says at times. Eva tries to respond, but Mrs. Stein talks over her.
MRS S: In fact, last year you resented it because he [Mr. Stein]
wouldn't tickle you like he tickled Mikey.
EVA: (loud, angered) I don't care about last year.
MRS S: and he tried to explain to you that you're getting older.
(laughing, in mock-defeat as if she has really trapped Eva) Oh,
OK, Eva. Alright, I have no answer.
After a similar exchange, Mrs. Kerr is prompted to ask Mrs. Stein,
Do you realize that you disregard your daughter completely and
you laugh at her?
MRS S: No, I think it's sweet. That's why I'm smiling. I'm not
laughing at her.
Mrs. Stein demonstrates a capacity to adapt creatively to new cir-
cumstances when she blames the therapy itself for the supposed problem,
Referring to the problem of displaced sexual feelings, Mr. Stein asks
his w i fe
,
Mildred, don't you accept it. The possibility. . .
MRS S: No, I think it's a little bit exaggerated. I think it's now
exaggerated in her mind a little bit.
In her attempt to maintain the status
other statements than Eva's alone, as
quo, Mrs. Stein must invalidate
demonstrated when Mr. Stein tells
Eva that she should not be ashamed of her past adoration for him and
that most affection in the family has been buried. Mrs. Stein inter-
rupts :
MR
S
S
S:
|
r
diHnV
el,i
?
9
,
her Y° U haVe n° love for the children.
mrc c !u , . Y
haVe n
° loVe for the children.MRS S: That's what it sounded like. I was wondering myself.
Finally, the desperate, flailing quality of Mrs. Stein's attempts
at mystification is revealed when she responds, at one point, with a
flurry of defensive maneuvers. Mrs. Kerr is trying to help Eva clari-
fy her discomfort with her father's affection. Mrs. Stein keeps as-
serting, over their voices,
He always kibbitzes with her. He always kibbitzes with her from
the time she was an infant.
MRS K: But she doesn' t back.
MRS S: She does. Oh yes she does. [silence, a stale-mate]
I don't
encourage it. I mean I don't think it's overdone. [Mrs Stein
chastizes Michael]
.
Here, Mrs. Stein begins by re-defining the problem out of existence,
describing it as "kibbitzing" or harmless fun. Next, she dissociates
herself from the problem (implying it exists), immediately corrects
this by, instead, minimizing the problem (it does not really exist)
and ends up by "mothering" Michael, an activity in the status quo with
which she is most comfortable.
Lest it appear that Mrs. Stein is solely responsible for obstruct-
ing Eva's moves toward autonomy, the following examples provide some
sense of Mr. Stein's role. In general, while Mrs. Stein makes use of
attribution and mystification to keep Eva bound to her parentified role
in the family, her husband uses these as well as less subtle mechan-
isms. One of the most obvious elements of Mr. Stein's relationship
with his daughter is his sense of insecurity and inadequacy. He deals
with these feelings (unsuccessfully, it seems) by attempting to over-
power her. So when Eva makes a comment about her father's treatment
of Michael, he does not question, disprove, examine or consider the
comment, but blasts Eva, telling her to mind her own business. What
is communicated so powerfully in this reaction and the subsequent dis-
cussion of the incident is Mr. Stein's sense that her observation is
accurate and that he will be found wanting.
Later, Mrs. Stein expresses her own feeling that her husband tries
to overpower Eva and forbids her to speak.
MRS S: It bothers me that he chooses to use it with Eva, because I
don't think she's quite up to par with him, argumentat i vely , be-
cause he won't consider the fact that she's growing up. See,
here he'll sit and listen but at home he has very little pati-
ence. ... If.
.
.he doesn't [feel patient], he will tell her
he doesn't feel that she's old enough to voice an opinion or that
she should know where her place is. . .
.
So mother and father try to achieve the same goal by different roads.
Mr. Stein forbids Eva to speak or he shouts her down; his wife gives
her the freedom to speak and disqualifies her.
At another point, Eva says, "He always laughs at me, at my at-
tempts, at my way of trying to think." Later, Mrs. Kerr comments to
Mr. Stein, "The way you speak to [Eva], Norman, you speak to her hor-
ribly. You don't speak to her like a person." She parodies him, an
angry, rasping growl. "A mechanical machine." When Mr. Stein reacts
to this defensively by laughing at Mrs. Kerr, Eva says,
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Now you know how it feels, don't you"?
MRS K: How it feels?
EVA: When he starts laughing at you.
MRS K: It could make you feel like shit.
Behind these different parental styles of squelching what they
consider to be troublesome aspects of Eva lies a common purpose. And
despite Mr. Stein's loud protestations against his wife's treatment of
Eva, both his passive abdication of responsibility and his sometimes
activecollusion in these efforts attest to his complicity. This col-
lusion extends to both children, as in the case of Michael's toilet
problems which Mr. Stein loudly blames on his wife. An early case note
records
It was made very clear.
. .that Mr. Stein as well as Mrs.
Stein participated in the destructive pattern concerning
Michael's raising. It was discovered that when Michael
goes to the toilet [age 8] he waits for one of his parents
to come in and clean him because presumably he is not able
to do so. When this was brought up in the meeting this
caused some embarrassment to the parents and thereafter
they claimed that they had stopped this habit.
In one session, when Mrs. Stein is battling nearly every member of the
group to maintain the status quo in Eva's relationship with her father,
Mrs. Kerr observes that Mrs. Stein is "taking all the flack" while Mr.
Stein sits there "scot-free."
Finally, the most dramatic demonstration of this parental collu-
sion occurs when Mr. Stein, the week after Eva first expresses her
discomfort, declares his own solution to the problem. Therapist 1 asks
him what he did after Mrs. Stein refused to discuss the problem at
home
.
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•For a while I was a little bit overcome with it And I
is way, that with Eva, as far as I am concerned, this
Mrs. Kerr insists that Eva says there is. Mr. Steiin says Eva just
wants him to show more affection to Mrs. Stein. Mrs. Ke rr responds
that Eva would prefer it not to be shown to her in that way.
MR S:
• •
-the way she thinks it's being shown to her
MRS K: She doesn't think
.
MR S: She will realize, I hope, and if she has any questions, I
hope.
. . .
MRS K: (interrupting) That's assuming, isn't it?
MR S: You assume a lot of things.
. .
Without the opportunity to scapegoat his wife for their shared willing-
ness to consider Eva's feelings and perceptions, Mr. Stein proves no
less willing to sacrifice his daughter by discounting those perceptions
and feel ings.
In summary, the parent is driven by his/her own needs to create
an over- respons i bl e and self-sacrificing parental figure in the child.
The mechanisms by which such a figure is induced are no different in
the case of the parentified child than in those of other one-dimen-
sional object- rol es . Induction relies on sets of instructions and in-
junctions, conveyed through attributions of who the child "really" is.
These attributions may be supplemented by more overt commands and pro-
hibitions and they are likely to be obscured by a process of mystifica-
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tion which serves to deny that they are even being communicated.
The reader may have noted a certain paradox implicit in this dis-
cussion. How can the parentified child be both groomed as messiah
and thwarted as mere person? How can s/he be so powerful and yet so
powerless within the family? The answer seems to be that the paradox
is inherent, and as painful to the parentified child as it is perplex-
ing to us. Slipp and Nagy have both commented on this paradox of
captive power. Slipp states:
We hypothesized that the lack of ego boundaries appeared
.
.
.related to the paradox of feeling controlled and
helpless (having to be whatever the other member required),
while at the same time feeling grandiose and omnipotent
(responsible for the other's self-esteem and survival)
(p. 383).
Nagy's observation is surprisingly similar.
From the viewpoint of the parentified person, parentifica-
tion is an overtly exploitative maneuver. The exploitation
of the child is of a double-binding type: He is expected
to be obedient, yet behave in accordance with the ostensi-
bly superior or senior position he is cast into. Although
he is recognizable, at least covertly, as a willing victim
and as a source of strength for the family system, he pays
for his assigned rank by his captive role (p. 165).
This paradoxical bind heightens the normal difficulties of being
a child who sometimes wants to be treated like a grownup into the an-
guish of being forced to be a grownup while being dominated like a
chi Id.
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i on
The preceding discussion has centered on the parents' induct
of the child into a parentified position, but what of the child's con-
tribution to this process? How do we understand the child's assumption
of both the "overt role assignment" and "internal expectation and com-
mitment" characteristics of parent i fi cat ion? The concept of introjec-
tion is clearly relevant here, although it provides less of an explan-
ation than a convenient shorthand for a thoroughly mysterious process.
Furthermore, Laing observes that, while we can discuss both projection
and introjection, there is no term to describe the reciprocal process
in one person to the other's induction. "Compliance," "co-operation,"
and "acceptance" may be as close as we can come, although their conno-
tations are regretably passive and inert.
Semantic problems notwithstanding, what we are interested in is
an appreciation of those forces wi thin the child which motivate him/
her to actively assume both internal commitment to and external per-
formance of the role marked out. In Nagy's terms, the question con-
cerns the nature of the child's loyalty to his/her legacy in the family
Because our data are neither longitudinal nor phenomenol og i ca
1
, our
hypotheses must necessarily be more speculative and theoretically-
based. Nevertheless we can make some guesses as to probable motivat-
ing forces for the child. We need to keep in mind, however, that the
child does not decide to fill the bill or, for that matter, decide
not to, as we might decide to accept or refuse a job, to maintain or
abandon a relationship. It is safe to assume that both the child's
acceptance and uneasy squirming under the mantle of parent i fication
will be unformulated and, to use Roger's (1951) expression, unsymbo-
Uzed or, at best, Hystericus even to him/her. ,„ itself, this repre-
sents one level of expianation or, at least, one element in this ac-
ceptance. The child's assumption of the parentified role devolves,
in part, from his/her unconscious acceptance of the parents' images of
him/her. What basis does s/he have for disputing these personifica-
tions, especially to the degree that self-awareness is impaired by
ego-binding? To return to Laing's metaphor, the child accedes to the
hypnotic induction of the parents which, by virtue of their relation-
ship to the child, is the most powerful source of reflected personifi-
cations available to him/her. But more than this would appear to be
i nvo 1 ved
.
Another cluster of motivations involves loyalty, concern for the
parent and self-interest, here implying a natural need for the parent
and a desire to avoid criticism and rejection by him/her. We delib-
erately discuss the forces of loyalty and concern in conjunction with
self-interest in order to emphasize the common convergence of these
forces described earlier. It is the artificial division of the rela-
tional dialogue into self-contained and competing individuals which
creates a correspondingly artificial distinction between loyalty and
concern, on the one hand, and self-interest, on the other. Naturally
these children experience conf 1 i cts--necessary conf 1 i cts--between con-
cern for self and concern for other. But this conflict is never sim-
ply between self and other so much as between self and self. When they
are able to re-direct some of that energy which has been so absorbed
in caring for the other into caring for themselves, they are likely to
discover that they have gone against not only the other but a part of
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the sel f
.
The child's own need for the parent constitutes a powerful induce-
ment to parentification. How does s/he make contact with a parent who
cannot contact the child as^a-parent but who pulls for nurturance and
protection? The child's efforts toward closeness with the parent may
be most consistently rewarded when s/he comforts and soothes the par-
ent, when s/he listens sympathetically to complaints, feels with the
parent and tries to reduce his/her pain. When the child brings his/
her own pain or need to the parent, seeking closeness and contact,
the parent may lose interest, turn away, minimize or express helpless-
ness. The child will get the message that these particular efforts
toward closeness are likely to fail consistently. S/he may become a
protector if this is the only form of relationship the parent can
rea 1 i st i ca 1 ly accept
.
The child's loyalty and concern for the parent provide additional
inducements to accept and sustain the burdens posed by parentifica-
tion. Just as concern constitutes an essential pre-condition, it also
serves to maintain parentification. The child is driven to perpetu-
ate his/her callings by a concern for the other(s) much like the sen-
sitivity to distress described by Sullivan as maternal "tenderness."
In terms of loyalty, the operation of the coun te rautonomous superego
makes non-compliance with parentified responsibilities tantamount to
a betrayal of the relational system. The rigidity of expectations as-
sociated with the assigned object-role gives the child little or no
freedom to reject selected aspects of that role. To avoid the devas-
tating sense of betrayal, s/he must continue to perform all parentified
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responsibi 1 it ies.
In addition, once the roles and responsibilities of parentifica-
tion are established, these forces of loyalty and concern are inten-
sified. In departing from this role, the child may, as Nagy suggests,
violate not only "the loyalty of belonging, but also the commitment
to caretaking" (p. 161). The child's struggle for liberation will be
experienced by self as well as others not merely as a "leaving the
fold" but as the abandonment of a helpless charge.
There is one more c r i t i ca 1 mot i va t i on involved in the child's ac-
ceptance of the parent! fied role. It derives from the natural emerg-
ence of a readiness for responsibility, as described in the last chap-
ter, and involves the potential utility of the parentified role in the
child's struggle to fashion and sustain a sense of identity. Erikson.
uses the term "identity" to refer to a "conscious sense of individual
i dent i ty ," "an unconscious striving for a cont i nui ty of personal char-
acter ," "a criterion for the silent doings of ego synthesis ," and "a
maintenance of an inner so 1 i da r i ty w i t h a group's ideals and identity"
(1959, p. 102). He asserts that
Ego identity, then, in its subjective aspect, is the aware-
ness of the fact that there is a selfsameness and continuity
to the ego's synthesizing methods and that these methods are
effective in safeguarding the sameness and continuity of
one's meaning for others (p. 23).
Whatever its drawbacks, parent i fi cat ion offers the child, at least
initially, a role which certainly provides for continuity of charac-
ter, both experienced internally and reflected by others, and which
is not only a part of but is essential within the family group. In
102
addition, this is often, though not necessarily, a valued (if exploit-
ative) role.
Erikson also states
,
It is this identity of something in the individual's core
with an essential aspect of a group's inner coherence
which is under consideration here: for the individual
must learn to be most himself where he means most to
others— those others, to be sure, who have come to mean
most to him (p. 102) .
Obviously it is as a caring, protective, self-sacrificing "parent"
that the parentified child "means most to others" in his/her family
and can therefore most easily achieve a sense of continuity and self-
sameness within group and within self. Stierlin's (197^, 1976) notion
of the child as the "delegate" of the parent shares a conceptual af-
finity with Nagy's approach to parent i fi cat ion
. He speaks to this
poi!nt directly when he states,
Children.
.
.have a need to serve as delegates. In such
service, they are given direction, a primary sense of
identity, a sense of importance, and missions. These, to
them, are all vitally needed gifts (1976. p. 28).
Our data are not sufficiently phenomenological to address this
aspect of parenti f ication directly. However, the importance of the
parentified role for the child's struggle to develop a sense of iden-
tity can, perhaps, be inferred from some aspects of Eva's participa-
tion in the family therapy group. Over the course of the sessions,
we can see Eva begin to function more and more as a sort of co-thera-
pist in the group. She becomes an intermediary between the adults
and the smaller children, translating back and forth between the gen-
erations. She asks questions, reflects feelings and make interpreta-
tions in trying to help the Kerrs clarify problems in their marriage
and family. This co-therapist role certainly reflects a strong iden-
tification with Therapist !, whom she states explicitly has replaced
her father after his demotion as her "god." But, even more clearly,
it represents a natural consolidation and extension of characteristic
skills of the parentified child which predate but are validated by the
therapy. It is obvious that her exercise of these skills provides Eva
with a senseof belonging, being important and making a valuable con-
tribution in Ihis group and, in this way, reflects a sense of identity
analogous to that in her family of origin.
The importance of this role for Eva's identity is further sug-
gested by her uneasiness and outright resistance when the therapists
try to relieve her of the burdensome expectations placed on her by
the adults in the group. When one therapist tells Eva she should be
glad not to have to deal with these adult problems, she sadly and un-
enthusiastically says, "Yeah." Later, she admits that, in the words
of the therapist, she feels "kicked out of. . .some older problems."
It seems clear here that for Eva to give up the parentified role she
has assumed in the larger context of the family therapy group would
cut deeply into the sense of competence, contribution and self-esteem
she has built up in the exercise of that role.
Let us pause to consider two last points concerning the relation-
ship between pa ren t i f i cat ion and the child's developing identity.
Firstly, while parent if icat ion certainly contributes to the formation
of a sense of identity, its contribution to a sense of effectiveness
is more problematic. Not infrequently the parentified child's efforts
are taken for granted, unrecognized by family members. Searles (1975)
notes that the child's
therapeutic strivings.
. .[may] be subjected to, or remain
under, severe repression and be acted out, within the
family in a manner largely unconscious to all the family
members including the child himself (p. 132).
Furthermore, the parentified child's callings— functioning for a se-
verely impaired parent, healing a bitter poisoned marriage--are often
so hopeless that his/her efforts can provide little sense of compet-
ence or satisfaction.
Finally, the implicit must be stated exp 1 i c i t
1 y--that while par-
entification may save the child from something like what Erikson de-
scribed as "identity diffusion," it is likely to painfully limit both
the child and, later, the adult to something akin to his notion of
"identity foreclosure." We refer again to Stierlin's discussion of
the child's role as the delegate.
However--and this is cent ra 1 --s uch service must leave room
for increasing (relative) autonomy, for shifts in loyal-
ty—away from the parents to peers and alternate adults—
and for a constant re-negotiation of the generations' mu-
tual needs, rights and obligations. We may speak of a
liberating dialectic that needs to be built into the de-
legating process (1975, p. 28).
The possibly crippling effects of
t i ty formation will be discussion
parenti f icat ion on autonomous iden-
in Chapter 7-
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We have asserted that in an analysis of parent i fi cat ion we are
concerned with a relational configuration which reflects "a chain of
social forces rather than an i ndi vi dua 1
' s i n i t i at i ve or acts." The
concept of induction, however, necessarily focuses attention primarily
on the acts of individuals. We have tried in this chapter to convey
some sense of this cham of forces, both intrapsychic and interper-
sonal, of which induction is merely one element. These forces— the
parent's need for a parent, the child's loyalty and concern, the par-
ent's induction (through instructions, injunctions and mystification)
of a "parent" in the child, the child's need for a sense of identity
and usefulness— interlock to produce a sort of relational drift toward
the imbalance of parent i f i cat i on
.
A drift not entirely without oppos-
ing forces— the child's sporadic protest, the parent's fitful exercise
of responsibility. But unless the system can permit a continual re-
balancing through reparation and reciprocity, the drift proceeds to a
stagnant endpoint of fixed, imbalanced role requirements.
Because this interlocking of forces is more difficult to grasp
than the more linear notion of one person's action on another, we
will examine one piece of this complex fit as a sort of microcosmic
illustration. We might refer to this process as the dialectic of ac-
tions and expectations
.
The configuration is ubiquitous; it occurs
in probably every situation which involves more than one person and
various shared responsibilities. However, depending on the types of
responsibilities, their age-appropriateness and, again, the availabil-
ity of accountable reciprocity, it may be either benign or explofta-
t i ve.
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In the case of parent! fication this dialectic revolves around an
action which is called for. It may be comforting a parent, caring for
a sibling, trying to resolve a marital conflict, making a decision
which guides the family, or even a more task-oriented action, such as
cleaning up, shopping, etc. The important elements include: the par-
entified child's expectation
, based on past incidents, that others
will no^ perform the necessary action; the parentified child's perform
ance of that action
; the others' expectations
, based on past experi-
ence, that the parentified child wi 1
1
act; and the other's inactii on
These elements are mutually reinforcing, as suggested in Figure 3.
Each participant reacts to 1) the (in)action of the other in past in-
cidents, which contributes to 2) expectations of the other's response
to a current situation and reciprocal expectations of the necessity
(or lack thereof) for action on his/her own part. These expectations
then, influence 3) their own present (in)action. The pattern becomes
increasingly predictable as it is repeated, and the parentified child
becomes over-accountable while others are underaccountabl e. It is
not uncommon to observe a family's indignant condemnation of a par-
entified child (most likely shared by the child) for occasional lapses
from a responsibility not even expected of any other family member.
When an emergency (and parentified children specialize in long-
term, chronic emergencies) or any other call for action develops, the
others can sit back fairly comfortably and wait, with fully justified
assurance, for the parentified child to "come through." The parenti-
fied child is equally justified in anticipating thatnoone else will
act, and so the responsibility realistically lies with him/her. In
Figure 3
Dialectic of Actions and Expectations
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addition to illustrating the chain of forces which interlock to create
parentification, it is hope that this example also demonstrates the
interlocking of intrapsychic and interpersonal processes described ear-
lier. Action and expectation are related facets of a unitary process,
neither fully comprehensible without the other.
One fairly clear illustration of this dialectic can be observed
in the evolution of action and expectation in the family therapy group
itself. The adults' attempts to dissuade Eva from her "co-therapist"
and most-active-member roles merely serve to highlight the expectations
placed on her and experienced by her in the group, as well as their
context of inaction by other members.
MRS K: Eva.
.
.you've sort of been built up over the past several
weeks or so. You're sort of expected to give a certain level,
and really, you don't have to live up to anything.
. . . Maybe
everybody here has placed you in a position where you think you
have to reach out. . . .
T 3: Well, that couldn't be helped, because Eva was the only one
in the group who came through.
. .
MRS K: I think her reason for going way out is because she felt that
if she didn't, the whole thing might flop here.
T 3: It's a shame that the responsibility laid on her shoulders
MR S: Eva, do you feel that because of whatever happened here, the
prime responsibility for any movement as far as we're concerned
is on your shoulders?
EVA: Yes.
Mr. Stein proceeds to try to verbally dissaude Eva but, as we might
suspect, his (in)actions speak much louder than his words.
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CHAPTER 6
Characteri st ic Patterns
Characteristic patterns of pa rent i f i cat ion include those roles,
responsibilities and relationships which constitute parent i fi cat ion
and by which it is recognizable. An analysis of these patterns can be
usefully divided into functional and ethical levels. The functional
level includes those attributes, family roles and related "callings"
which characterize the parentified child. The ethical level involves
the fundamental imbalance of reciprocity and accountability which is
an essential component of parent i f i cat ion . We begin here at the func-
t i ona 1 1 eve 1 .
One of the most common attributes of the parentified child is a
sort of pseudo-maturity which is the complement of the parents' imma-
turity. On tapes of family therapy sessions, and even in the short
and fragmented excerpts included here, one is struck when remembering
that Eva is only 12 or 13 years old. Her comments and the general
tone in which they are delivered suggest someone at least five years
older. We are reminded that Mrs. Stein dressed Eva "like a little old
lady" and asserts frequently that she is "much more mature" than her
peers
.
Progress notes on the Robbins family, cited earlier, remark on
the "outspoken,
. . .man-like" comments of the eight-year-old son.
This boy not only defends each parent against the other but does so
110
in long speeches (jarringly delivered with the speech imperfections of
a small child) on the responsibilities of marital partners and, in
general, on how it is with life. When his mother and sister caustic-
ally berate the inadequate father, Andy pipes up,
I know something. Y 1 know when Emily [his sister] says that Iknow what's in Emily's mind. She 'spects a man to go to the
grocery. She 'spects a man to iron things. But my mother does
that. A woman's job is to iron things, wash things and wipe the
dishes. A man's job is to carry furniture or like that but not
to go to the grocery.
Later Andy gives a short lecture (perhaps learned from his counselor
at school?) to the therapists evaluating the family for treatment:
ANDY: Can I talk? You see, when a person, when you're a little boy
and a person babifies you, when you get older you don't under-
stand the life. Now, if a person teaches you right from wrong,
you understand. Y' understand what I mean?
When one therapist asks Andy if he feels like "a man sometimes or a
little boy," he answers, "A man."
We recall that when Therapist 1 comments that Davie Gardner seems
more like one of the grownups in the room, Mrs. Gardner agrees empha-
tically, explaining how well he can carry on a conversation with an
adult. Case records observe,
He is anxious to please and generally worrisome. . . . Not
quite eight years old, he displayed a pseudo-maturity beyond
h i s yea r
.
Nagy notes that when therapy is successful with families such as these,
the parentified child is often observed to become more age-appropri-
ately ch i 1 d- 1 i ke
.
1 1
1
The "worrisome" quality referred to above in Davie Gardner is
another frequent characteristic of parentified children. Therapists,
and even family members, often identify a parentified child as "the
family worrier" (Spark, 1973). In Fajiimes, of the Shjms_, Minuchin et
aj_. give a concise example of one such "parental child."
Margaret is concerned not just for her mother, but more ba-
sically with keeping the family together.
. . . Though es-
sentially in her mother's camp, Margaret.
. .appears to be
the most "torn apart" or neurotic. Overburdened to ex-
tremes, Margaret often supercedes her mother. She can be-
come so "maternally worried" that she escorts Daniel from
the bus station despite a parental decision that he is old
enough to try it alone.
. . . During the sessions, any
allusion to the parental conflict makes her cry profusely.
She becomes mute, and looks very pained and distant (p
228).
Worry is the inheritance of the over-responsible. In these cases, it
reflects the development in the child of a sense of accountability for
events which far exceed his/her capacity for effective act ion--ei ther
because of their sheer magnitude or because of their fundamental in-
tractability. These childhoods are often absorbed in concern over
"chronic emergenices" and for this reason psychosomatic disorders may
be an "occupational liability" (see pgs . 155-159).
Furthermore, the parentified child's feeling of "being responsi-
ble for" family problems, in the sense of having to minister to and
hopefully resolve them, can shade into a feeling of "being responsi-
ble for," in the sense of having crea ted these problems. The fact
that, linguistically, both meanings are expressed by the same phrase
suggests a natural, if not strictly logical, cognitive association
between the two. This is illustrated by Eva Stein. Therapist 1 ob-
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serves in an early progress note that "Eva thought that her birth
finished the 'good' relationship between her parents." On the face-
sheets filled out, upon intake, for each family member, we find, under
"chief complaint" on Eva's form: "Believes she is the cause of par-
ents' emotional problems." Whether this belief was encouraged by her
parents or not, it conforms with Eva's objectively justified sense of
responsibility for all family problems. When problems persist, it
may be difficult for her to distinguish between the others' actions
and her own continuing failure.
These attributes reflect a variety of what we have referred to as
"cal 1 ings"--those specific types of tasks or duties for which the par-
entified child becomes respons i bl e--and the roles often associated
with them. We have proposed the term "calling" in this context for
its connotations of l) the child's perception of a real external need
for the burdens to be assumed, 2) his/her acceptance of those bur-
dens, and 3) the enormous influence they may come to exert over all
areas of his/her life.
One of the most common callings and related roles for the paren-
tified child is that of the ca re- taker
. S/he may serve in this capa-
city for any member of the family-parent or sibling, or even an ex-
tended family member who is essentially a part of the system, such as
a grandparent, aunt or uncle. The role of care-taker implies respon-
sibility for the "cha rge"-- respons i b i 1 i ty typically for physical care,
emotional care, or both. Responsibilities for physical care are fair-
ly obvious. They may include protecting a younger sibling from harm,
nursing an ill parent, being in charge of feeding family members,
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watching over an alcoholic parent to prevent self-injury, etc. Re-
sponsibility for emotional care is both more complex and more diver-
sified. But whatever form it takes, it requires both a sensitivity
to the feelings--especially the pain, distress, anxiety, and fear—
of the other and a commitment to action, such as attempts to comfort,
re-assure, support and defend the other.
The relationship between Ben and his older brother, Irving, in
the Rosenberg family provides a nice illustration of both physical
and emotional aspects of the care-taker role. Henry notes:
Irving has left his dishes for Ben to do. Later just be-
fore his mother came home, Ben washed and wiped all the
dishes (p. I 34)
.
.
.
.[Ben] said, "I like to be Irving's slave." Ben al-
ways makes his bed and puts things in order before he goes
toschool; if Irving does not, he will tell Ben to do it
and Ben will go upstairs and do it (p. 153).
Henry notes that on a typical day Mrs. Rosenberg leaves instructions
for Ben--
. .
.what to give Irving for lunch, when to turn on the
oven for the meatloaf, what to give me to eat and so on
• • • •
During the day, when she is at the office, she
calls up and checks with Ben to see what happened with
the repairman, whether Irving got his breakfast, whether
I have been fed, etc. (p. 121).
He observes that when Irving makes orange j u i ce
,
a puddle of concen-
trate is left on the counter until Ben wipes it up.
Henry asks Ben:
how it was that he did all the chores and he answered, "be-
cause Irving doesn't cook so good and because Irving gets
dressed fast in the morning and comes downstairs " so Benis left upstairs to make the beds (p. 131).
Ben says he does what he's told because if he doesn't
their mother "would get mad and kill both of us," so whenIrving goofs off, Ben does the work of both (p. 1 30) .
We can recognize the dialectic of actions and expectations which un
derlie this configuration.
In other observations we get a sense not only of Ben's slave-1
role in relation to Irving but of his concerned, almost protective
role as wel 1
.
Ben is Irving's "slave," performing many little chores for
him--even, I was told, to the extent of looking up words
in the dictionary for him.
. . . Irving calls using peo-
ple "effi c i ency" and is proud of it, but he needs Ben and
eve4 gets into his bed at night to sleep with his arm
jafound his brother, pressed against his back, as I saw (p
129-130).
At one point, Henry offers to take Ben any place he'd like to go,
but he said, "Not just now; I have to wait for Irving be-
cause I don't know if he has a key." When Irving came home
I asked him whether he carried a key and he said, "About
33% of the time," and showed me his on a long chain (p.
131).
In another exchange,
Ben asked Irving if he had had his milk, so Irving asked
him, chal lengingly, if he had had his milk. Ben tries to
be a mother to Irving, even to the point of provoking him
by anxious hovering; even to the extent of somewhat taking
on the maternal anxiety and dominance. What could be a
more perfect expression of this than the question, "Have
you had yourmilk?" (p. 131).
Henry comments on the significance of Ben's submi ss i veness for
1 15
rv i ng
.
When an observer stays with the boys he perceives a con-
stant interplay between them in which Irving tries to as-
sert himself over Ben. Irving does not always get pre-
cisely what he wants, but he gets enough to maintain the
appearance of dominance
. In this way--by relative sub-
miss ion--Ben does his brother a good turn; he manages to
make him feel big (p. 132).
Henry highlights the implicit trust between the boys when he makes the
fol lowing observat ion.
Irving is anger-prone because that is when he experiences
his most intense states of selfhood. Only when pouring
out his sense of irritated nothingness does Irving seem
to feel like something in the house. And it is safe to
pour it out on his brother because Irving knows he will
not lose him and will not be injured (p. 151).
While Henry may intend to suggest "injury" only in a literal, physical
sense here, it would seem justifiable to extend this to include injury
to self-esteem and pride as well.
Henry summarizes the relationship between the boys as follows.
Ben ministers to Irving's need for mothering without domin-
ation; hovering over him to see that he is fed, running
out to the store to buy a ball or French fries, allowing
his brother to snuggle close at night. Ben is the embodi-
ment of a maternal presence- -benevo 1 ence without domina-
tion (p. 1*»8).
The distinction between physical and emotional care-taker func-
tions is a useful one. Stierlin's (197*0 distinction between "simple
helping or supporting missions" and more "complex ego-support missions"
represents an analogous conceptualization. Nagy remarks,
Apart from.
.
.extremes of functional exploitation
It is not certain that reality-determined premature adultfunctioning has a crippling effect on the child similar tothat of guilt-laden exploitation of the child for emotional
rather than realistic needs (p. 155).
But however useful the distinction, it should not be interpreted as
absolute. In different relationships in different families, these
two types of responsibilities may be quite separate-parent i f i cat ion
being primarily of one type or the other-or they may converge inex-
tricably. The purpose of this discussion is to convey a sense of the
variety of respons i b i 1 i tes parent i fi cat ion may entail, not to develop
a taxonomy of exploitation.
In the Stein family, the care-taker function is quite clear in
Eva's relationship to her infantilized brother. The opening note on
the fami ly observes that Eva
is being used as a mother substitute for Michael to the
extent that he is hugging Eva and leans on her shoulder
throughout the session.
Her concern and protective caring for Michael are illustrated by her
intervention in the "cake incident," and by her remarks discussing it
af te rwa rds
.
EVA: I couldn't just stand there and see Michael get physically ill
to teach him something. ... I couldn't stand it when I could
do something about it.
When she is
was related
sponds
:
questioned by Mrs. Kerr as to whether her
to some facet of her relationship to Mrs.
i ntervent i on
Stein, Eva re-
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Well, I don't think so,.
. .it didn't have anything to do with
mother and me as much as I feel something between Michael and
father if something's wrong.
When asked if she thinks Michael shares her feeling of discomfort
with parental affection, she displays an ability to differentiate be-
tween Michael's feelings and her own, and to sensitively intuit his
response
.
EVA: Maybe Mikey has a different feeling than I do because mother's
affection towards Mikey is different from daddy's towards me.
Mommy treats Mikey,.
. .her affection is like a baby's affec-
tion, y'know.
.
.and Mikey resents that, but I don't think it's
the same thing.
In a rare exception to her typically global denial, Mrs. Stein
corroborates this perception of Eva's care-taker role towards Michael.
She remarks in one session,
We gave her responsibility for taking care of Michael quite a bit
when she was very little,
and in another session states this even more clearly,
She has always worried about him in the past. ... I f he
had a fight with a kid outside, she'd run and tell us about
it. She has always worried about Michael, way before this
thing [the cake incident] happened. ... It started from
the time he was born, she worried about him. ... We always
burdened her with Mikey. She had too much responsibility with
him from the day he was born. We had her baby-sitting with him
. . . . She used to take care of him constantly. ... It was
too much. And to this day if he has a fight with a kid outside,
she makes it her business.
This reference to "making it [Michael's fights] her business" expres-
ses a critical aspect of the care-taker role. The care-taker makes
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the other's pain his/her own business. It seems, in fact, as though
s/he is unable not_ to make this empathic transformation. Recall the
girl described by Minuchin et aJL who becomes so "maternally worried"
that she escorts her younger brother from the bus station in spite of
the fact that her parents feel he can do this by himself.
The parentified child's responsibility as a care-taker to a sib-
ling can also be seen in Steve's relationship with his scapegoated
brother, Larry, in the Lewis family. Steve works feverishly to run
offense for Larry against the parents and to support and defend him
when necessary. In one session, Larry has been rebuffed by his par-
ents and appears to have withdrawn, hopeless and depressed. Steve in-
terrupts the adults to make room for Larry to talk, which prompts one
therapist to ask if he is helping Larry or getting in the way.
STEVE: (very emphatically) Yeah, but Larry never talks, ... he
has his chance but he never talks about what he wants to talk
about
.
12: And you're gonna help him out?
STEVE: Yeah, I'm gonna tell him that when he does have the chance he
can talk.
T1 asks Larry if he sees this.
LARRY: No, I never can express what I feel, especially to dad,
12: Now you're starting a fight again.
STEVE: No, he's not. He's just continuing.
At another point, the parents have described an improvement in
their relationship over the past week. Larry, who later admits he
feels as if they are drifting away from him, comes in as a "spoiler,"
trying to ruin the mood. Tl focuses on his resistance to change, his
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being accustomed to getting attention by picking fights in the family.
LARRY: It's the only way I can get attention
Tl: That's right.
LARRY: (crying, pointing to himself emphatically) Because nobody
else wants to see the way
J_ feel about things.
Tl says he must talk about how he feels.
LARRY: I can't!.
. .
I can't do i t to dad because dad always over-
powers me.
. .
.
Both therapists try to convince Larry that he can talk to his parents
and to attribute his sense of "drifting away" to this withdrawal on his
part. At this point, Steve enters in, saying "Mom and dad have a lot
to do with it too. ... Ma keeps on saying.
. .
." Therapist 1 in-
terrupts and interprets this as Steve trying to "get into the act"--
that is, fighting. Steve asserts this is not his reason and continues.
STEVE: Like mom keeps on saying that she hates him and dad agrees
and then dad keeps on cursing.
. .
T2: What does she say? Mom says she hates Larry?
STEVE: That's what she says.
LARRY: Yes.
T2: She says that to Larry?
STEVE
:
Or, dislikes him.
LARRY: Yup.
MRS L: That 1 d i s 1 i ke him. Yes 1 have.
STEVE: Last night you just said that you hated him!
MR L: She was angry.
At another point, Steve, in tears, expresses his sense of injus-
tice at Larry's angry outbursts at him and prompts Larry to acknowledge
Steve's care-taker role.
STEVE: (c rying, bewildered, hurt) Larry gets angry with me for no
reason at all and I'm not even against him. Like he just did
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about the dishes, like that he works more than me. And I
never get angry with him. I mean for that.
MR L: You don't get angry at him.
STEVE: But he always gets angry at me. But I don't get farther away
I try to get closer to him.
MR L: I know you do.
LARRY:
\ feel Steve is the only one who likes me in this whole familySTEVE: (turns to Larry) You feel but you don't do! [Pause Tl asks'Larry to repeat what he said.]
LARRY: I feel that Steve is the only one who really loves me in this
whole family. I feel that he loves me more than Dale, mom and
dad (pointing, accusingly, at each in turn). I do!
More strictly in keeping with the literal meaning of parentifica-
tion, the parentified child may also be called upon to act as a care-
taker for one or both parents. Such a calling may involve any or all
of the components we have already descr i bed--phys i cal care, emotional
sensitivity and active protection, defense and support.
When Mrs. Stein is asked if she ever cries, she answers that Eva
says she cries about one a week. By answering in this way, she may
be playing the martyr, too selfless to descr i be--even notice--her pain
herself but, in any case, she tells us that Eva notices her pain and
is aware of it. Eva then identifies the source of Mrs. Stein's dis-
tress—the bookkeeping for which she is responsible.
EVA: 'She complains that they're too much on her and that's when she
cries. [Mrs. Stein tries to minimize the problem.] She worries
too much.
Eva's role as care-taker for both parents is most dramatically
exposed when they discover that each has experienced Eva as having
been "on his/her side" for years. She has so successfully comforted
and supported each one separately that both assumed s/he was her sole
charge
.
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MRS S:
;
•
-many a time she came to me to comfort me, and she'd speak
against him. Not in a horrible way, but in a way to make me feel
a little better.
EVA: In all the fights you and daddy had, who did I defend all of
the time? Whose side did I take 331 of the time?
MRS S:^ Basically, you took mine. You would tell me not to antagonize
him but you would feel for me and not for him. .
.
EVA: I took your side once and a while, but . . . 30% of the time
I took his side.
Mr. Stein, at another point, supports this, saying "Eva always would
verify what I said or come to my defense in the past." Eva may feel
she favored her father but what is more significant is that both par-
ents felt Eva was on "their side." Interestingly, in the family
therapy sessions, Eva manages to support her mother most of the time.
In one early session, Mr. Stein criticizes his wife by insinua-
tion, saying, "That's one thing I try to do, is keep my word with the
kids." Mrs. Stein is duly triggered and Eva comes to her defense.
MRS S: I don't keep my word with the children?
EVA: Oh, she does too, daddy. She does, daddy.
Later she defends her mother against Mr. Stein's charges that Mrs.
Stein is to blame for their present poor neighborhood.
EVA: Well, we have neighbors and sometimes we get into trouble and
pick fights and everything, and dad says it's mom's fault that
we picked the neighborhood. Yet how could she possibly know
what the neighborhood was like. . . ? He continues to remind
himself about Jersey. . .which wasn't half as good as he thinks
i t was
.
In an early session when Eva is still somewhat skittish in thera-
py, Mr. Stein blames his wife for Michael's problems. Eva whispers to
her mother who announces, "My daughter wants to mention that I'm blamed
for everything that happens." In a later exchange, Eva manages to re-
spond in a way which supports both parents simultaneously. Mr. Stein
says that recently his wife quiets the children out of consideration
for him, suggesting broadly that she had not cared enough to do so in
the past. Mrs. Stein says angrily that he just never noticed. Eva
enters the debate at this point.
EVA: Daddy, I don't think there's been any change in mother, but I
think maybe you've become more aware, 'cause ever since I can
remember she's said, "Don't make noise. Father's taking a nap."
MR S: Maybe I'm just becoming more aware of it.
The parentified child's role as care-taker to a parent is evident
in other families in this sample as well. Both opening and termina-
tion notes on the Gardner family refer to the eight-year-old boy's
worry over and efforts to protect Mrs. Gardner. And in the Robbins
family, 8-1/2-year-old Andy repeatedly comes to his father's defense
when the latter is criticized by his wife and daughter. At one point,
he interrupts a stream of abuse directed at his father and appeals to
one of the therapists.
ANDY: Wait, wait. I want to talk to you. Same is a good man
T1: Who?
ANDY: Sam, my father. He's a good man.
When Mrs. Robbins accuses her husband of never doing anything for her,
Andy rushes in again to defend his father.
ANDY: Remember Wednesday night?! . . . Y'know something. Wednesday
night my aunt watched me, remember? Daddy took you to the mo-
vies?
MRS R: (grudgingly) The first time in ten years. Took me out and
he couldn't wait to go home.
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Later Mrs. Robbins berates her husband for never teaching Andy any
sports. Once again he leaps into the fray.
ANDY: (to his mother) You don't argue with him! He taught me bask-
et bal 1 ! I real ly mean it!!
MR R: Footbal 1 .
ANDY: He taught me football and he taught me basketball and he taught
me like, ah, play golf and all that. He taught me them. You
could even ask everyone around my street that he took me.
The preceding examples illustrate some components of the parenti-
fied child's care-taker role in relation to both siblings and parents.
It is interesting to note in this context the "uncanny sensitivity"
to others' feelings which many investigators of schizophrenia have
observed and which some have related directly to a family constella-
tion comparable to parent i f i cat ion . For example, Slipp notes:
In 1951, Lidz reported that the usual pattern he found
with schizophrenia was not overt rejection of the child
by the mother during infancy.
. .but the use of the child
by the mother to complete her life, with rejection threat-
ened otherwise. The child then became burdened with the
continued responsibility for mother's existence, having to
develop an "uncanny sensitivity" to her feelings, and
could not develop a separate identity (p. 38 1 - 382 )
.
Searles' formulation of the attributes and responsibilities of the
"symbiotic therapist" is remarkably similar. Noting that this concept
"is of particular significance for psychotic patients," he suggests
that instead of being able to develop a separate self, for this type
of person,
life consisted basically in his postponement, as it were,
of his individuation, in the service of his functioning
symb i ot i ca 1
1
y as therapist to one or another of his family
no^
rS
'
° r
o^°
311 collecti vely in a family symbiosis
I 1 975
, p . 98) .
We will have more to say concerning the relationship between parenti-
fication and psychotic disorders in Chapter 8.
The remarkable or "uncanny" sensitivity of the parentified child
is a concommitant of the care-taker role. It is analogous to what
Sullivan referred to as "tenderness"--an almost visceral sensitivity
to the experience, especially the distress, of the other. Ironically
but predictably, we can get a better sense of the development of this
sensitivity by considering the normal impact of a needy, dependent
charge, such as an infant, on others. In the following passage, Erik-
son conveys this process quite well. We have only to mentally sub-
stitute the needy, dependent parent (or sibling) for the actual infant
with which Erikson is concerned. In view of the preceding discussion,
such a substitution scans remarkably well.
. .
.the smallest baby's weakness gives him power; out of
his very dependence and weakness he makes signs to which
his environment.
.
.is peculiarly sensitive. A baby's
presence exerts a consistent and persistent domination
over the outer and inner lives of every member of a house-
hold (1959, p. 55).
The reader should bear in mind, however, that this hyper-sens 1 1 i vi ty
of the parentified child may well involve a distorted perception of
the other, stemming from the pathological interdependence of care-
taker and charge. One characteristic form of this mi spercept ion , in
which care-taker activities become compulsive and intrusive, is dis-
cussed on pg. 158-159.
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When the primary calling of the parentified child involves care
and support of one or more individual family members, we can speak of
the care-taker role. Another common calling involves responsibility
to bridge or try to heal a serious relational breach in the family.
This breach is probably most often, although not exclusively, between
the parents. Nagy observes that
Even when children are not charged with overt care-taking
roles, they may function as cementing agents, holding
thei r parents * marriages together (p. 155).
But estranged or conflictual relationships may also exist between sib-
lings, between parents and siblings or, again, extended family members
P resent in > if n ot living with, the family. Parenthetically, such
conflictual relationships may theoretically involve more than two
participants but, even where this is the case, if the parties line up
into two polar camps, the parentified child's task is essentially the
same. Where alliances are less clear, more numerous and more fluidly
chaotic, the tasks of the parentified child obviously change. We
will refer to such situations below when we discuss the parentified
child's responsibility for the family as a whole.
Here too, the specific responsibilities which accompany this role
may be exercised in a variety of ways. The parentified child may be
called upon to translate between battling partners, to mediate dis-
putes, to literally stop fights which the embattled dyad experience
as uncontrollable. The child's role may be to encourage the partners,
to embody hope for the possibility of reconciliation, or to fulfill
more of an executive function by giving advice and trying to solve
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problems, acting in many ways like a therapist for the dyad. Or, the
parent! fied child may be called upon not so much to heal such a rela-
tional conflict as to help maintain it by filling the breach it cre-
ates. S/he may do this by carrying messages between members or by
serving in more complex ways to "pick up the slack" created by these
estrangements. In all of these cases, we can describe the role of the
parentified child as that of a "go-between" (Nagy, 1 973) . Some illus-
trations of these various patterns follow.
Case records for the Stein family observe that Eva
functions as an arbitrator for the parents. She has been
quite active in intervening in her parents' arguments in
an effort to save their marriage.
We have already described instances in which Eva serves as an ally for
both parents. In one instance already cited, when Mr. Stein implicit-
ly accuses his wife of being inconsiderate to him in the past, Eva
quite skillfully manages to support both her mother's efforts at con-
sideration in the past and her father's present flexibility in being
able to recognize this. In so doing, Mr. Stein is able to hear and
acknowledge what Mrs. Stein said earlier but he could not then accept.
Eva functions as a sort of marital therapist for her parents when she
gives her father advice on his demonstration of affection in the home.
After she expresses discomfort with his physical affection towards
her, he asks why she feels uncomfortable. She responds, "Because you
should show that affection to mother instead of me. And now you're
showing it all on me and you certainly don't show any of it to mother."
In the Harris family, Brian, only 7~l/2 years old, does the best
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he can to improve his parents' conflictual relationship. In one ses-
sion, as the couple's tone and the mood of the session becomes more
and more full of despair, Brian tries to divert their attention by:
shifting in his seat, sitting up in the air and plopping back down,
making noises with his mouth, banging and swinging his feet, and clown-
ing conspicuously. When his mother cries, he reacts noticeably and
finds a tissue for her. At one point, the therapist is forced to at-
tend to him and ask if it is OK to continue. Brian is seated between
his parents. The therapist ascertains that he chose that seat. In
order to remove him from the "line of fire," she asks if he would like
to change seats with one parent. He replies, "That's the way this
family should be lined up." The therapist asks if he means with him
in the middle. He laughs and nods yes. The therapist asks if he
doesn't want to move; he indicates he does not.
When the parents begin to discuss their anger towards one another,
Brian again diverts their attention. When his mother mentions the
month of June, he starts talking about his up-coming class trip in
that month. The therapist asks Brian how he feels when his parents
are angry. He says, "I wish I had earmuffs so I could put 'em on when
there's all that screaming in there." In this context, Mr. Harris
mentions that when he and his wife argue, Brian "usually tries to butt
in or come over and hug one of us." Therapist 2 asks if this has any
effect. He replies, ".
. .the times that we have [fought], when he's
done that, that usually does slow it down or stop it."
This is graphically demonstrated when, after a long interchange
between husband and wife, dripping with controlled anger, Mrs. Harris
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finally cries and expresses her sense of futility outright. We feel
(and the therapists note) that she has finally expressed a real gut
feel ing. Brian talks up.
BRIAN
MRS H
BRIAN
MRS H
Now you 1 re tal ki ng.
What?
Now you 1 re talking.
See
, now I'm ta 1 k i ng,
Therapist 2 asks Brian what he means.
BRIAN: (shyly, liking the attention, but covering his face) She got
all the stuff out of her, that she wanted to say.
Therapist 1 asks him to explain.
BRIAN: Just dragging some trash right out of your throat or some-
thing.
Mrs. Harris is touched and cries. Both therapists draw Brian out fur-
ther. There is a sense among all the adults of bright, laughing ap-
preciation for this unexpected and perceptive statement. Brian adds,
"Now I'm talking." What stands out in this sequence is not only that
Brian understands the catharsis his mother has experienced, but that
the whole mood of the room has lightened. The pain and despair of
the preceding discussion has been, at least temporarily, replaced by
a sense of possibility, almost joy. It is noteworthy that soon after
this moment, when his parents have sunk back into their depressed le-
thargy, Brian gives several indications of host i 1 i ty--pushi ng against
his father's arm, seeming to punch or almost punch his father's leg
and making an ambiguous but angry-sounding remark. Obviously we can-
not be sure, but it may be that these signs express a sense of protest
ar
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and resentment at having to exercise this function or at failing in
it so predictably.
In the Lewis family, as described earlier, Steve serves a simil
role and even greater powers are attributed to him. As he asserts and
as his parents emphatically corroborate, he can "stop the fights.
"
This family is of special interest here for two reasons. Firstly,
because another relational breach exists in addition to the conflict-
ual marital relationship and, secondly, because the "uses" of Steve
to fill this breach are somewhat more subtle than those we have ob-
served so far. While both parents actively scapegoat Larry, it is
obvious that the relationship between mother and son is more blocked,
antagonistic and poisoned, by her transference and his unmet needs,
than that between father and son. We have already heard that Mrs.
Lewis tells Larry she dislikes and even hates him. She says herself,
as though confronted with an insurmountable obstacle, "I can't talk
to Larry. I can't, Dr. T. I can't talk to Larry." In a situation
typical of scapegoat i ng , the parents, although they bait Larry, find
it unpleasant to interact with him. His provocative and obnoxious be-
havior expresses his sense of deprivation and injustice and must re-
ind them of their failure towards him as parents. Steve becomes
their means for escaping Larry.
MR L: I know that Larry's harder to get. . .to do things than
S teve
.
MRS L: And rather than argue a lot of times. .
.
MR L: Rather than arguing. . .
MRS L: I'll turn around and say, "Steve, do it for me please."
MR L: I did i t last night!
m
1 30
Mr. Lewis proceeds to explain how, when he returned from taking Steve
to the doctor, he found Larry had done only the bare minimum of his
chores
.
MR L: And Larry was upstairs. Whatever he was doing I didn't want
to go see and I didn't want to argue with him. And I asked
Steve, I said, "Steve, I know you don't feel well. I'm going
out to get your prescription. Would you please help me out now
and clean the table off, and wash the dishes or finish in the
ki tchen?"
MRS L: Like I'll say, "I don't want to ask Larry. I don't want to
get in an argument with him. Would you set the table?"
T2: That makes Steve responsible for you and Larry not fighting!
.
. .
Steve gets used as a peace-maker. If he'll do the dishes,
then you won't have to fight with Larry. So Steve, it's your
responsibility to keep this family not fighting. That's sort
of sad if the best he can do in this family is to keep the peace.
That doesn't give him much space for himself and his own feel-
ings-
• • •
Steve has been picking up a lot of the slack in
this family for a long time.
This excerpt suggests that the responsibility of the parentified
child may extend not just to one or more individual family members
or even to dyadic relationships between members but, indirectly or
even directly, to the family as a whole. Steve keeps the whole family
from fighting. As Therapist 2 points out,
T2: Steve.
. .ends up being respons i b 1
e
. Right? He's taking care
of Larry; he's gonna take care of his parents.
MR L: He takes care of Dale. . .
T2: So here's Steve, sort of holding things together. And at some
hurt to his insides.
The parentified child may be charged with responsibility for the sur -
vival of a "capta i n"- 1 ess
,
drifting family, the i ntegr i ty of a rela-
tional ly-torn
,
centrifugal family, the " repa i r" of a crisis-torn
family, or the resuscitation of a stagnant, depressed family. These
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configurations are often dramatically illustrated when families are
"sculpted" with one member, like Atlas, supporting all the others or,
instead, trying to hold together members who are pulling away in oppo-
site di rect i ons
.
Both these callings can be seen in the example cited earlier
from Minuchi n et al
.
.
.
.Margaret is concerned not just for her mother but more
basically with keeping the family together. ... she
.
.
.is obsessed about getting a job to "fix" the family
(p. 228).
Eva also tries to "fix" the family in her own way--that is, by her
work for the family in their therapy sessions. Eva, with one or two
very minor exceptions, is the only member of the family who asks
questions and pursues answers in therapy. On numerous occasions the
impetus for direction and progress in the family and the group comes
when Eva breaks into a hopeless and familiar stalemate to raise a
real issue. We have already seen her acting as a sort of marital
therapist for her parents. In another session when Mr. Stein ex-
presses confusion as to how to deal with her changes, she tells him
he will have to find a new way to relate to her. Therapist 1 refers
to "the child's leadership. . . . The child drags the parent, until
the parent has the courage to face it in himself." In a later ses-
sion, he summarizes the situation neatly.
Tl : What is Eva's role? ... Is she a child? When we see the family
here, usually Eva is the one who has the courage of making a
step towards something that might bring progress in the family.
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Clearly, Eva's work in therapy has several motivations, including the
personal validation and support for individuation she experiences in
that context, her strong identification with the therapists, and the
validation of those therapeutic skills which she has developed in her
role as parentified child. But in addition to these factors, it is
obvious that Eva is working in therapy as she has been shown to work
at home to sustain and perhaps to "fix" the family.
Ben appears to serve a somewhat similar function in the Rosenberg
family. Henry observes:
. .
.he has been chosen by the others to be a girl. They
need someone with the gratifying capabilities of a woman,
without Mrs. Rosenberg's nagging and violence. Mrs.
Rosenberg needs someone to keep her company and to re-
1 ieve her of the burden of being a woman; someone to help
her take care of the family and of the house (p. 169).
Lacking a truly feminine figure in the house, Irving and
his father have turned to Ben, whose qualities of yield-
ingness and softness are lacking in the mother. Thus, in
his curious way, Ben makes living in this house possible.
While Irving is everything the parents fear and despise,
Ben symbolizes what everybody longs for (p. 1 8 5 ) -
In a family remarkably lacking in affection and warmth, Ben provides
what little there is for his brother and parents. In this way, par-
entified children often come to embody those qualities, such as car-
ing, concern, hope, vitality, and dependability, whose absence makes
life so empty or unbearable in the family. Instead of being shared,
distributed or traded off among members, it is as though these qual-
ities were siphoned "out" of them and "into" the parentified child
whose autonomous needs are neglected in his/her responsibility to
dutifully collaborate in this drama.
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The previous discussion has focused on some of the most common
roles and responsibilities exercised by the parentified child. In so
doing, it approaches parent i f i cat ion from a functional level of ana-
lysis. But parenti ficat ion must also be examined from an ethical
level of analysis, one which is concerned with the balance of justice
between members of a system. It asks not "Who does what?" but "What
is the nature of reciprocity between members?"; "Are acts of devotion
repaid?"; "Is exploitation repaired?"; "Can the system correct for
inevitable, temporary unfairness?"; "Do all members experience others
as sufficiently accountable to merit a basic sense of trust?". At
this level, parent i fi cat ion is seen as a relational configuration
which involves a fundamental imbalance of reciprocity. Since detailed
illustrations of the responsibilities, callings and sacrifices of par-
entified children have been offered throughout this paper, it will be
unnecessary to repeat these illustrations in equal detail here. In-
stead we will refer back to them in conjunction with additional data
on the lack of reciprocity experienced by the parentified child. In
this way, we hope to communicate the ethical context in which these
sacrifices and responsibilities are embedded.
Reciprocity, as well as its violation, takes many forms. Its
context is a dialogue of actions between members but its "coin" is
remarkably variable. Reciprocity entails mutual accountability. But
accountability for what? Some fundamental elements of this account-
ability, especially in a parent's relationship to a child, would ap-
pear to be: to at least attempt to consider the other's experience,
to be available to meet some of the other's needs, to protect or de-
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fend the other, to aid, support or help the other when called upon,
and to share control over the definition of mutual expectations,
rights and ob 1 i gat i ons— i n other words, over the terms of the rela-
tionship. In the families of these parentified children, accounta-
bility flows unevenly. This has been implicit in all the preceding
discussion and can be made explicit here by summarizing and supple-
menting data already presented.
In the Rosenberg family, Ben is Irving's "slave," his care-taker.
He performs various chores for Irving, such as cooking, cleaning,
washing, running errands, etc. He is available as an object for Ir-
ving's needs--his dependency, his need for a positive se 1 f -def i n i t i on
and his need for an object for his anger, Ben expresses concern for
Irving in his anxious mothering. And although Ben obviously derives
some satisfaction and sense of identity from this arrangement, he
actually receives very little in return. Irving's actions towards Ben
are, with few exceptions, consistently selfish. Henry cites a typical
example in which he observes Irving ask Ben if he wants some orange
juice. Ben turns to Henry and says, "Irving wants me to drink up
what is left of the orange juice so he can make lemonade in the con-
tainer." Ben declines. Irving makes the lemonade anyway and a mess
in the process which Ben cleans up later. Irving offers lemonade to
no one. Henry observes:
Knowing how selfish his brother is, when Ben is suddenly
offered something he surmises it is not out of solici-
tude, and a few minutes later Irving reinforces skepticism
when, having made lemonade, he does not offer any to his
brother (p. 132).
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In their play together, the "power of definition" over the terms
of the relationship is consistently in Irving's hands. Ben is the
foil for Irving's imagining himself, in play, as a big league pitcher,
Irving badgers Ben for moving too slowly at chess; the game is to be
played at his speed.
Irving blames Ben for crossing him, and in this view Ben
deserves to be punished. What is so striking is the ex-
clusively internal, personal definition of the relation-
ship, and Ben's failure to take a strong stand aqainst
it (p. 152).
Henry comments,
Ben has learned to give in, has filled himself with the
needs of everyone else but has become empty to himself,
and this emptiness afflicts him like an illness.
. . .
In the Rosenberg family we see how the search [to bal-
ance needs] has become a catastrophe-- I rv i ng giving no-
thing and Ben giving so much that he has nothing left
for h i mse If (p. 1 66)
.
This relationship reminds us of that between the Lewis brothers where
Larry, like Irving, is a miserable, scapegoated child. We recaH the
moment when Steve pours out his sense of unfairness and bewilderment
at Larry's treatment of him, crying that Larry gets angry at him and
blames him for things when Steve never gets angry at his brother and
is the only family member who tries to get closer to him.
The lack of reciprocity experienced by the parentified child is
even more clear in the Stein family. Eva is sensitive to her bro-
ther's feelings, she worries about him, cares for him, protects him.
She is sensitive to both parents' feelings, shows concern over her
mother's distress, defends and supports both parents. She tries to
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help them in their marital relationship and works for the whole family
in therapy. She receives very little in return. Neither parent
demonstrates an ability to consider Eva's distress. When, in an in-
terchange already cited, she sobs out her sense of being denied as a
person, her parents make no effort to help her and their indifference
to her pain is noted by others in the group. She understands that,
in the family system, she is on her own. This indifference is remin-
iscent of Margaret's family described by Minuchin et aj_. They ob-
serve that
During the sessions, any allusion to the parental conflict
makes her cry profusely. She becomes mute, and looks
very pained and distant. During the office fights, while
she cries, the rest of the children appear unrelated, in-
different-looking, or busy as a tight, playful affectionate
subsystem (p. 228).
Nor are the Steins any more able to respond to Eva's assertions
of autonomy, her observations and interpretations of situations. We
have seen how Mrs. Stein permits Eva to talk but invalidates her ob-
servations and her credibility, while Mr. Stein is so threatened by
her perceptions that he tries to forbid her to speak, attempting to
overpower her with argument or, if all else fails, with "authority."
Nor is she protected from the fallout of the marital battles by ei-
ther parent, nor from either parent by the other. Mr. Stein, as he
often says, no longer tries to control his wife and, like Mr. Rosen-
berg, with only token protest gives his wife a free hand with the
children. Similarly, Mrs. Stein, who asserts she feels her husband
unfairly restricts and overpowers Eva, has only this help to offer
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her
.
MRS S: In the past there were other incidents.
. .and she has come
to me for comfort. ... But al 1 I have done or can do is to
tell her that we all have our good and bad points and we have
to be accepted with each, that's all.
The clear implication here is that Mr. Stein must "be accepted" by
Eva, not the reverse. These parents have an unspoken agreement to
allow each other to exploit the children in the method of their choice.
The lack of reciprocity can be observed also in discrepancies be-
tween demands expressed by family members in the home. This topic is
raised in one of the Stein family sessions, in the context of a dis-
cussion of Michael's extreme demand i ngness
. Michael, severely infan-
tilized, cannot sleep unless one of his parents lies down in bed with
him, talks or sings to him, or takes him into their bed. At the age
of nine, he waits in the bathroom for one of his parents to wipe him
which he supposedly cannot do for himself. His practically insatiable
demands are suggested in the following excerpts.
MRS S: He calls me and I give him a drink and I soothe him and some-
times he asks me to lie down with him. And if 1 tell him "No,"
immediately he says, "Well, I'll stay awake all night then be-
cause I had a bad dream." . . . Cause I ' ve seen him keep him-
self awake. . . . Now, he used to do something that I talked
him out of. Before he would go to sleep, he would say, "I'm
having bad dreams." (laughs) It took me about three months to
talk him out of that, but I finally convinced him.
EVA: Michael watches TV and I want to practice piano because I
have to and my brother say "after this program, Eva" and then
doesn't stick to his promise.
MRS S: But I make him, don't I?
EVA: (grudgingly, half-hearted) Yeah, lately.
T2 : Why do you have to make him?
MR S: Because no one else does.
MRS S: There are certain favorite programs a child has.
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EVA: Every program's his favorite program.
Therapist 1 points out that, by contrast,
Eva seems to have no demands.
MR S: I think with Eva there's a little more consistency and unity
with us .
T1
: Does she have any demands?
MRS S: Once and a while she might ask for a little water.
EVA: No, I get it myself.
MR S: Eva's a little more self-sufficient than Michael.
Remarkable here are how little distinction the parents make be-
tween their children in this area, how absurdly Mrs. Stein attempts
to demonstrate Eva's demands, and how quickly Eva torpedoes even this
pathetic assertion. At another point, Mrs. Stein is again trying to
show that Eva, like Michael, gets her own way. Mr. Stein is exercis-
ing his typical role of making a token defense of Eva, at least par-
tially in the interests of attacking his wife.
MRS S: When she says quiet and that's on [a favorite television show],
everybody's quiet.
MR S: (tight-lipped anger, slowly for emphasis) Because that's the
only demand she makes.
Mrs. Stein agrees weakly.
A brief episode which takes place when a session has ended and
the members are getting ready to leave provides an illustration of
the differences between Michael and Eva in their level of demands and
of Mrs. Stein's typical response to each of them.
MICHAEL: (excited, pleading) Mommy, can we go outside? Oh! Can we
go outside?
MRS S: I said when school's over.
MICHAEL: Oh mommy, please (cute, pleading tone).
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MRS S: (suddenly softening) Oh, M i key
, no.
MICHAEL: (more defiant) Mommy, why not?
. . . (whining) Mommy I want
to go outside for a little bit!
MRS S: In a couple of weeks, Michael.
MICHAEL: (a howl of protest) No!!
MRS S: (harshly) Get your feet up from under that ruq'
MICHAEL: No!!
MRS S: (louder) I said get your feet out from under the ruq 1
MICHAEL: (defiant) Why should I?
MRS S: Because you're not supposed to sit there, that's why. Good
enough answer?
MICHAEL: No.
MRS S: Because I told you to, now quick! No, you can't go out.
MICHAEL: I'm going outside.
MRS S: Better not.
MICHAEL: I am.
At this point another adult intervenes and tries to reason with Mich-
ael. Eva's brief interaction with her mother, in the midst of this
exchange, provides a telling contrast. She asks her mother whether
she should study some work for school or not. Mrs. Stein responds
quickly, brusquely and rather coldly, "I don't know what to tell you,
Eva." End of interaction.
It is obvious from the data that both parents, but especially
Mrs. Stein, actively encourage Michael's insatiable demands. Mrs.
Stein induces regressive dependency in Michael (which satisfies her
own needs) and then, with good reason, experiences him as an uncon-
trollable force which can be placated only by capitulation. So Mich-
ael's induced but real man
i
pu 1 at i veness becomes the interpersonal ra-
tionalization for Mrs, Stein's own covert needs. There is, therefore,
an inevitable complementarity between Mrs. Stein's over-indulgence of
Michael and her under - i ndul gence of Eva. This complementarity is
again constituted by a dialectic of actions and expectations. As
Michael is indulged, he comes to need more and is experienced by his
mother as more needy; as Eva is neglected, she becomes satisfied with
less, and experienced as less needy. Expectation of need and grati-
fication of need are co-constitutive and, together, generate the com-
plementary positions of the two siblings. Eva must come up with "the
short end of the stick.'- In most immediate situations and over the
long term, Mrs. Stein will respond to Michael's needs over Eva's be-
cause they are so much more urgent and absolute for her. As she con-
tinues to respond, they will become that much more so.
In one session, Therapist 1 asks Mr. Stein who is the most rea-
sonable member of the family.
MRS: There isn't. [Therapist 1 presses] I ' m ego-cent r i c . I'll
say me.
Therapist 1 presses again—not Eva? In a qualified and half-hearted
tone, Mr. Stein responds,
Yes, reasonable for a child.
MRS S: And I think I am.
MR S: Natural ly.
TT: Because here, Eva seems to be the reasonable one, in that she
is willing to consider others, and not demanding, almost too
good to be true.
EVA: Oh, my brother and I have fights.
MRS S: (interrupting) Oh, they argue, they argue.
Therapist 1 asks about demands on them as parents.
MRS S: Oh, she wants to go bowling sometimes. Don't think she's
ange 1 i c
.
MR S: (softly) No, she's not angelic.
MRS S: Besides, an angel in our house would be lost, I think.
In view of Mrs. Stein's refusal to acknowledge Eva's sexuality, it
would seem that Eva can be allowed neither the credit due an angel
nor the needs of a human being.
In this last remark, Mrs. Stein touches on a crucial point. The
parentified child may not be an angel (although, as suggested, s/he
is often forbidden to be anything but angelic), but s/he is, in a
variety of ways, "lost" in the family. The parentified child "loses"
in terms of an imbalance of reciprocity. S/he is "short-changed."
In another sense, the parentified child is "lost" as one might be
lost in a storm--over- looked. This brings us to a discussion of the
possible effects of parent i f i cat i on on the parentified child.
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CHAPTER 7
Effects
This chapter is concerned with the effects of pa rent i f i cat i on
,
which means, in essence, its negative effects. We have already al-
luded to possible positive effects of parent i fi cat ion
,
including its
role in the development of responsibility and care for others in the
child and its contribution to his/her emerging sense of identity and,
perhaps, competence. However, unless these developments take place
in a context of balanced reciprocity and mutual accountability, their
potential contributions will be overshadowed by the significantly
harmful effects of parent i fi cat ion . In keeping with our focus on the
pathogenic form of pa ren t i f i cat i on , we will concentrate in this chap-
ter on these harmful effects. However, two qualifications are in
order,
First, conclusions about the effects of parent i f i ca t i on
,
espe-
cially in light of the limited empirical data available here, must
necessarily be tentative and hypothetical. Without access to either
longitudinal data or data from a much larger number of families, we
can only make tentative guesses about whether the processes we ob-
serve in these families will result in certain configurations for the
parentified child and whether certain observable results can, in fact,
be traced back to the relational structure of parent i f i cat i on . Never-
theless, in spite of this uncertainty, it is considered worthwhile to
try to state some assumptions about the probable impact of parentifi-
cation on the parentified child, both during childhood and, by impli-
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cat ion, in 1 ater 1 i fe.
Second, it would be foolish to assert the inevitability of such
effects, and no such assertion is here intended. The continuing life
of the child may offer a variety of opportun i t i es-for changes in
other family members and consequently in the family as a whole, for
new relationships for the child, and for creative adaptation by the
child (and later, adul t ) -wh i ch may help him/her to transcend limita-
tions imposed by early parent i f i cat i on . Actual family or individual
therapy represent only one form of such opportunities. Strong at-
tachments with significant adults or peers, including an eventual
spouse, may also provide resources and a context for necessary growth
and rebalancing. With this in mind, the effects of pa rent i f i cat i on
to be discussed are seen as logical consequences of the pressures,
binds, and prolonged imbalance of parent i fi cat ion--poss i bl e , even
probable, but by no means, unavoidable, consequences.
One serious constellation of effects resulting from parentifica-
tion involves the impa i rment of the child's individuation and auto-
nomy. The normal developmental processes of differentiation of self,
i ncreas i ng se 1 f-def i n i t ion and se 1 f -d i rect ion , and transfer of loyal-
ties to new relationships may be significantly impeded if not crip-
pled by parent i f i cat ion . Pa rent i f i ca t i on sabotages the "liberating
dialectic" referred to by Stierlin. We can discuss a variety of im-
mediate causes and consequent forms of this impairment of individua-
tion.
The induction through attribution and the mystification of the
child-what Stierlin referred to as "ego-b i nd i ng"-- i nterfere with
his/her ability to correctly perceive and trust his/her own percep-
tions, thoughts, feelings, and even actions. S/he is more likely to
doubt his/her own experience and to remain dependent on, the reflected
attributions and appraisals of others. In other words, the child's
self-concept is rendered more vulnerable to the external vicissitudes
of interpersonal relationships. Similarly, the manipulation of loyal-
ty, excessive guilt and responsibility ("superego binding") makes
moves towards se 1 f -def i n i t i on and individuation which threaten the
parentified child's "charges" tantamount to acts of betrayal. The
sense of abandoning a helpless dependent—whether it be parent, sib-
ling, marriage or family as a whole—can so overwhelm the child that
normal moves towards independence and new relationships become impos-
sible. It is not uncommon in cases of a child's school phobia to dis-
cover an extremely dependent parent who covertly encourages the child
to stay at home. In terms of relationships outside the family, Nagy's
earlier observation is instructive.
The parentified child is in an especially difficult posi-
tion in considering new commitments like marriage or par-
enthood. Not only may he violate the loyalty of belonging
but also the commitment to caretaking (p. 161).
For this reason, it may not be uncommon for the parentified child to
experience the devastating and potentially self-destructive "breakaway
guilt" as a separating adolescent which Stierlin describes. In this
way, ego-binding and superego-binding conspire to keep the parentified
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chiid avai.able to the family or to specific members as an object and
not a person.
This thralldom to the family represents both cause and effect of
the impairment of individuation. Out of his/her excessive sense of
responsibility for the survival or stability of family members, the
parentified child is overly invested in the family and finds difficult
the transition to roles and relationships outside the family. As a
result, the parentified child is often isolated from peer contact.
When the subject of peer relations comes up in the Stein family ses-
sions, Eva reluctantly explains,
y
el1
' • ' •
1 dor,,t 9o out to, y'know. ... | ' m rather shy and
I sort of like to keep to myself. And once I learn, if there's
a group, once I learn the ways of the group and what I'm ex-
pected to do and what I'm not expected to do, like school and
the^class room, once I learn about it, I follow it. And there
isn't any trouble. I don't get much from them. I don't give
much . . .
T3: How would you like to feel with these people, Eva?
EVA: Well, in the past four months, I've been quite at ease with
them. I've been getting along better.
. .
T3: That's how you feel now with them?
EVA: (weakly, unsure) I think it's OK. [silence]
T3: You say it with a question-mark. I don't know.
EVA: (same tone, unconvincing) I think it's OK.
Jules Henry observes a similar isolation on the part of the Rosen-
berg brothers.
Their mother says they enjoy so much being with each other
that they don't need other children .... (p. 133).
Except for the necessary trips to school, close to home
and for private games with a small rubber ball on the pave-
ment outside their home, Irving and Ben did not go out.
Whi le I was there, only one friend phoned, and the brothers
called no one. . .once away from school they had practic-
ally no one but each other, their parents, and a (despised)
teenage male relative ... (p. 129).
AndyvRobbins and Davie Gardner are both described in case records as
having poor peer relationships. This dialectic of investments is
self-perpetuating. The parentified child's investment in family re-
lationships increases his/her isolation in the peer world and his/her
discomfort with this isolation reinforces investment in the family.
A similar dynamic operates in terms of the parentified child's
pseudo-maturity. We have already seen data illustrating this quality
of the parentified child in Eva Stein, Andy Robbins and Davie Gardner.
Eva, we recall, was even dressed "like a little old lady" by Mrs.
Stein. This pseudo-maturity seems likely to further alienate the par-
entified child from age-mates and, in so doing, to deprive him/her of
an exposure to more age-appropriate models which might counter these
precocious patterns.
By impeding the transition from familial to social roles, paren-
tification deprives the child of the resources available in the peer
network and in close friendships. Both Sullivan (1953) and Erikson
(1959) describe the important contributions these relationships can
make to the healthy development of the c h i Id— in correcting idiosyn-
cratic and often incorrect impressions about the world and the self,
and in contributing to a sense of identity, self-esteem and belonging
in the wider world beyond the home.
A related facet of this impairment of individuation concerns the
impact of paren t i f i cat ion on the child's identity. And while it was
stated earlier that parent! ficat ion may initially contribute to a
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sense of identity in the child, in the context of prolonged unilateral
demands for care and responsibility, parent i f i cat ion constitutes a
major obstacle to the child's ability to fashion an autonomous, self-
directed identity. S 1 i pp expresses this quite clearly.
.
.
.the child does not learn to. . .experience a total
sense of self or self-awareness apart from the family
Thus, he does not form a stable, autonomous and permanent
mental image of himself, and continues to be excessively
influenced by his ongoing family relationships. Not hav-
ing sufficiently developed self-esteem and ego identity
the identified patient is unable to be spontaneous and
assertive, but remains constantly reactive to others.
In addition, we repeatedly noted that the i dent i fi ed
'
pa-
tient needs to perpetuate this.
. .pattern, since otherwise
he fears he would cease to exist.
. . . Thus, his self-
def
i
ni t ion continued to remain react i ve and relat ionaTT
i.e., he continued to remain excessively dependent upon
his family relationships for his self-esteem and eqo-
identity (p. 378).
Parent i fi cat ion encourages the creation of an identity around, as it
were, an external hub. This is most dramatically illustrated in some
of Jules Henry's observations of Ben when he is alone and when he is
wi th his brother.
Since Ben had no school after 12 o'clock, afternoons were
long drawn-out, excruciatingly empty and boring and he
started to exist only when Irving came home (p. 132).
After lunch.
. .1 found Ben sitting downstairs on the sofa
in the living room staring into space and twiddling with
his glass marbles. Then he got down on his knees by the
ottoman on which there was a newspaper open to an ad for
some dry goods or drugstore and he read that. ... He
went to the door and looked out (p. 167).
After. . .Irving had left, Ben wandered in a do-less, aim-
less way, first fingering his marbles and then putting them
on the floor and playing with them in a half-hearted, not
very competent way (p. 166).
1 k8
I asked Ben what he does with his spare time, and it seems
^th^r'riee):"
TV
J
«Uh°!r ^ TY . r0°m fr°m 3 ha,f
- h°^ of watching
w.t Ben.
. . | t
'
s obvious that he didn't get muchout of the p,cture because he spent so much time lookingaWay
:
• * *
At one P° int he said, "Only six hours to qo "meaning that there were only six more hours to the gradua-tion ceremony. Sitting there with Ben, I had the impres-
sion of oceanic boredom.
. . (p. 166).
In a similar vein, Henry offers at one point to take Ben to a delica-
tessan
.
I asked him whether he would like some pickles. He thoughtfor a moment and then said, "I don't think Irving needs
any." I asked him if he wanted something, and he said "Idon't need anything" (p. 131).
Henry comments on this boredom and emptiness.
When Ben is alone he aches with time; only when his bro-
ther comes home does this pain leave him, for since he
cannot stand f reedom- i n-t i me , his bondage to his brother
is sweet (p. 1 6 7)
.
Ben has learned to give in, has filled himself with the
needs of everyone else but has become emoty to himself,
and this emptiness afflicts him like an illness (p. 166).
Irving is the metaphysic of Ben's existence for Irving's
dependence and even his tyranny give his brother a reason
for being. Irving is Ben's flight from nothingness (p.
132).
Irving is existence, and when he is not present, Ben does
not exist as a self (p. 1 6 7)
.
Over time, the parentified child may come to experience him/herself
as incomplete without his/her charge. S/he may, with good reason,
know of no way to be, alone or with another, other than as a care-
taker or a go-between. Once this state of affairs can be said to
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exist, it provides in itself, as already suggested, a powerful induce-
ment for the child to collude in perpetuating his/her parent i f i ca t i on
.
S/he may come to feel s/he is nothing without it.
The "success" of this development depends on a particular con-
striction of personality which is another negative effect of parenti-
fication. Its sources can be described in several ways but their com-
mon effect is to allow only certain, typically "positive," traits and
roles to be accepted as aspects of the parentified child's identity.
Returning to Erikson's concept of initiative, whereas it was suggested
earlier that paren t i f i cat i on both nourishes and is nourished by this
sense of initiative, here we must note that it is not initiative per
se_ which is strengthened but a selective and conditional form of ini-
tiative. Namely, initiative for those activities which support, pro-
tect and care for family members. Other forms of initiative, such as
forming new relationships, being adventurous in the interests of play
and recreation, developing skills related to school and peer group
activities, may be ignored, covertly or even overtly discouraged to
the degree that they conflict with parentified responsibilities. Whe-
ther initiative is "good" or not becomes conditional on whether or
not it serves the others' needs and interests, not the child's. For
example, Minuchin et al. note that
Margaret is understandably phobic about seeking life or
relationships outside the home; she has trouble making
friends and is obsessed about getting a job to "fix" the
family (p. 228).
In other words, over the long run, the child suffers a real loss
of personal autonomous initiative. Erikson himself suggests such a
possibility in discussing the role of guilt, which we can relate, at
least in part, to the family's active discouragement of "bad," i.e.,
non-parent i fied, initiative.
The consequences of guilt aroused at this stage [initiative
vs. guilt] often do not show until much later, when con-
flicts over initiative may find expression in a self-re-
striction which keeps an individual from living up to his
inner capacities or to the powers of his imagination and
feel ing.
. . (p. 8l )
.
The child may lose the ability to see him/herself making choices and
the growth of self-esteem and self-confidence which accompany such
percept i ons
.
Burdened with the "commitment of the care-taker," discouraged
from autonomous activity and often restricted to the relational world
of the family, the child may lose the flexibility to experiment with
different roles and identifications, to feel free to "try on" and
discard different personalities in a gradual, if tentative, process
of identity formation. Because the price of such vital experimenta-
tion is so high the child may be forced to settle for the identity
s/he has evolved in the family. Again, Erikson indicates a similar
process when he describes the danger that
. .
.his sense of identity can remain prematurely fixed
on being nothing but a good little worker or a good lit-
tle helper, which may not be all he could be (p. 88).
More specifically, one common form such constricted identities
may take in parent i fi cat i on involves characteristics of competence and
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"goodness" (essentially, compliance and selflessness) and the disso-
ciation of a host of other traits or facets of personality. Slipp
offers an excellent description of this process.
.
.
.even a positive introject projected onto the child
I
such as the "good parent"] was found to be damaging Ac-
ceptance was so conditional on being hyperf unct ional there
was no tolerance for failure or inadequacy. Thus, the
child had no authentic base to develop 1 eg i t i ma te ' se 1 f
-
esteem and needed to dissociate divergent feelings and
thoughts. The child felt compelled to incorporate only
the good introject and could not spontaneously identify
and integrate aspects of his parents that he selected in
order to achieve an autonomous identity (p. 386-387).
Experience of self as needy, rebellious, mischievous, angry, resent-
ful, overwhelmed, troubled, or confused, and the expressions of such
facets of personality may be implicitly forbidden.
In view of earlier discussion, we should expect the parents' at-
tributions, which play an important part in the child's induction into
the parentified role, to constitute a significant vehicle for this
selection of acceptable traits. Some of Jules Henry's observations
of Mr. and Mrs. Rosenberg's attributions and mis-attributions concern-
ing their sons are instructive in this context. Henry cites several
instances in which the boys are fighting and, although Ben is observed
by Henry both to provoke fights and to enjoy them, Irving is blamed
by the parents. In one instance, Ben provokes an attack by hitting
Irving and when Irving tries to quit, Ben provokes him to continue.
Mr. Rosenberg rushes out to stop the fight.
Then Irving got sore because they blamed him, and Mr. Rosen-
berg said, "You're stronger. Why should I blame Ben?" (p.
146),
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This mis-attribution and its subsequent transmutations illustrate
an escalating dialectic of attributions which transforms a fleeting
individual mis-attribution into a virtually indestructible family myth
The following evening when relatives are visiting, Mrs. Rosenberg's
brother asks Irving why he attacked Ben. Ben interrupts, saying he
enjoyed the fight. The relative then accurately observes to Mr. Rosen-
berg, "So obviously your interference was entirely unnecessary and un-
cal led for."
Mr. Rosenberg said that Irving was in the wrong--since he
was on top, he must be in the wrong. But actually, when
he came out to interfere, the boys were lying side by side
on the ground. Mr. Rosenberg said that he was afraid Ir-
ving would injure Ben--that he might throw a knife (n
138).
VP '
So, mis-attribution is compounded by mis-perception and, so far as we
know, completely unfounded expectation. Later, mi s
-percept i on becomes
foundation for further mis-attribution when Mrs. Rosenberg discusses
the fight wi th Henry
.
In talking with me in the kitchen Mrs. Rosenberg said that
what made Irving mad was being confronted with the fact
that he must have been the aggressor, since he was on top
(p. I 39-140)
.
The sequence has come full circle, from initial to secondary mis-at-
tribution. In the process, several transformations have been effected
An initial mis-attribution by one parent has hardened into a piece of
"accepted family history" shared by both parents. Now granted the
status of fact, this error is employed as explanatory proof! ... in
order to further blame Irving for his anger at the initial mis-attri-
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bution!.
. .
and thereby to exonerate both Ben and his parents from
any blame.
Henry comments that
.
.
.since the fights are common, occur a couple of time
a day and have been going on for a long time, strong forces
must be at work compelling the parents to see Irvinq in the
wrong (p. Hi).
In a similar incident, he observes that
.
.
.the parents, each ascribing different motivations to
Irving, discuss the dinner-table argument as if it revolved
entirely around him, though Ben was involved too (p. 158).
These incidents suggest a dialectic of attributions— specifically,
blame--in which one family member is made "bad" in inverse relation-
ship and to the degree that another is made "good." Ben and Irving
share responsibility for fights they both enjoy. But in their par-
ents' eyes (and so eventually in their own, to some extent), Irving
is the "bad one" and Ben the "good"; Irving the attacker, Ben the vic-
tim. Such mis-attributions, ironically appearing to "spare" the par-
entified child, may serve to consign him/her to a sort of straight-
jacket of identity in which only a narrow segment of his/her potential
can be expressed and experienced.
In summary, parent i f i cat i on impairs the individuation and auto-
nomy of the child by interferring with his/her awareness and trust of
his/her own experience and by d i sconf i rmi ng the child when s/he at-
tempts to pursue his/her own needs; by keeping his/her identity essen-
tially relational and reactive, by tying the child to the orbit of
the home and by depriving him/her of the opportunities, resources and
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increments in sel f
-esteem wh i ch may accompany extra-familial relation-
ships and roles. In addition, the child is discouraged from express-
ing or experiencing potentially healthy traits which may conflict with
the parentified role as the parents and other family members see it.
S/he may lose the flexibility to experiment with tentative roles and
identifications in the gradual development of a satisfying sense of
i dent i ty
.
Parenti fication impairs the child by not permitting him/her_ to
real ly be a chi Id . In so doing, it seems likely to undermine later
development as an adult. Whatever initial "reserves" of trust and
autonomy may have been acquired during infancy may later be undermined
by subsequent exploitation in parent i fi cat ion . In addition, while it
is clear that the parentified child is deprived of some of what we
normally consider prerogatives of childhood, it is unclear what the
impact of such deprivations are likely to be. In this context, a
statement by Milner (1969) is intriguing. Discussing "the theme of
premature ego-development and the necessity, for healthy mental growth,
of recurring times when retreat into absent-mindedness is possible"
(p. 1 55) , she asserts
,
. .
.behind the states that are talked about by analysts
as auto-erotic and narcissistic there can be an attempt
to reach a beneficient kind of narcissism, a primary self-
enjoymen t--wh i ch , if properly understood, is not a rejec-
tion of the outer world but a step towards a renewed and
revitalized investment in it (p. 383).
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Winnicott (1965) also discusses this "capacity to be alone" as an
portant developmental achievement. As Milner suggests, most psycho-
logical literature on this subject only compounds the difficulty of
assessing the importance, for healthy development and relatedness, of
this ability to withdraw into oneself, to be available even if only
for brief periods to oneself alone. If the parentified child is never
really allowed to be "care-free," is s/he thereby deprived of resources
for subsequent development? The implication would appear to support
such a view.
The results of such loss, deprivation and depletion of "reserves"
may not be felt until much later in life when their contribution to
diminished trust, flexibility and self-confidence may affect, for the
worse, the individual's decisions and sense of success in his/her
life. The consequent disappointment or bitterness may seriously in-
terfere with later relationships, as will be briefly discussed below.
While it is difficult to posit specific relationships between factors
such as these, it seems safe to conclude, in accord with most develop-
mental theory, that without having really received as a child, the in-
dividual's capacity for real giving later in life may be threatened
if not seriously impaired.
Finally, we want to consider the impact of the excessive burdens
carried by the parentified child on his/her psychological, interper-
sonal and even physical development. One obvious liability involves
the development of some kind of neurotic disturbance. We have already
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referred to the potential for excessive, irrational guilt on the part
of the parentified child and, in this context, specifically cited Eva
Stein's belief that she is responsible for her parents' marital prob-
lems. Searles (1975) feels that material from the analyses of many
patients supports a similar conclusion. He asserts,
In the course of [treatment], one encounters transference
data.
.
.which brings to light the patient's heretofore-
unconscious guilt at having failed in his therapeutic ef-
fort, begun very early in life, to enable his ego-frag-
mented mother to become a whole and fulfilled mother to
him (p. 98-99).
Elsewhere, describing the sense of shame expressed in another patient-
one of a pair of twins--he observes,
. .
.the shame had in it a perceptible quality that this
shame was not so much that he and his brother had proved
unworthy of the mother's caring for them but, much more
meaningfully, that the two brothers had failed shamefully
in their long-sustained effort to enable the mother to be-
come, and to know the fulfillment of being, truly a mother
(p. 107).
We have previously described the high degree of worry which may
accompany parent i f i cat i on and which reflects the child's accountabil-
ity for events which exceed his/her capacities. This chronic worrying
seems likely to constitute one source of the anxiety which character-
izes neurotic disturbances. In this context, it is tempting to con-
sider the possible consequences of such vigilance for chronic emer-
gencies on the child's psychosomatic functioning. The following
study, by no means intended as validational evidence, does suggest
the possibility of some connection between the precocious burdens of
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the parentified child and psychosomatic disorder.
In the journal
,
Psychosomatic Medicine
, Wal lerstein et ah ( 1 965)
describe a study of patients with thyroid "hot spots," a probable pre-
cursor to actual thyroid disorders. In a review of the literature on
hyperthyroidism, they note that previous researchers have "stressed
the persistent efforts of their patients to become precociously self-
sufficient and responsible.
.
." (p. 509). In their own study of
15 women, between the ages of 25 and kj
, with thyroid "hot spots,"
Wal lerstein e^ aj_. arrived at a typical psychological profile based
on interviews and psychological test data, independently rated by
psychologists and psychiatrists. Their descriptions are surprisingly
fami liar.
As a group these patients were inhibited and constricted.
Hostile urges were particularly difficult for them to con-
front seriously. ... As children they had been compli-
ant,
. .
.fearful, timid and submissive, and consequently
were considered "good children." ... In some of these
women, the denial appeared in altruistic devotion to
others, while in others it appeared as strained, almost
martyred cheerfulness in the face of adversity. . . . With
unpleasant affects and ideas so systematically screened
out, these women thought of themselves as "good persons"
and indeed, their altruistic dedication to the welfare of
others was noteworthy. They seemed willing to live a
martyr's life, as if they expected chronic suffering to
be their fate to be borne without complaint and without
awareness of wishes for relief and release.
. . . Promin-
ent guilt feelings, appearing as self-reproaches, punctu-
ated their conscious experience (p. 513).
In a similarly health-related, if not strictly psychosomatic,
vein, Nagy offers this dream of an anorectic young woman:
I dreamt that I was running back and forth between the two
open graves of my parents. They were lying in the open
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caskets, both half dead, half alive. As I was feeding one
of my parents, I was desperately afraid that the other
might die of starvation (1975, p. k) .
Again, these examples are cited not to prove a connection between par-
entification and psychosomatic disorder but to support the plausibil-
ity of such a hypothesis. As one final point in this discussion of
psychological and physical effects of parent i fi cat ion
, it is worth
noting the possibility of a relationship between the relentless per-
sistence in the face of hopeless futility, which may characterize the
efforts of the parentified child, with the development of severe de-
pressive symptoms.
Having considered the impact of paren t i f i ca t i on on psychological
and physical development, we can turn to its possible effects on the
child's other present and future interpersonal relationships. We have
already referred to the possible loss of trust experienced by the ex-
ploited parentified child and its impact on other relationships. This
loss of trust, together with the child's commitment to care for family
members, may make it extremely difficult to form any significant re-
lationships outside the family and in later life. However, even if
s/he succeeds to some degree in forming such relationships, they are
likely to be subject to a variety of stresses related to the individ-
ual's early parent i f ication . The bitterness, disappointment or lack
of self-respect which may be felt in later life can place excessive
stresses and demands on these relationships.
This highlights the fact that pa rent i f i cat i on both trains (pre-
cociously) and stunts the child. The result is often an individual
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who, in later life, knows how to be a parent but is unready to do so.
For example, the parentified individual's need for a dependent object
in order to maintain his/her own relational identity as care-taker may
make him/her, paradoxically, insensitive to the real needs of the
other. This may take the form of compulsive and intrusive caring,
with consequent i nfant i 1 i zation of the other, whether spouse or child.
Or, it may be seen in martyr-like giving and non- rece i v i ng which traps
the other in relational debt. In either case, this type of relation-
ship is likely to perpetuate the binding by which the parentified in-
dividual him/herself was victimized.
Such a scenario is suggested in the incident in which Eva Stein
protects her brother Michael from getting sick on too much cake. When
she is questioned by group members as to how she "knew" Michael would
get sick, she has to admit that she did not know and that she is her-
self "fanatical" about nausea--that is, she dreads it. The fact that
it is so difficult to differentiate here between sensitive concern
and projective "anxious mothering" only lends further weight to this
poss i b i 1 i ty
.
We can suggest one last possible effect of parent i f i cat ion on the
child's interpersonal relationships. To do so, we refer back to Nagy's
concept of the "revolving slate," which posits that serious imbalance
experienced by a person in one relational context may be transfered,
in an attempt to rebalancing, to a different relationship. We can
speak of both "horizontal" and "vertical" attempts at rebalancing.
"Horizontal" rebalancing refers to the individual's attempts to
regain what has been lost or to extract repayment from relationships
with peers--a spouse, friends, or persons in the broader social con-
text. In other words, the over- respons i b 1 e and self-denying parenti-
fied child may appear irresponsible and excessively demanding in ex-
trafamilial contexts. Case records suggest this as a possible explana-
tion for David Gardner's behavior. Davie is seen by the school as
.
.
.hyperactive and anti-social in his peer group,
continually disruptive in class and hostile towards teachers
and classmates.
Davie is symptomatic in both the neighborhood and in school.
His grandmother describes many incidents of arguing and
fighting with other children and she says tearfully that
"Davie has no friends."
. . . [Davie is] "compulsively very
good" and "cooperative" in the family and.
. .rejecting and
angry in relationships outside the family.
"Vertical" rebalancing describes attempts to rebalance relation-
al injustice across generations, such as when the once-parent i f ied
child, now a parent, tries to exact repayment for past wrongs by
scapegoating a child or to make up for early deprivation by parenti-
fying his/her own child in turn. Mrs. Lewis, herself seemingly par-
entified in her own childhood, may provide an example for both pro-
cesses, as she and her husband scapegoat Larry and parentify Steve.
When this occurs, the pa ren t i f i ca t i on process has come full circle;
it extends over another generation the exploitation of children and
the disruption of "the cogwheeling of life cycles."
PART III
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CHAPTER 8
The Theoretical Context-- Conceptual Boundaries
The four preceding chapters represent an attempt to illustrate,
by means of empirical and theoretical material, those patterns and
processes which constitute the parent i fi cat ion of children. The goal
of these chapters has been the differentiation of the "figure" or the
concept of parent i fi cat ion
.
Hopefully., by this point, some of its
attraction and practical utility for both individual and family ther-
apists will have been made clear. In this chapter, we return to the
purely theoretical level in an attempt to further differentiate the
conceptual "ground" in which parent i fi cat ion is embedded. This is ap-
proached by considering the relationships, and therefore the nature
of the boundaries, between the concept of the parentified child and
several similar but by no means interchangeable formulations. In
this way we hope to be able to differentiate those instances in which
concepts represent fundamentally different, alternative conceptuali-
zations of the same phenomena, those in which different phenomena
within one theoretical approach—here
, dialectical relational theory-
are involved, and those which involve essential differences in both
the phenomena of interest and the theoretical approach to these phe-
nomena. In the process, we hope to contribute to the clarification
of some of the ambiguities posed by the concept of pa rent i f i cat i on
.
Parenta 1 or Parent i f ied Chi Id ?
Minuchin's "parental child" represents perhaps the clearest ex-
ample of a concept which views essentially the same phenomena as does
that of the parentified child but from a fundamentally different theo-
retical perspective. The heart of this difference lies in the dis-
tinction between a funcUonaj- transact iona] and an ej]^-eii i1_tent^
approach to family systems.
Minuchin is primarily concerned with questions of transactional
structure, function, power and skills, as the following excerpts il-
lustrate.
Family structure is the invisible set of functional demands
that organizes the ways in which family members interact.
Transactional patterns regulate family members' behavior.
They are maintained by.
. .universal rules governing
family organization [such as].
. .a power hierarchy,
[and] a complementarity of functions, [as well as] idiosyn-
cratic.
.
.mutual expectations of particular family members,
The family system differentiates and carries out its func-
tions through subsystems.
. . . Each individual belongs
to different subsystems, in which he has different levels
of power and where he learns differentiated skills.
For proper family functioning, the boundaries of subsystems
must be clear (197*», p. 51-5*0.
Minuchin is primarily concerned with the vicissitudes of power and the
overall functioning of the family and its members; rec
i
proc i ty--"ac-
comodation," in Minuchin's terms--is implicit but hardly of primary
i nterest
.
Nagy looks instead to the invisible web of existential commit-
ments and loyalties, to the "legacies" which originate in multigenera-
tional structures of expectation, and to the balance of justice and
reciprocity between members as the most important determinants of
: i ve
i on
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family systems. Here, power and function are implicit-power, as a
force to be balanced with loyalty and concern in the system, and func-
tional performance, as a derivative of the level of inter-member re-
ciprocity and trust.
In viewing the parentified child, the dimensions along which
these approaches differ include what are seen to be 1) the essential
pathognomic features of parent i f i cat i on
,
2) the child's motivation,
and 3) the child's callings. Minuchin sees the system with a parental
child as essentially characterized by the mi s
-a 1 1 ocat i on of execut
(parental) functions to a child. Problems develop if the "delegati
of authority is not explicit." Nagy remarks on the abdication of par-
ental responsibility but places far greater emphasis on the funda-
mental imbalance of justice between parent and child, deriving from
the discrepancy in accountability between them, as the essential fea-
ture of parentifi cation.
In their views of the child's motivation in the system, these
approaches again emphasize somewhat different elements. Minuchin
stresses the exercise of superior power by the parent-- i . e
.
, in the
ability to confuse the child with devious communicat ions--as the source
of the child's trap. Nagy, by contrast, points to the child's inherent
loyalty and concern for the parent as crucial determinants of parenti-
fi cat ion.
Finally, these theorists differ somewhat in their views of the
child's callings. Minuchin emphasizes reality-oriented burdens of
the child, such as physical care-taking, household chores, etc. Nagy
stresses both reality- as well as more emotionally- and psychologically-
16*4
un-
oriented responsibilities, such as trying to console a parent for
mourned losses, re-assuring parents, Sustaining or holding together
hopeless or fragmented families.
In summary, looking at the same family, we would notice and stress
significantly different processes depending on which theoretical ori-
entation we took. From the "structural" perspective, we would empha-
size the delegation of the executive function to a child, the perform-
ance of relatively reality-oriented functions and, somewhat paradoxic-
ally, the child's compliance stemming from his/her relative lack of
power in relation to the parent. A dialectical relational orienta-
tion, on the other hand, would direct us to the fundamental imbalance
of justice between parent and child deriving from the discrepancy in
accountability and reciprocity between them, to the performance of
complex psychological and emotional as well as reality-oriented respon-
sibilities by the child, and to the interplay of loyalty, concern,
power and self-interest which support the child's collusion in his/her
exploitation. For these reasons, concepts of the parental and paren-
tified child represent fundamentally different theoretical approaches
to essentially similar phenomena.
Parent i f ied Ch i 1 d and 1 ' Loyal Object' '
Even within the limits of dialectical relational theory, however,
the concept of the parentified child stands in somewhat ambiguous re-
lation to its theoretical context. We feel that the major area of am-
biguity concerns the breadth of the concept- -that is, the range of
phenomena which can usefully be encompassed by the term. Nagy and
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others frequently use parent i fi cat ion to describe those cases in which
children assume dutiful, over- respons i b 1 e roles. This is the strict
sense in which it has been used in this paper. However, at other
times, the concept appears to expand to include even i nf ant i 1 i zed
,
scapegoated and rebellious roles, as suggested by the following state-
ments (Nagy, 1973).
While every successful attempt to bind a child to the
family through guilt-laden loyalty delays the child's
maturation and leads to i nfant i 1 i zat ion , on a more sig-
nificant level it also parentifies the child. A parent's
symbiotic clinging to his child originates from the par-
ent's lack of maturation and se 1 f -del i neat i on vis-a-vis
h i s own parent (p. 1 62)
.
Although our concept of parent i f i cat i on is expressed in
essentially possessive (oral, dependent) terms, we are
aware of other, e.g., aggressive or sexual, implications
of parenti f ication. The parent can relate to his child
as if he were a generational equal instead of being of a
different generation. Long pent-up, unsettled resent-
ments can be vented onto the child in displaced retalia-
tion (p. 152).
Parent i fi cation is sometimes used even more broadly to refer to any
situation in which a child's loyalty and devotion to the parent or
family is expressed.
We feel that the source of this ambiguity lies in the relative
immaturity of the theoretical perspective from which parent i fi cation
derives. The family systems orientation itself, an essential founda-
tion for dialectical relational theory and by now a basic, almost
"traditional" set of assumptions for all family theory, dates back
only two decades. More recent still are the recognition of loyalty
and concern in relational systems and the emphasis on an interlocking
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of experiential and transactional processes which characterize dia-
lectical relational theory. Our contention is that because of the
relative immaturity of this approach in general and more specifically
of an analysis of the importance of loyalty and concern in relational
systems, the concept of parent i fi cat ion has been used to cover a va-
riety of phenomena which can and will, hopefully, be differentiated
and interrelated over time. Ironically, the concept of parentifica-
tion has, in effect, been as over-burdened as the child it often de-
scr ibes
.
One step towards a clarification of this conceptual space in-
volves the differentiation of three levels or configurations involving
loyalty and concern. At the broadest possible level, we can speak of
loyalty and concern as universals, that is, as ubiquitous forces in
human relationships. More narrowly, we can focus on the loyalty and
concern of the individual exploited in relational imbalance. One of
the most important contributions of the dialectical relational per-
spective has been its clarification of the role played by these forces
in the individual's collusion with his/her exploiters. The forms of
such exploitation are numerous and varied. We can subsume these vari-
ous roles under the concept of the "loyal object." This term is in-
tended to convey both the non- rec
i
proca 1 use of the individual as an
object by the other(s') and the loyalty which binds him/her to the
exploi ter (s ) .
In an excerpt from Invisible Loya 1 1 i es , Geraldine Spark conveys
some of the variety of these object roles.
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•
•
-children need a life space of their own, to play andto learn, to be permitted to be a child. In pathogenicfamily systems, by contrast, children are used as objects
upon whom many conscious and unconscious feelings and at-
titudes are projected by their parents. Thus, children
are perceived as sources of life-giving strength; as ob-jects of loyalty and disloyalty. They may be caught in
a power struggle between the parents or even between the
parents and their family of origin. Children may be per-
ceived as stimulators of conflicts, to be blamed. They
may be experienced as sources of dependence who are rejec-
tors as the parents may have felt rejected (p. 253).
Significantly, Spark concludes this catalogue of object roles by empha-
sizing the importance of the child's loyalty.
Yet, children remain eternally loyal. They may appear ex-
ploited by their parents, but on some level chi 1 dren--out
of loya 1 ty— unconsc ious ly comply with the parent's need
to exploi t them (p. 253) .
Stierlin describes a number of object roles, organized around
various missions of the child which meet specific id-, ego- and super-
ego-related needs of the parent. The child may have to provide the
parent with id-gratification s/he may only allow him/herself to ex-
perience vicariously. In so doing, the child also serves ego- and
s uperego-needs
.
For example, a delegate who must provide his parent with
id nutriment (e.g., must engage in orgies, smoke pot on
his parent's behalf) may also have to alleviate his par-
ent's anxiety, guilt and conflict about needing such nutri
ment. His task becomes now more difficult as he, in addi-
tion to becoming profligate, embodying and enacting his
parent's forbidden impulses, must also offer himself as a
living screen for his parent's punitive projections. His
major mission becomes, then, to maintain the parent's de-
fensive organization, i.e., to "protect" and support his
parent's fragile ego by sparing the latter heightened con-
flict and ambivalence (197^, p. 5 7" 58 )
.
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He notes that the child may serve the parent's needs for "ego support
and protection" by serving as a faithful ally in marital or other
family battles, and further describes two variants of the objectifi-
cation of the child for the parent's superego needs.
If support of the parent's self-observation and self-con-firmat,on becomes the adolescent's main mission, he willbe delegated to provide a living contrast: to be bad
He is to be mischief maker, troubled, crazy, etc in or-der for the parent to be reassured that he himself is notbad, crazy, etc. after all...
.
Finally, a delegate's main mission can be the alleviation
of the parent's often excessively strict conscience. In
this case, the adolescent will be covertly encouraged to
commit and seek punishment for those delinquent acts about
which the parent harbors (chiefly unconscious) quilt (197A
p. 57) . '
But Stierlin, like Nagy and Spark, pays particular attention to
the role of loyalty and concern on the part of the "object."
.
.
.these "crisis adolescents" seemed to invite punish-
ment not so much because they betrayed their primary loy-
alty to their parents, but because they.
. .made it their
mission to externalize, and invite punishment for, their
parents' disowned "bad" impulses. One can therefore say
that these runaway delegates remained loyal as targets for
punishment by proxy (197*4, p. 65-66).
.
.
.in my years of work with adolescents and their fami-
lies, I have come to revise my notions of adolescent "re-
bellion." ... At the outset of joint family meetings,
I have been told again and again that this or that adoles-
cent was the most "rebellious" family member.
. . . But
the more I saw of these young "rebels" and their parents,
the more I doubted their rebelliousness. On the contrary,
rather than seeing them as most self-determined and most
defiant, I came to see them as most compliant. I realized
that in their very rebelliousness they complied with their
parents' deeper expectations and wishes. . . (1976, p.
15).
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Nagy makes a similar observation.
•
."symbiotically" bound schizophrenic young adults areoften violently hostile to their mothers. The mothers
•n turn, take such hostility easily and with liu e con-cern over los.ng their child's loyalty. These Parentsknow better: the child's violence" documents hi np -
-ng involvement and interminable devotion (p. 161)
Finally, from a very different clinical context-that of long-term
individual psychoanalysis-Harold Searles reaches an essentially simi-
lar conclusion.
.
•
-in most instances, it is only after some years of ana-lysis that one detects a shift in the feeling tone with
which the patient speaks of his family's psychopathology
.
The feeling tone, which in the earlier years of the analy-
sts had portrayed etiological family events or situations
as burdens which were Imposed upon him, gradual ly shiftsm quality, as his more deeply repressed emotions of grief
and loving devotion come to the fore, and conveys that he
had also incorporated these burdens within himself in an
active and lovingly devoted--what I am calling therapeutic
-spirit (1975, p. 127-128).
So the loyal object may serve as faithful ally, rebel or traitor.
S/he may provide a source of vicarious excitement or a negative foil
to serve as contrast for the self-regard of the other. S/he may be
infanti 1 ized, scapegoated, or, finally, parentified. Nagy's position
has been that, because the child's compliance in such roles seems both
to be necessary for the parent's stability and continued reliance on
the captively available child and to be at least partially motivated
by concern and loyalty to the parent, these role configurations can
be justifiably subsumed under the rubric of pa rent i fi cat ion . We con-
sider this position counter-productive to the wider comprehension and
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utilization of the concept of parent i f i cat ion and the perspective it
reflects. The assertion that a vengeful scapegoated or pampered in-
fantilis child is demonstrating concern and loyalty to the parent,
while not unacceptable, requires a significantly higher level of in-
ference than a similar assertion for the clearly parentified child.
From this perspective, the highly visible hostility of the rebel or
scapegoat and the demanding helplessness of the infantilized child,
on a surface level, are seen as masking the parent's essential depend-
ence on the child's performance of the object-role and the child's
compliance out of loyalty and concern, at a deeper relational level.
In this view, whether the child combats, clings to or cares for the
parent represent negligible variations in an essential willingness to
act out whatever object-role is necessary for the parent's psychological
s tab i 1 i ty .
We feel that these dynamics are better conveyed by the concept of
the loyal object and that the term "parentified child" should be re-
served for those object roles in which the child exercises overtly
protective, care-taking and ove r- res pons i b 1 e duties. Little or no in-
ference is involved in these cases since the child's overt activities
consistently document the qualities of loyalty and concern. In this
more strict usage, the term "parentified child" is well chosen since
it conveys several major aspects of such roles. It suggests the fail-
ure of maturation in the parent, the real or pseudo-maturity and over-
responsibility of the child, and the disruption of the child's natural
development. Finally, unlike terms such as the "symbiotic therapist,"
it describes a primary relationship in the language of primary, and
not secondary, relationships. It is felt that the extension of the
term "parentification" beyond these limits dMutes its relevance and
invites ambiguity and confusion. In summary, boundaries between con-
cepts of the loyal object and the parent! fied child-the latter seen
as one particular form of the former-suggest an instance in which
different phenomena have been insufficiently differentiated within one
theoretical approach, that of dialectical relational theory.
Parent? fied Chi Id and " Symbiotic Therapist"
There is one last conceptual boundary to be addressed. It con-
cerns the relationship between the concept of parentified child and
that of the "symbiotic therapist," a formulation deriving from indi-
vidual psychoanalytic theory and practice, and referred to frequently
in this paper. We consider this question especially important in its
implications for the possibility of integrating individual and rela-
tional dynamics. Convergences between these approaches have been
noted recently in closely related areas—most notably, in the pro-
cesses of fusion and individuation (Nagy, 1965; Slipp, 1973; Karpel
,
1976). One of the most intriguing aspects of parentification, at the
theoretical level, is the striking similarity between concepts de-
veloped out of family therapy and relational theory, on the one hand,
and individual psychoanalytic theory and therapy, on the other.
Reconsider the major similarities between the concepts of the
symbiotic therapist and the parentified child. Searles emphasizes
the parent's "ego- i ncomp 1 eteness" and "unconscious transferences" to
the child as being his/her parent. He describes the child's natural
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concern for the parent in terms of the former's inherent "therapeutic
strivings," and his/her failure to individuate and become a "whole
person" out of loyalty to the family, which requires instead that s/he
remain "available for complementing the ego- i ncompleteness of the
others in the family, individually and collectively." But departures
from the profile of the parentified child become apparent as well.
Although he refers to the whole family's role in the creation and
the burdens of the symbiotic therapist, Searles places primary empha-
sis on the child's relationship with the mother in particular. This
emphasis is related to his focus on what he refers to as the symbio-
tic or "pre- indi vi duation" stage of development for the child. Also
related to this focus on the first 12-18 months of life, Searles sug-
gests that this formulation has particular relevance for the person
who develops psychotic or other more severe forms of symptomatology.
.
.
.the hypothesis is of particular significance for psy-
chotic patients, for psychosis involves the patient's not
having achieved, in infancy and childhood, the firm esta-
blishment of an individual human self. . . (1975, p. 98).
[As opposed to material expressed in neurotic patients],
in the following examples from patients who were suffering
from some degree of schizoid or schizophrenic illness, the
patient's therapeutic striving is referable more to a pre-
indi vi duat ion than pos t- i nd i v i duat i on developmental era.
The patient's therapeutic striving is to function as mother
to his biological mother (the latter's ego development in
regard to her own mothering effort, being fixated at, or
having regressed to, an infantile level) so as to enable
her to become sufficiently integrated and mature that she
will become able to function truly as a mother to the
patient (1975, p. 10*0.
Finally, the portrait of the symbiotic therapist departs from
that of the parentified child in Searles' emphasis on the role of in-
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trojection by the child at a very early age, not of the parent's image
of a good parent but of the parent's own dissociated
"craziness."
Discussing one long-term psychotic patient, he remarks,
I had reason to know that she, as a child, had not onlybeen invaded by the psychotic introject of the grief-crazed
mother [after loss of an infant], but had striven thereby
to rescue the mother by taking into herself the mother's
p
U
US-US)
r3gedy pSychotic reacti °n to tragedy (1975,
Of another patient, he says,
I regarded the image of the child, struggling within him
as being comprised not only of elements of his own child-
hood self, but also of elements of the child in mother,
struggling against sickness, elements which he had taken,
partly with a therapeutic motive, into his self-imaqe
(1975, p. 11*0.
y
He concludes,
.
.
.the pathogenic introjects which have comprised the
core of his schizophrenia have represented not only his
unconscious means of coping with an otherwise intolerable
outer reality, but also his unconscious primitive way of
trying to heal that "outer rea 1 i ty"— that is, those most
deeply ill components of mother and subsequent mother-
transference figures--by taking those components into him-
self and trying thus to free her (and her successors) from
the burden of them (1973, p. 251).
We must ask, then, to what extent are these differences signific-
ant and, if significant, to what can we attribute them--the optic of
observation or the object of examination? The answer seems to be that
there are significant differences between these two concepts and that
these differences are attributable to both optic and object.
To some extent, there are inevitable differences in conceptual i-
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•re-
zation which derive primarily from the different clinical and theoi
tical contexts from which they emerge. Searles practices intensive
individual psychoanalysis. This two-person context, both dictated
and supported by a theoretical emphasis on transference, would seem
likely to make the analyst more attuned to the impact of a single fig-
ure—the mother--on the child, than that of other family members and
of the family as a whole. This contrasts with Nagy, whose primary
clinical context involves direct observation and treatment of whole
families. While Searles 1 work has been almost exclusively, until
quite recently, with psychotic patients, Nagy's clientele has, neces-
sarily, been more heterogeneous. Searles' long-term work with these
patients, often already severely regressed and obligated to regress
even further in treatment, has led him to the phenomenon of early sym-
biosis as a life-long organizing principle of his theory. Nagy, while
originally interested in the concept of symbiosis, found his own work
with families leading him instead to a consideration of the relational
balance of justice as a major dimension of theory. These differences
in theoretical and clinical contexts can account for some of the dis-
parity between these two conceptualizations. They suggest two differ-
ent optics viewing identical phenomena. But beyond these differences
in observation, there appear to be very real differences in the phe-
nomena observed as well.
The pressures and burdens imposed on the child, in terms of the
parent's needs deriving from past deprivation and his/her subsequent
transference to the child as a parental figure, would appear to be
essentially similar in both instances. However, the timing of the
imposition of these pressures, and in consequence the tools_ at the
child's disposal and the effects, on the child's development, appear
to be significantly different. Differences between Searles' and Nagy'
formulations suggest that the parent's attempts to create a parent
in the child may begin significantly earlier in the case of the sym-
biotic therapist-specifically, during the period of psychological
symbiosis which follows birth, continues in healthy development until
the second year of life, and diminishes gradually from that point on-
wards. If this is in fact the case, considerably more primitive as-
pects of the child's make-up will be involved than we might expect if
these pressures were to begin at a later stage.
Illustrations of parent i f i ca t ion presented in this study suggest
that excessive demands for over-responsible behavior do not begin be-
fore the child has achieved some degree of autonomy and, for lack of
a better term, ego- f unct ion i ng . In Erikson's terms, the parentified
child seems to have built up a sufficient sense of trust and autonomy
to be "successful" in his/her assigned and assumed tasks. These re-
serves of trust and autonomy may be jeopardized in later development,
specifically by the prolonged binding and exploitation of parentifi-
cation. But this constitutes a very different situation from that in
which parental neediness, dependence and disorganization interfere
with the maternal care necessary for even rudimentary psychological
development. In order to be able to function with any effectiveness
in his/her callings, the parentified child must be allowed, even en-
couraged, to develop the sensitivity and skills required in order to
do so.
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In this sense, the relationship between symbiotic therapist and
parentified child is analogous to that between Stierlin's "bound" and
"delegated" child. The delegate is allowed to leave the home during
adolescence but is sent out with a "mission" (or missions) to fulfill
for the parent(s). The bound child is not even permitted to leave the
family but remains tied to the orbit of the home. Stierlin points out
that the delegate's (in our analogy, the parentified child's)
.. -loyalty implies that he should become autonomous and
skilled enough to carry out his special mission (or mis-
s i ons ) . . .
All these missions imply that the child is allowed and
pushed to develop limited individuation, autonomy and
skills (or ego functions, if you wish). Those required
to carry out his missions ( 1 974
, p. 53, 56-57).
It should be emphasized that we are suggesting an analogous
,
not a
synonymous, relationship. It is not that the symbiotic therapist is
bound while the parentified child delegated; in practice, both are
most likely to be extremely bound, in Stierlin's terms. The analogy
addresses the levels of ego functioning and interpersonal skills they
are able to consolidate and make use of in their callings.
While this analogy is useful, it should not be read as suggesting
a sort of conscious deliberate control on the part of the parents in
shaping these processes. It seems improbable that the parent would
be capable, in terms of both knowledge and self-control, of monitoring
when and how inappropriate needs are placed on the child. This dif-
ference in timing can more likely be accounted for either by idiosyn-
cratic crises in the family's development (age of child in relation
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to sudden loss of spouse or parent's parent, for example) or by sever-
ity of psychopathology in the parent(s). The parents of the parenti-
fied child may take undue advantage of their five- or six-year-old
child who offers to help family members, but they seem able to recog-
nize the helpless infant for what s/he is and to provide what Winni-
cott refers to as "good enough mothering" ( 1 965) until the child is
ready to contribute to the family in a meaningful way. The parent of
the child who becomes a symbiotic therapist appears to be unable ei-
ther to make such a distinction or to insulate and protect the child
from his/her own pathology. The result is that in some modified (and
probably less organized form) the transferences, projections and
pressures often placed on the young parentified child are, in the
case of the symbiotic therapist, placed on the even younger infant.
What are the implications of this difference in timing for the
"tools" at the child's disposal in his/her effort to calm, comfort or
heal the parent? In the case of the infant, we can expect these tools
to be extremely primitive, and for the effort itself to be both more
disorganized and more seriously disorganizing to the child's develop-
ment than in the case of the more highly integrated parentified child.
The relatively greater emphasis placed by Searles on the child's in-
trojection of the parent's "sickness," as opposed to more mature ef-
forts to encourage, comfort or function for the parent, corresponds to
this distinction between resources available to the infant and older
chi Id.
As the parents of the symbiotic therapist are likely to be much
more severely disturbed and, because of the pressures created by their
i on
on
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pathology, seem to impinge on the child much earlier than in the case
of the parentified child, so the disruption of the child's maturat
is likely to be more radical. The interference with ego integrati
and with the development of a capacity for relationship is likely to
be more devastating with these children. This is consistent with
Searles' formulation that these pressures are more likely to result
in schizoid and psychotic symptomatology.
In summary, (and recognizing that this represents only a tenta-
tive hypothesis concerning recently developed and, as yet relatively
unexplored, concepts), it appears that there are significant similar-
ities between the concepts of the symbiotic therapist, developing out
of individual psychoanalytic theory and treatment, and of the paren-
tified child, stemming from dialectical relational theory and family
therapy. Both emphasize the child's inherent concern and loyalty to
the parent, the parent's immaturity and transference to the child as
a parental figure, the child's self-sacrifice in an effort to stabi-
lize or heal the parent (or the family as a whole) and the subsequent
effect of this effort in postponing the child's individuation and
autonomy. Differences between these two conceptualizations, however,
are important. And while attributable in part to the dissimilar
clinical and theoretical contexts from which they emerge, they are
also thought to reflect real differences in the phenomena observed.
One interpretation suggests that while the pressures or burdens ex-
erted on the child are similar, the timing of such burdens, in terms
of the child's stage of development, may diffei— specifically, occur-
ring much earlier in the case of the symbiotic therapist. And that
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this crucial difference in timing is associated with differences in
the resources available to the child and the effects of these burdens
on his/her psychological and relational development. These two con-
cepts represent, then, an instance in which both the phenomena under
observation and the theoretical contexts of that observation differ.
But these formulations are not so much incompatible as complementary.
The contrast between the two helps clarify what the parentified child
is and is not, as do the other conceptual contrasts presented in this
chapter in different ways. Hopefully, this brief analysis of bound-
aries between concepts will clarify, to some extent, the theoretical
space in which paren t i f i ca t i on is embedded.
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CHAPTER 9
Recapi tulat ion and [mgj ications for Further Study
This paper has attempted to define and illustrate the concept of
parentif ication, to suggest its utility and to consider both its boun-
daries and the parameters of the theoretical context in which it is
embedded. This final chapter recapitulates the major points of the
argument presented, inpartmerelt to re-emphasize some points which may
have been obscured. In addition, we will briefly consider some im-
plications of this analysis for further study in this area.
Because our focus has frequently shifted between the two, it is
important to differentiate the process and relational structure of
pa rent i f i cat i on from the object-role of the parent i f ied child. At the
broadest possible level, parent i f i cat ion refers to the process in which
one person in a relational system comes to act as an over-responsible
parental figure for another or several others. Theoretically, the
parentified individual may be either a spouse or a child, but it is
the parentified child who concerns us specifically in this study.
Pa ren t i f i cat i on appears to be an inevitable feature of all parent-
child relationships and may contribute to the healthy development of
the child. The parent's temporary reliance on the child for support
and responsible action may prevent the parent from becoming over-bur-
dened and allow the child to make a meaningful contribution to the
family and to identify with responsible roles for his/her future life.
However, when this reversal of roles becomes not temporary but
fixed, when responsibility and accountability flow not back and forth
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but in one direction, pa rent i f i cat i on in the pathogenic sense can be
said to exist. The family system is characterized by a fixed imbal-
ance of reciprocity; the unilateral use of the parentified child with-
out repayment or reparation constitutes the pathogenic exploitation
of the child. In these cases, pa ren t i f i ca t i on represents a chain of
social processes, not the acts or initiative of any one person. It
persists as a covert organizing structure, shaping more overt family
interactions. In another sense, parent i fi ca t ion disrupts the normal
"cogwheel ing" of life stages seen in family systems; the parent is
unable to function as a parent and the child prevented from ever
really being a child. In this context of exploitation or relational
imbalance, the parent if ied chi Id represents only one of a number of
"loyal object" roles, which include the scapegoat and infantilized
child among others. The object-role of the parentified child involves
over-responsible concern and activity which serves to maintain the
emotional stability of family members and/or the relational stability
of the family as a whole.
Parent i f i cat i on appears to begin with a failure of parenting,
expressed in the parents' inability either to exert guidance and con-
trol over the family or to respond sensitively to their children's
needs. This failure of parenting is compounded by marital conflict
or dissatisfaction which leaves spouses' needs unmet and often pulls
for the child as an alternative source of gratification or as a go-
between in the marital warfare. The child's contribution to parenti-
fication begins with a capacity for meaningful contribution to the
family, which includes a capacity for loyalty and concern towards other
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family members and a readiness for responsibility.
The development and maintenance of parent i fi cat ion involves a
complex interlocking of intrapsychic and interpersonal processes which
include the parents' unconscious transference to the child as a quasi-
parental figure and the induction of such a figure in the child by
means of attribution, ego- and superego-binding. The child's compli-
ance or active participation in this process is thought to be influ-
enced by a number of factors, including the parents' power as virtual-
ly the sole reference points for the child's developing se 1 f
-concept
,
the child's loyalty and concern for the parent, and his/her self-
interest, in terms of a need for the parent on any terms possible.
In addition, parent i f i cat ion may be initially helpful to the child in
his/her struggles to develop a sense of identity, belonging and use-
fulness. Because parent i f icat ion is seen as an overall configuration
involving experiential and interpersonal processes on the parts of
several family members, consideration is given to the dialectic of
actions and expectations which constitutes one important aspect of
its development and maintenance.
Although the literal meaning of the term "parent i f i cat i on" refers
to the use of the child as the parent's parent, a broader spectrum
of "callings" can be included within its boundaries. At a functional
level the parentified child, often worrisome and pseudo-mature, may
act as a physical or emotional care-taker for any or all family mem-
bers. The child may instead be called into service as a go-between,
whose vocation is to mediate, alleviate or heal a major relational
breach in the family, often but not exclusively in the marital dyad.
Finally, the child may feel and be held responsible for the survival
and integrity, the "repair" or "resuscitation" of the family as a
whole. Whatever the various roles and callings at the functional
level, at the ethical level, the parentified child is always exploited
Called upon to be sensitive to the other's experience, to be available
for his/her needs, to protect, defend or help the other, toshare (or
relinquish) control over the mutual terms of the relationship, the
parentified child is "short-changed" in return, for little of this
accountability and consideration flows back to the child.
The most common effect of pa rent i f i cat i on on the child is its in-
terference with his/her individuation and autonomy. The parentified
child is bound to the family not only by loyalty but a sense of com-
plete responsibility for his/her helpless charge(s). Often isolated
from peers by this excessive investment in the family and by the
pseudo-mature traits which may accompany paren t i f i ca t i on , the child
is deprived of resources potentially available in relationships and
activities which accompany a childhood friendship or the larger peer
network. The parentified child's identity remains relationally reac-
tive, built as it were around the external hub of others' needs.
Similarly, his/her identity remains constricted in that often only
competent, selfless, compliant, "good" qualities are acknowledged or
permitted in the parentified child by other family members.
Parent i fi cat ion can deprive the child of any real childhood and
the results of such deprivation may not be felt until later in life.
Finally, the excessive burdens assigned to and assumed by the par-
entified child may take their toll in either psychological, physical
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or relational development. Psychologically, the parentified child is
vulnerable to excessive guilt, anxiety and depression. S/he may be
more likely to develop certain kinds of psychosomatic or health-re-
lated disorders. And the loss of trust which may accompany prolonged
exploitation and the deprivation and related developmental deficits
which attend parent i fi cat ion may create significant obstacles for the
child in current extra-familial or later adult relationships. From
the perspective of the "revolving slate," the now-adult parentified
child may find him/herself compensating for his/her own parentifica-
tion and early deprivation by parentifying his/her own child in turn.
In this case, the disruption of the cogwheel ing of life stages is ex-
tended over yet another generation.
This examination of paren t i f i cat i on obviously leaves a number of
important questions unexplored. We have not been able to address the
selection of the parentified child. Who is primarily responsible for
this selection--a specific parent, both parents or the family as a
whole? Can this selection be related to specific factors, such as
relative age of siblings, sex, or physical resemblance to a parent
or parenta 1 -f
i
gure for the parent? While these represent significant
questions at a somewhat descriptive level, there remains another set
of relatively unexplored areas which would seem to be of more central
importance for the further clarification of these phenomena.
One question, directly related to the recent appreciation of the
role of the child's loyalty and concern for the parent, concerns the
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relative effects of exploitation versus frustration of the child's
efforts to contribute to family members or to the family as a whole.
It was indicated at the outset that, while apparently opposite types
of processes at one level, both imply forms of relational imbalance
since both involve the disruption of reciprocity. While Nagy stresses
the exploitation of the child's concern in his description of parenti-
fication, he is, in other contexts, emphatic in asserting the negative
effects of the parent's preventing repayment by the child and thereby
binding him/her with un-d i scha rgeab 1 e gratitude and obligation.
Searles' formulation of the symbiotic therapist stresses the simul-
taneous intensification and frustration of the child's "therapeutic
st r i vi ngs
.
1 '
Nagy's theoretical perspective comes closest to developing con-
ceptual distinctions between, as it were, giving and taking too much
in relational systems. He envisions an invisible bookkeeping of ob-
ligations incurred and discharged, of meritorious actions committed,
recognized or ignored. Members of relational systems may be momenta-
rily or chronically in either a position of merit or debit in terms
of relational obligations. He sees this invisible balance of justice
as the most significant structural force in relational systems and
stresses that it has an existential reality which includes but tran-
scends the internal experience of its members. In other words, both
the child who cannot "repay" and the child whose "payment" is never
returned occupy existential positions which carry with them psycho-
logical and relational consequences. It is the specification of these
consequences which may provide a fruitful focus for further study.
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More broadly, this relates to the larger question of the implica-
tions of parenti f ication for what have traditionally been seen as forms
of individual pathology. And while that question has been addressed
in this paper, it can hardly be said to have been answered. Can a
more convincing link be demonstrated between paren t i f i cat i on and psy-
chosomatic or other heal th- re 1 ated disorders? Can such individualis-
tic formulations as "obsessive-compulsive neurosis," "neurotic anxiety,"
"reactive depression," and "adjustment reaction of adolescence" be
translated into the relational context of parent i f i cat i on or are these
concepts irreconcilable, orthogonal as it were to one another? Can
conclusions be reached as to why the stresses of pa rent i f i cat i on are
expressed in one case in more psychological areas while in others in
primarily somatic or relational spheres? These questions are espe-
cially important in their potential for demonstrating more specific
connections between the dynamics of relational systems and their im-
pact on individual development.
Another area which calls for further elaboration involves the
transmission of family relational configurations across generations.
In his own system, Stierlin (197'0 suggests i dent i ty as the general
cross-generational rule--that is, that binding parents tend to have
been bound as children, delegating parents to have been delegates for
their own parents, etc. Laing has suggested greater heterogeneity
of patterns across generations. Similarly, Nagy sees a less clearly
isomorphic relationship than does Stierlin, implying much greater
variety in the relationship between parent's position in his/her own
family and the position of his/her child. At the same time, Nagy in-
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sists on homogeneity in the perpetuation of relational imbalance across
generations unless addressed and repaired at some point in the evolu-
tion of the family. The dissimilarity of ch i 1 dren ' s rc 1 es in the same
family would seem to support the more heterogeneous view. It may be
that no more specific intergenerational links can be demonstrated.
However, the striking repetition of highly idiosyncratic patterns
across several generations of a family's history, observed by those
who have begun to collect such data, suggests this may also be a fruit-
ful area for further work.
Lastly, a rather broad but crucial area to which this study of
pa rent i fi cat ion directs us involves a closer look at the relational
structure of reciprocity and balance and to what Stierlin has referred
to as a "liberating dialectic." If nothing else, a greater apprecia-
tion of the pre-conditions, development, characteristic patterns and
effects of bal anced relational systems would provide a contrast that
might highlight aspects of imbalanced systems which remain obscured
otherwise. But more importantly, such an appreciation would contri-
bute to an understanding of relational and individual health.
The criticism has often been levelled against traditional individ-
ualistic conceptions of personality that they are essentially path-
ology-oriented and see health implicitly only as the absence of path-
ology. A dialectical relational perspective avoids this pitfall by
emphasizing the structure of mutual accountability, trust and commit-
ment which characterizes balanced relational systems and is thought to
be conducive to healthy individual development. We have stressed,
along with Nagy, for example, that the individual personality compon-
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ent of "basic trust," emphasized by Erikson as the cornerstone of
healthy development, depends on a relational structure of mutual re-
liability and responsibility. This is considered only one element in
a more pervasive relationship between systems balance and individual
health. In addition, such an examination might lead to a further
clarification of specific relational structures and processes which
correspond to healthy versus pathogenic forms of pa rent i f i cat i on
.
The concept of a liberating dialectic seems especially powerful
as a conceptual tool for the examination of relational balance and
individual health. Beyond reciprocity, it suggests reciprocity-main-
tained-in-the-context-of-basic-relational-change. The complexity of
the concept (and an exposure to its failure in action) allows us to
momentarily glimpse and appreciate the remarkable accomplishment of its
success, as when a child matures, separates from the family and rebal-
ances original loyalties with new commitments, without having to
sacrifice either set of relationships or him/herself in the process.
The dialectical approach enables us to consider the "conflict and
reconciliation" (Stierlin, 1968) of the complementary loyalties, roles
and obligations of parent and child as they are transformed, but kept
in balance, through the evolution of the family. It facilitates an
appreciation of the contradictory pulls and pushes exerted by the
child's growing autonomy (commitment to self) and loyalty (commitment
to others), without imposing a false negation of one or the other of
these antithetical yet co-constitutive forces. The potential utility
of this approach demands an effort to examine the structural dynamics
of balanced relational systems and healthy individual development
and of the dialectical processes by which they are related.
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